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What is modernity? What is modern philosophy? What is modern society? 
And what, if anything, does philosophy have to do with the possibility of 
a free society? 
The purpose of this book is to show that Montaigne transforms phi-
losophy itself, bringing it down from the heavens and into the streets, 
markets, and taverns of ordinary men and ordinary life. Thus, he “invents” 
or discovers society as a distinctly modern form of association and radi-
cally changes the nature of political power. The essay is philosophy made 
sociable. 
My approach to the Essays, then, is philosophical rather than literary. 
True, the essays do not look anything like traditional philosophy, and 
Montaigne himself calls them “bizarre.” Nevertheless, he does describe 
himself as a philosopher, “a new figure: an unpremeditated and acciden-
tal philosopher.” My discussion of the language, style, and order of the 
essays is intended to show the ways in which these features of the essay 
form reveal Montaigne’s radically new philosophical project. The essay is 
not simply a literary innovation: it is the expression of an unprecedented 
philosophical intention. 
In Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (2003), I argued that 
Montaigne should be regarded as an original philosopher, not simply as 
the inventor of the essay. I was also especially concerned to show that 
Montaigne is not a skeptic as most of his scholarly readers take him to 
be. The emphasis in that book, then, is on drawing a contrast between 
Montaigne and the “deliberate” philosophers of antiquity. In this book, 
I return to many of the same themes that emerged in Accidental Philoso-
pher in order to explore them in greater depth. However, my emphasis 
here is on Montaigne’s relationship to modern philosophy, and I believe 
that this relationship brings out his originality in a more radical way. 
Thus, I approach Montaigne as a philosopher within the context of 
modernity rather than Renaissance humanism, although there is much 
in common between these contexts. Two major works on humanism and 
the Renaissance are especially compatible with my view of the Essays. 
Montaigne holds a central place in Tzvetan Todorov’s account of the 
humanist tradition, a tradition that he traces into the eighteenth century. 
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In his Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism, Todorov argues that 
humanism offers the antidote to our deepest and most pressing moral 
and political problems: the dissolution of society, the disappearance of 
morality and the self, and the conflict between liberty and community. 
The humanists do not fall into the extreme either of the autonomy of 
the individual or the disappearance of individuality. The “humanist core” 
that he sees in the tradition of liberal democracy can combat the drift of 
democracy toward collapse into illiberal and inhuman forms of auton-
omy and isolation. 
Montaigne also figures prominently in William J. Bouwsma’s The 
Waning of the Renaissance, 1550–1640. The Renaissance saw three lib-
erations: the liberation of the self in the affirmation of the uniqueness of 
every human being, the liberation of the cosmos from the constraints of 
the classical-medieval hierarchy of being, and the liberation of politics in 
the emergence of the concept of sovereignty. Montaigne’s moral attitude, 
according to Bouwsma, displays “the re-ordered self” in the absence of 
natural hierarchy. 
These conclusions are, in some ways, similar to my own. However, 
by approaching Montaigne as a modern philosopher, rather than as a 
Renaissance thinker, I believe it is possible to bring to light certain epis-
temological and political aspects of his thought that might otherwise 
remain unnoticed. Although I do not focus primarily on Montaigne’s 
relationships to other modern philosophers, I do discuss them at certain 
points in order to elucidate Montaigne’s thought. 
In addition to the influence of Machiavelli, we find in the Essays inti-
mations of such widely diverse philosophers as Descartes, Pascal, Bacon, 
Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau. Montaigne appears as the incomparably 
rich source from which both rationalists and empiricists, liberals and con-
servatives, draw. Yet Montaigne himself is neither a rationalist nor an 
empiricist, neither a liberal nor a conservative. His “unpremeditated and 
accidental” philosophy transcends these distinctions. Indeed, both mod-
ern epistemology and modern political philosophy take on a somewhat 
different color when seen through the lens of Montaigne’s philosophical 
project. 
Montaigne’s re-formation of philosophy is his radical break with the 
classical-medieval Aristotelian tradition. This rejection of Aristotelian 
philosophy is a fundamental principle of early modern philosophy. Mon-
taigne undermines the foundations of Aristotle’s metaphysics, politics, 
and ethics, so that the traditional hierarchy of being collapses. In his 
rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics, Montaigne combats especially the 
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conceit that the philosopher is most fully human and therefore divine 
through his participation in the divine activity of contemplation. Modern 
philosophy understands itself as a human, not a divine, activity and there-
fore abandons contemplation as the philosophical act. 
Montaigne sees the philosophical pretense to divinity as dangerous 
because it makes the philosopher inhuman, destroys his natural sympa-
thy, and separates him from other men. The Aristotelian view identifies 
the philosopher with the act of contemplation: the man is essentially the 
philosopher. Only the philosopher attains the perfection of the human 
form. Montaigne, however, sets himself forth as a radical and devastat-
ing rebuttal to this understanding. He makes himself “a new figure: an 
unpremeditated and accidental philosopher.” The essay is the form of this 
new mode of philosophy which separates the man from the philosopher: 
the man is not essentially but rather only accidentally a philosopher. The 
separation of the man from the philosopher is actually, then, the human-
ization of the philosopher through the recovery of a common humanity. 
The human good is found, not in the escape to the heavens of philosophi-
cal contemplation, but in the experience of everyday life in society with 
other men. Montaigne turns philosophy on its head.
So also, Montaigne separates the man from the prince. The prince’s 
identification of himself with his mastery over others makes the prince 
inhuman. Montaigne overcomes the Aristotelian notion of natural mas-
tery by separating the master from his power, bringing him down from his 
lofty throne to “essay” himself with other men. The separation of the man 
from the prince is actually, then, the humanization of the prince through 
his recovery of his common humanity. It is the basis for the principles of 
representative government and the freedom of society which are central 
to modern political philosophy. Montaigne effects both the separation of 
the man from the philosopher and the separation of the man from the 
prince through his discovery of the social. 
The first part of this book (chapters 1 through 4) focuses on the reforma-
tion or refounding of philosophy through the separation of the man from 
the philosopher and the humanization of the philosopher through the 
subjection of reason to the experience of everyday life. The second part 
(chapters 5 through 7) focuses on the refounding or reordering of human 
life through the separation of the man from the prince and the humaniza-
tion of the prince through the invention of society.
Why must philosophy be reformed? What is it about the philosophy 
of Aristotle—the philosophy of the schools—that distorts our being and 
that must be overcome if human beings are to be free? In chapter 1, I set 
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out the first step in Montaigne’s refounding of philosophy, his reversal of 
the fundamental principles of Aristotle’s metaphysics and political philos-
ophy. Form, end, and potentiality and actuality are all brought together 
in Aristotle’s understanding of perfection: final cause is the perfection of 
form, the actualization of the potentialities that belong to the individual 
by virtue of his species. Human perfection must be understood in terms 
of the hierarchy of being in which the human is located below the divine 
and above the bestial. Man is perfected by striving for and attaining the 
divine. For Aristotle, there are two distinct kinds of perfection: intellec-
tual excellence (or contemplation) and moral excellence, which requires 
the political realm for its complete actualization.
For Montaigne, however, perfection is the enjoyment of “our own” 
condition: he considers man as he is in himself, “without striving.” Mon-
taigne replaces contemplation (the divine activity) with judgment (the 
human activity that is all “one’s own”). He also replaces the primacy of 
the political with his own “end,” the domestic and private. Montaigne 
changes the meaning of “form” by particularizing form, especially in his 
notion of the “master-form” which is a form “all one’s own.” Final cause, 
or “end,” becomes power and the production of effects. Aristotelian 
potentiality and actuality are replaced by possibility.
Aristotelian philosophy and medieval theology understand human 
desire as, ultimately, a desire for the divine and eternal. Montaigne’s 
philosophical stance toward the temporal world is not one of escape to 
the eternal. But neither is it one of immersion in the temporal realm of 
practice. Montaigne is actually reordering the temporal realm. He rejects 
and reverses Aristotle, because Aristotle’s foundations are weak: they rest 
on the presumption and pride of the philosopher in his own divinity. 
That is, the Aristotelian philosopher cannot separate the man from the 
philosopher.
Despite his rejection of Aristotle, are there intimations within the tradi-
tion inherited by Montaigne that might suggest the possibility of a free 
society? In chapter 2, I discuss Montaigne’s relation to sacred tradition. 
The question of Montaigne’s sincerity in matters of religion and religious 
belief is one that deeply divides his readers. The apparent absence of piety, 
the lack of concern with the “next world,” and his attitude toward death, 
for example, lead some to hold that his frequent avowals of his Catholi-
cism are merely a cover for atheism. Others consider him a skeptic-fideist 
who combines philosophical skepticism with unexamined faith. Most 
readers agree that his adherence to Catholicism is due to his conviction 
that, within the context of the civil wars of his day, the old religion is 
a source of political stability. I put aside the question of his personal 
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sincerity and attempt instead to make sense of both the apparent absence 
of piety in the Essays and his claims of submission to the Church. Mon-
taigne objects to the role of Aristotle’s philosophy in medieval theology 
and in the schools: he separates out what he regards as essential to the 
tradition and thereby frees it from its dependence on ancient philosophy.
Montaigne attacks the Reformation not only for the threat that it 
poses to the social bond but also, and more fundamentally, for its under-
standing of the human being and of man’s relationship to God. He sees 
the reformers as attempting to institute a purely spiritual and intellec-
tual religion, disdaining the role of the senses and images in worship. 
Montaigne’s understanding of the human world can be described as a 
sacramental and incarnational metaphysics. He finds the miraculous in 
the lowliest details of ordinary life. Here again, he reverses Aristotle, who 
locates the divine in the highest and most rare. 
What precisely is the philosophical act that frees the philosopher from 
the traditional hierarchy and makes possible the existence of society? In 
chapter 3, I first examine the nature of the new philosophical act in which 
the philosopher is separated from the man. For Montaigne, the philo-
sophical act begins in the world of thought, not in the world of things. 
Hence, it begins in the condition of error because the mind is not (as 
Aristotle held) receptive of what is, but rather generates and produces 
out of itself. 
The mind’s capacity for “representation,” as Montaigne holds, mani-
fests the “unruliness of thought.” The mind represents to itself both 
what is and what is not, the true as well as the false. Invention enables 
Montaigne to discover the possible: his task is to tell “what can happen” 
rather than what has happened. Montaigne’s descriptions of reason have 
led many of his readers to conclude that he is a skeptic: reason is weak, 
self-interested, and biased. However, Montaigne discusses another kind 
of reason as well: “reason inflexible and impassive.” This reason is with-
out self-interest and can, therefore, settle the conflict between mastery 
and slavery. 
The philosophical act is ultimately the act of judgment in which rea-
son, representation, and invention are brought together under the will. 
Montaigne says that the essays are the tests of his judgment. Judgment 
here replaces Aristotle’s contemplation. Montaigne’s judgment does not 
contemplate “the thing itself”; it subjects the thing itself, making it his 
own. Freedom of judgment is the mark of the “self-ordered soul” which 
is “strong in itself.” Montaigne does not judge by the standard of what 
ought to be (Aristotle’s final cause): he judges what is, as it is, in its imper-
fection. His judgment of other men is unique, for he does not judge them 
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by the standard of himself. Thus, he removes himself, his self-interest and 
self-esteem, from the act of judgment. That is the separation of the man 
from the philosopher.
Chapter 4 completes my presentation of the philosophical act and of 
Montaigne’s reformation of philosophy. His unpremeditated and acci-
dental philosophy is the separation of the man from the philosopher. The 
man is not essentially a philosopher: he does not participate in the divine 
but is simply a man like all other men. Traditional philosophy, in contrast, 
dehumanizes the philosopher because it destroys his sympathy with other 
men.
How, then, does Montaigne “humanize” the philosopher? The essay is 
the perfect form for unpremeditated and accidental philosophy because 
it makes philosophy sociable. I examine five features of the essay form 
in order to show how the essay is sociable. First, Montaigne’s practice 
of quotation brings ancient philosophy into ordinary conversation. Sec-
ond, he writes the essays in French rather than Latin, the language of the 
schools. He uses only the language of the streets, markets, and taverns of 
France. Third, he sometimes goes beyond the limits of propriety in speak-
ing about the body and the sexual, thus overcoming the shame of the 
private. Fourth, the use of testimony and stories enlarges his experience 
and allows him to test or essay himself against other men. Fifth, in spite 
of the apparent disorder of the essays, Montaigne follows the everyday 
order of shepherds and shopboys who, unlike the learned, never fail to 
understand each other. 
The essays look unphilosophical because there are no syllogisms, argu-
ments, or conclusions. That is because judgment is not a conclusion but 
an act. Montaigne’s judgment reorders the mind to the lowest rather than 
the highest. The act of judgment reverses the traditional order by submit-
ting philosophy to the everyday, to the social, and thus to experience. 
That is why the last essay is “Of Experience.” 
In chapters 5, 6, and 7, I take up the political, social, and moral aspects 
of Montaigne’s reordering of human association. Just as the man must be 
separated from the philosopher in order to recover his humanity through 
submission to the social, so the man must be separated from the prince in 
order to recover his humanity through submission to the social. 
Why must the man be separated from the prince? Why is it that the 
rule of one man over another cannot be based on natural inequality? 
In chapter 5, I discuss the separation of the man from the prince as the 
overcoming of natural mastery, the inequality that, for Aristotle, justifies 
the rule of one man over another. The first essay, “By Diverse Means We 
Arrive at the Same End,” serves as my example of Montaigne’s practice 
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of essaying and as the structure for presenting an account of his political 
project. In particular, I explore the unspoken presence of both Homer 
and Aristotle in the stories about Alexander the Great. In the two stories 
Montaigne recalls here, Alexander believes himself to be divine and dis-
plays extreme cruelty. In contrast, Epaminondas, a figure largely invented 
by Montaigne, exemplifies the separation of the man from the prince. 
Montaigne’s words about himself, also in this first essay, spoken from the 
position of the philosopher-prince, point to the fundamental principles of 
his new political philosophy: forgiveness and promise-keeping. These two 
principles demand a new foundation for human society.
Montaigne therefore rejects Aristotle’s foundation of “the common 
good,” for he sees it as really the pretext for the actions of vicious men. 
Since the good cannot be pursued in common, he asserts: “let each 
one seek it in his particularity.” If the standard of the common good is 
abandoned, then the new standard for the exercise of power must be 
the limitation of evil, violence, and force. Montaigne acknowledges that 
the prince must sometimes submit to the demands of necessity and that 
vicious means may be required to preserve the state. The limit on the 
power of the prince, however, is the freedom and independence of society 
from the political. 
How do the Essays actually bring about the invention of society? What 
is the fundamental reform of mores that must occur, and how do the 
Essays effect that reform? In chapter 6, I discuss Montaigne’s “domestic 
and private” end. Society is the domestic and private brought out into the 
public realm. That is the action of the Essays: Montaigne reveals himself 
in public without the justification of great deeds, specifically by exposing 
those aspects of private life that are normally hidden or shameful.
By revealing himself in public, he overcomes the shame of the private. 
He transforms the meaning of honor by associating courage with truth-
fulness rather than simply with valor in combat. Open speaking about 
oneself is, he says, the “cure” for pride. Montaigne criticizes the French 
legal system for the burdens it imposes on the people in all their domestic 
affairs; he also suggests that these burdens should be lifted and the trades 
and negotiations of the people be made “free, gratuitous, and lucrative.” 
Such a reform would free the private sphere from the control of the politi-
cal. But Montaigne also offers the possibility of a much deeper reform 
through the project of the Essays, that is, the reform of the nobility at the 
deepest level of mores. 
In fact, Montaigne reorders the traditional virtues and vices in accor-
dance with the requirements of social life. Cruelty becomes “the extreme 
of all vice.” Lying and ambition are also among the worst vices, while 
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those vices associated primarily with the body are ranked as lesser vices. 
Truth becomes “the first and fundamental part of virtue,” and Montaigne 
offers himself as the primary example of its practice.
Montaigne’s self-revelation is the generous gesture that lies at the ori-
gin of a free society. Not only does this gesture invite the nobility to 
imitate him, but it also serves as the act of trust and confidence that 
invites a reciprocal trust and confidence of the people. Montaigne insists 
that he is nothing more than a common man. He gives a voice to the 
people and shows that they are not naturally slaves. 
What are the conditions for the preservation of a free society? Is the 
notion of the radical autonomy of the individual sufficient to constitute 
the social bond? Or is character of a certain kind necessary to make pos-
sible both community and individual freedom? In chapter 7, I discuss 
the character of the free individual as it is displayed in the Essays: the 
“self-ordered soul,” who is neither master nor slave. The free, self-ordered 
individual is necessary for the existence of a free society. 
In “Of the Education of Children” Montaigne says that he has only 
one new lesson for the young man who is to be brought up as a free 
man: his new lesson is “the ease of virtue.” Virtue in the traditional sense 
involves the mastery of reason over the passions, which means struggle 
within the soul at least until this mastery has become a habit. Montaigne, 
however, experiences no such struggle. Rather, he enjoys the harmony of 
soul and body. His two descriptions of his production of virtue within 
himself—“unlearning evil” and “training the disposition”—show that 
naturalness can actually be acquired. That is to say, one’s natural disposi-
tion or nature can be changed. The new foundation of virtue is the ease 
of goodness rather than the strength of self-mastery. 
Montaigne’s new character can be set out in terms of the virtues of 
generosity and integrity. Generosity is the virtue which prompts him to 
reveal himself in public. It can be seen especially in the way he judges 
other men, and thus it is the virtue associated with the philosophical life 
itself. Generosity is Montaigne’s replacement for Aristotelian magnanim-
ity. Integrity means “knowing how to belong to oneself.” Thus, it suggests 
both the independence of the individual from political association and the 
limits on what can be demanded of him. This virtue is manifested in Mon-
taigne’s description of his own association with princes: he wants nothing 
from them, serves them freely, and owes them nothing. He does not seek 
his own good in public affairs for he already possesses it in himself. 
In Montaigne’s character we can discern the ways in which the social 
is the limit on the power of the prince. First, Montaigne is one of the very 
few modern philosophers who treat friendship as an important topic of 
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moral and political philosophy. The stories of friendship in the Essays 
are often about opposition to tyranny, a point made very forcefully in his 
friend La Boétie’s On Voluntary Servitude. Second, Montaigne’s views on 
education focus on the freedom and independence of the young noble-
man from his prince. Liberal education, especially the study of history, 
forms the judgment and puts before its students examples of noble char-
acter. Third, the frankness and openness of Montaigne’s speech show how 
important freedom of speech is to a free society. Montaigne not only tol-
erates but also even welcomes opinions that are different from his own. 
Indeed, he claims that he is “perfect in forbearance” of disagreement. 
Thus, unpremeditated and accidental philosophy is the philosopher’s 
mode of participation in and preservation of a free society. Fourth, the 
universal Church stands as both Montaigne’s model for society and as 
an independent authority which limits the power of the state over the 
individual. 
In the conclusion, I bring out more explicitly the way in which Mon-
taigne’s transformation of philosophy and his invention of society are 
the same act. Philosophy becomes invisible—unpremeditated and acci-
dental—as the common man emerges into the light of the good. Modern 
philosophy originates in this single, hidden act.
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Note on the Texts
References to the French text of the Essais are to the edition by Pierre 
Villey and V.-L. Saulnier, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, “Quadrige,” 1992). The English translation is that of Donald 
Frame, The Complete Essays of Montaigne (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1943). The citation (VS16, F9), for example, refers to p. 
16 of the Villey-Saulnier edition and to p. 9 of the Frame translation. In 
some instances, I have emended Frame’s translation. I have also consulted 
the translation by M. A. Screech, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne 
(London: Penguin, 1991). 
No English translation of mœurs of which I am aware captures pre-
cisely the scope of meaning that Montaigne wants to convey. Frame 
sometimes translates it as “behavior” (F409) and Screech as “ways of 
life” (S614). I have settled on “mores” in order to try to capture both the 
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In his discussion of Montaigne’s ancient sources, Hugo Friedrich says 
that “traces of readings in Aristotle are weak in the Essais . . . It cannot 
be established to what extent he actually read Aristotle; certainly it was 
not a thorough study.”1 It is true that the number of explicit references 
to and discussions of Aristotle in the Essays would give that impression. 
A quick survey of the index for Frame’s translation reveals many more 
references to Cicero, Plato, and Seneca than to Aristotle. When Mon-
taigne decides to tell his ways of being in public, he calls upon the help of 
ancient philosophy and discovers, to his surprise, that his ways of being 
conform to many different philosophical discourses and examples. So it 
is to be expected that philosophers and philosophical schools of all kinds 
should appear in the pages of the Essays: he uses them as fragmented and 
approximate expressions of what he is, but no single philosophical teach-
ing can capture what he is.
However, Montaigne is “a new figure” of the philosopher, a profoundly 
original philosopher with a philosophical project that is entirely new and 
all his own. Therefore, it is necessary to look past the quotations in order 
to identify that original project. What is new and original in Montaigne 
can be discovered primarily through his relationship to Aristotle. He uses 
the Aristotelian vocabulary of form and final cause, perfection and imper-
fection, but he transforms the meaning of these terms. This transformation 
pervades the Essays even when Aristotle himself is not mentioned.
The philosophy of Aristotle, as appropriated by Scholastic theologians 
such as Thomas Aquinas, was the teaching that dominated the universi-
ties.2 “The god of scholastic knowledge is Aristotle; it is a religious matter 
to discuss any of his ordinances, as with those of Lycurgus at Sparta. His 
doctrine serves us as magisterial law. . . . Nothing in it is discussed in order 
to be placed in doubt, . . . his authority is the end beyond which it is not 
permitted to inquire” (VS539, F403). Therefore, accepted philosophical 
beliefs are never questioned but are discussed only to be supported and 
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confirmed. Montaigne criticizes the philosophy of the schools because it 
accepts Aristotle’s teaching as truth “with all its structure and apparatus 
of arguments and proofs, as a firm and solid body, no longer shakable, 
no longer to be judged.” However, Montaigne regards this foundation 
as weak. “The reason why we doubt hardly anything is that we never 
test our common impressions. We do not probe the foundation [le pied], 
where the fault and weakness lies; we dispute only about the branches. 
We do not ask whether this is true, but whether it has been understood 
this way or that.” This presumption is both the constraint on the liberty 
of our judgments and the tyranny over our beliefs. “It is very easy, upon 
accepted foundations, to build what you please; . . . By this path we find 
our reason well founded, and we argue with great ease.” Aristotle’s first 
principles have become our presuppositions, and “whoever is believed 
in his presuppositions, he is our master and our God; he will plant his 
foundations so broad and easy that by them he will be able to raise us, if 
he wants, up to the clouds” (VS539–40, F403–4).
The centrality of Aristotle for Montaigne’s philosophical project is 
indicated by the fact that the very first presentation of his intention, in 
“To the Reader,” is framed in terms of Aristotle’s four causes: formal, 
final, material, and efficient (e.g., Meta. 1.3, 983a25–32; De An. 2.4, 
415b). The end Montaigne has proposed for himself is domestic and pri-
vate, not public service or his own glory. “My powers are not capable of 
such a design.” He will present himself in his simple, natural, ordinary 
manner, without striving, for he wants to be seen in his natural form, 
which includes all his defects. He himself, he says, is the matter of his 
book. Efficient cause is implicit in the immediate inference that he is also 
the maker of his book and is explicit in his reference to his power. It is 
important to note that, in each case, Montaigne weakens the meaning of 
the cause. His end is merely domestic and private, not the lofty goal of 
public service and glory. His form is not perfect but deficient and defec-
tive. Because he himself is the matter of his book, the reader is warned: “It 
is not reasonable to spend your leisure on so frivolous and vain a subject” 
(VS3, F2).
Montaigne questions the classical foundations of metaphysics and 
epistemology in the “Apology” within the context of his discussion of 
whether it is possible to know even what is most near to us, our own 
selves. We do not know how a “spiritual impression” can penetrate a 
body and we do not understand the nature of the connection between 
“these wonderful springs of action,” soul and body (VS539, F402). Mon-
taigne here criticizes Aristotle’s account of causality. In his Physics (1.7, 
190b16–191a22), Aristotle says that matter, form, and privation are the 
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principles of natural things. Montaigne ridicules the idea that privation 
can be a principle: “And what could be more inane than to make empti-
ness itself the cause of the production of things? Privation is a negative; 
by what notion can he have made it the cause and origin of the things that 
are?” (VS540, F403). Aristotle claims that what makes the body move is 
“entelechy” or actualization. Montaigne calls this a “frigid invention,” 
for it refers to “neither the essence, nor the origin, nor the nature of the 
soul, but merely notes its effect” (VS543, F406).
Both privation and entelechy refer to Aristotle’s teaching concern-
ing final cause. Final cause is the completion or perfection of a being in 
accordance with its nature or form. Final cause moves the being toward 
its perfection. In that sense, it is really first, for it initiates movement. 
Privation implies a lack of something that must be there if the being is 
to become a complete and perfect member of its species. Therefore, pri-
vation entails “striving” for the perfection of form, for the good. Final 
cause, then, is the good.
Form is “what” a thing is. All of the members of a species have the 
same form. Thus form is universal. Form is actuality: it is the realization 
of the being in the activities that are proper to it (e.g., Meta. 9.8, 1050b2). 
So, for example, the form of the eye is sight. Final cause is the comple-
tion of form: the final cause of the eye is also sight. Both the “what” and 
the “why” of the eye are sight. Aristotle says that “if the eye were an 
animal, the soul would be sight” (De An. 2.1, 412b18–20). As sight is 
the actualization of the eye, so the soul is the actualization of the body. 
The actualization or realization of form is the movement from potential-
ity to actuality. The perfection, the completion of the form of any being, 
is simply to be a perfect member of its species, capable of the activities 
proper to that species. This understanding of being and becoming entails 
a grounding in the eternal and the divine as first unmoved mover, as nec-
essary being, and as pure actuality.
Montaigne breaks with Aristotle on every major aspect of his meta-
physics: form, final cause, potentiality and actuality, perfection, the good, 
and the eternal and divine. And he reverses Aristotle’s understanding 
of philosophy itself: he reverses the philosophical act. Montaigne uses 
the vocabulary of form and end, perfection and imperfection, because 
these are the terms available to him: he has no new words in which to 
express his originality. But he transforms the meaning of these terms in 
a way that allows him to display just what is new in his thought and to 
introduce notions of diversity, power, and freedom that amount to an 
understanding of philosophy, of nature, and of politics radically different 
from Aristotle’s.3 
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The Particularization of Form
Montaigne changes the meaning of form entirely by particularizing form. 
He often refers to the great diversity and variety of forms, especially in 
reference to men and to human action: “the perpetual variety of forms 
of our nature” (VS973–74, F744).4 Nature, he says, has become variable 
and particular to each man (VS1049, F803). There is, then, not simply 
one single human form. The clearest instance of the particularization of 
form occurs in his introduction of the idea of the “master-form” in “Of 
Repentance.” “There is no one who, if he listens to himself, does not 
discover in himself a form all his own, a master form” (VS811, F615, 
emphasis added). The description “all one’s own” emphasizes the pos-
session of the form by the particular, in contrast to the notion of the 
particular “participating” in the universal form of human nature. 
At the beginning of his essay on Cato the Younger, Montaigne explains 
the way in which he regards other men in terms of the particularity of 
form: “Because I feel myself tied down to one form, I do not oblige every-
body to espouse it, as all others do. I believe in and conceive a thousand 
contrary ways of life; and in contrast with the common run of men, I 
more easily admit difference than resemblance between us. . . . I consider 
[each man] simply in himself, without relation to others; I mold him to 
his own model” (VS229, F169). He does not judge other men by the stan-
dard of a common, universal human form or nature. Rather, he sees each 
man as he is in himself, in his own form. 
The way in which Montaigne changes the meaning of “form” calls 
into question the relationship between the individual and the species 
and introduces a new notion of particularity. For Montaigne, particular-
ity cannot be grounded simply in the body. He particularizes form itself 
and claims that there is greater variety among minds than among bod-
ies: “Variety is the most general fashion that nature has followed, and 
more in minds than bodies, inasmuch as minds are of a substance suppler 
and susceptible of more forms” (VS786, F598). Whereas for Aristotle, the 
particular is not the object of knowledge because knowledge is the appre-
hension of the universal form, the Essays are a philosophical attempt to 
reveal the intelligibility of a particular human being. 
This is why there is little talk of essences and universals in the Essays. I 
believe that there is only one place where Montaigne refers to his “essence.” 
In “Of Practice” he tells us: “What I chiefly portray is my thoughts, a sub-
ject unformed, which is not able to manifest itself in action. I am barely able 
to couch them in this airy body of words. . . . These are not my deeds that I 
write, this is me, this is my essence” (VS379, F274). They are his thoughts, 
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his own thoughts. And they are “unformed.” He seems to be suggesting a 
contrast between the universal essence of man as “reason” (man defined as 
“the rational animal”) and the particularization of essence (each man as his 
own thoughts). This amounts to the particularization of the mind in con-
trast to the Aristotelian view of mind as the same in all men: it is the same 
because it is simply a receptivity to the world. It seems, then, that whereas 
for Aristotle the mind is public, for Montaigne it is private: one’s own.
Final Cause and Infinite Desire
Francis Slade argues that “the repudiation of end in the sense of telos” is 
“foundational for all modern philosophy.”5 In the tradition, final cause 
or “end” is completion, the completion of form. “End” does not refer to 
a temporal finish, the last moment in a temporal sequence, but rather to 
a condition in which nothing is lacking for the perfection of the being in 
question. For Aristotle, the end of human life, the human good, is hap-
piness, which he describes as both final and self-sufficient. All men by 
nature desire happiness, and all of their actions, whether they deliberately 
intend it or not, are directed to that end. 
In “Of the Inconsistency of Our Actions” Montaigne presents the 
traditional philosophical notions of consistency and perfection as the 
direction of all of one’s actions to a single end. Whoever has not directed 
his entire life to a certain end (fin) cannot order his particular actions. It 
is necessary to have the “form” of one’s whole life, and a certain “design” 
of one’s life, in one’s head. Our projects go astray because they have no 
determinate direction and end (but) (VS337, F243). It is, in fact, a very 
rare achievement to direct all of one’s actions to a single end. Very few 
men, perhaps a dozen among the ancients, have actually attained such 
perfection. We see, then, that Aristotle’s account of human action does 
not capture the lives of most men for it judges by the standard of “what 
ought to be,” not by what is in its imperfection. 
To locate human happiness in a self-sufficient perfection not only mis-
judges what is, but also fails to account for the nature of human desire. 
Montaigne says that the sages distinguish between desires that come from 
nature and desires that come from the unruliness of our imagination: those 
of which one can envision the end (bout) are nature’s, whereas those whose 
end (fin) we cannot reach are our own, that is, produced by the imagina-
tion (VS1009, F771). He calls this a “subtle” distinction, suggesting that it 
is merely verbal. In fact, there is no end to our desires, or at least to those 
that involve the soul and not only the body. In “On Some Verses of Virgil” 
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Montaigne advises those men who are astonished at the “unnatural and 
incredible” sexual appetite of women to look at themselves where they will 
find the same insatiability. “It would be, perhaps, more strange to see there 
some stop [arrest]; this is not a passion simply corporeal; if one finds no 
end [bout] in avarice and ambition, there is none either in lust. It lives still 
after satiety, and it is possible to prescribe neither constant satisfaction nor 
end [fin]: it goes always beyond what it possesses” (VS885, F675). Desire 
without end means that there is no permanent satisfaction and no comple-
tion or fulfillment of desire; rather, desire extends through the whole of life 
and ceases only in death. All satisfaction is temporary and temporal. Mon-
taigne says that death is the end (bout) but not the end (but) of life; “this 
is its end [fin], its extremity, not its object” (VS1051–52, F805). Death is 
the finish, the stop, of life. Montaigne here conflates the meanings of bout, 
but, and fin. When he says that death is the end of life, he uses the term fin 
for “extremity,” meaning the last point in time. The sense of the extreme as 
the last temporal moment shows the infinite character of desire, because 
that last moment is not a completion or perfection or actualization.
For Aristotle, the desire of the philosopher, implicit in the beginning of 
philosophy in wonder, is satisfied in contemplation. But for Montaigne, 
the desires of the mind are without end. In “Of Experience” he writes: 
“There is no end [fin] to our investigations; our end [fin] is in the other 
world.” The pursuits of the mind are “without end [terme], and without 
form,” and the movement of the mind is “irregular, perpetual, without 
a model, and without end [but]” (VS1068, F817–18). Our end is in the 
other world and therefore there is no end, in the sense of perfection and 
completion, in this world. 
Montaigne contrasts those Christian ascetics and contemplatives 
who desire permanent union with the eternal and divine in this life with 
“that brattish rabble of men that we are,” distracted by our desires and 
thoughts. These ascetics are “venerable souls, exalted by ardent piety and 
religion to constant and conscientious meditation on divine things,” who 
anticipate, “by dint of keen and vehement hope, the enjoyment of eter-
nal food, final end [but final] and last stop [dernier arrest] of Christian 
desires, sole constant and incorruptible pleasure” (VS1114, F856). Even 
the final end of Christian desires is the “last stop.” 
Power: Producing Effects
Montaigne replaces Aristotelian ends with effects, transforming the 
meaning of human action from the actualization of potentiality to the 
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production of effect. In book 1 of the Metaphysics Aristotle explains that 
final cause is “the counterpart” to efficient cause, for final cause is “the 
purpose of a thing and its good—for this is the goal of all generation 
and movement” (1.3, 983a25–32). Efficient cause cannot be understood 
apart from final cause, because movement is initiated by the end. The 
end is the beginning; final cause is the naturally given end, the good. The 
rejection of final cause means that efficient cause is now cut off from its 
connection with final cause and thus from its role in the attainment of 
the good. Efficient cause, then, becomes “power.” In Montaigne’s meta-
physics, beginnings are not ends. Aristotle’s “entelechy” or actuality is no 
longer the essence, origin, or nature of the soul but only its “effect.” 
Montaigne replaces end with effect in the very first essay, “By Diverse 
Means We Arrive at the Same End [Fin].” The most common way to soften 
the heart of the avenging conqueror is through submission, but there are 
times when defiance has the “same effect [effect].” It might plausibly be 
argued that strong souls are moved by esteem, whereas weak, common 
souls are moved by compassion; in some cases, however, astonishment 
brings about a “like effect [effect]” (VS7–8, F3–4). By diverse means we 
produce the same effect.
Montaigne uses the Aristotelian vocabulary of ends and perfection to 
speak about his own project, but his meaning is very different. In the first 
sentences of “To the Reader,” he says that his end is domestic and pri-
vate: it is the end he has “proposed” to himself. In “Of the Power of the 
Imagination” he says that his end is to tell what can happen, not what has 
happened (VS105, F75). The end proposed for the Essays will be arrived 
at exactly and fully: in order to “perfect” his work, he must only be faith-
ful to what he is (VS805, F611). Even though his work would have been 
“better” had he done it elsewhere, it is “perfect” because it is his own 
(VS875, F667). In each of these cases, he is talking about his own project, 
the end “proposed” by himself to himself. He transforms the meaning of 
“end” from the perfection and completion of nature to the projection of 
the will, that is, to the production of effects.
Montaigne notices that men ordinarily jump to inquire into the causes 
of things without first inquiring into the truth of things. These thinkers 
ask why something is the case instead of whether it is the case at all. “Fol-
lowing this custom, we know the foundations and causes of a thousand 
things that never were” (VS1027, F785). In particular, we look for “pow-
erful and weighty causes and ends,” while the true causes escape us by 
their littleness. Many famous impressions, accepted as true, spring from 
“empty beginnings and frivolous causes.” The beginnings of all things, 
he says, are always “weak” (VS1020, F780). They must be weak because 
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they are not ends; the end is not inherent in the beginning. In the search 
for such true causes, “a very prudent, attentive, and subtle inquirer is 
needed, impartial and unprejudiced” (VS1029, F787). Montaigne is con-
cerned not simply with finding the “true” causes but also with imagining 
or inventing possible causes. Origins are not ends but merely spontane-
ous beginnings with no intelligent direction. Therefore, the connection 
between beginnings and effects is not inevitable: a given action might 
have been caused by any number of motives or springs. Alexander’s rage 
at the captain Betis, for example, might have been caused by disdain, 
by envious spite, or by the natural impetuosity of his anger. In another 
example, the softening of the heart of the avenging conqueror might be 
accomplished through submission, but sometimes is brought about by 
defiance. With respect to Montaigne’s own disposition, he notes that his 
innocence and goodness could be due to his father, his nurse, his earliest 
upbringing, or to “some other cause.” His strong propensity to compas-
sion might be due to the circumstances of his baptism, or to pride, or to 
nature. In all of these cases, and many others, Montaigne seems interested 
only in setting out possible causes. His invention of possible causes and 
his apparent indifference to identifying the one true cause show that the 
origins are not determinative and that one cause can replace another.
This indeterminacy of the origins is the condition for power as the 
production of effects. Montaigne’s meaning can be seen more clearly 
in Hobbes’s definition of philosophy. In chapter 11 of the Leviathan, 
Hobbes claims that there is no such thing as the “greatest good” of the 
ancient philosophers: “I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a 
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceases only in 
death.”6 Hobbes defines philosophy in the Leviathan, chapter 46: “By 
philosophy is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning from the 
manner of the generation of anything to the properties; or from the prop-
erties to some possible way of generation of the same; to the end to be 
able to produce, as far as matter and human force permit, such effects as 
human life requireth.”7 Desire is satisfied temporarily when we produce 
and thereby possess the effects that we want.
This understanding of philosophy is the basis for modern science and 
modern politics: it explains why modern philosophy is a refounding. 
Causes and origins can be replaced. The goal is not to understand the 
causes but to produce the desired effect, not to understand the “why” but 
to produce the “that.” To understand philosophy as simply the search for 
the true causes of things concedes authority to nature, that is, to natural 
ends as causal. The search for possible causes, however, liberates the mind 
from nature and gives the determination of ends to man himself. The 
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invention of possible causes is the act that frees man from the power of 
natural causes. For modern philosophy, “thought defines itself as access 
to indefinite possibilities, thus to what it may be able to cause to be . . . 
Understanding itself as freedom from the actual, i.e., as not determined 
by ends, thought comes into view as power, the power to create forms, 
forms which have no actuality except as thoughts.”8
Potentiality and Actuality: Possibility
For Aristotle, fulfillment, completion, and perfection are brought about 
through the actualization of potentialities. Human action is actualization. 
Potentialities are given by nature and determined by species, and actual-
ization occurs through the agency of final cause. Form, then, is actuality 
(Meta. 9.8, 1050b2). Therefore, nothing genuinely new can ever emerge 
in the world. The limits of what can happen are set; differences among 
members of the same species are simply degrees of actualization of the 
same form. 
For Montaigne, human action is not actualization but the production 
of effects. Potentiality and actuality are replaced by possibility. The genu-
inely new can emerge only as the possible, which can be understood in 
two ways. It can be limited to what has already happened: what has 
happened can happen. Alternatively, the possible can be understood as 
what has never been seen before. Montaigne says that his “end” is to tell 
not what has happened but what can happen, what is possible to happen 
(VS105–6, F75). This suggests that he is not limiting the possible to what 
has happened, to what has been seen before, but that he is concerned 
with bringing out the new. The new can only emerge, or appear, against 
the background of the old, the familiar. This is why Montaigne is an 
“accidental” philosopher. He is using ancient philosophy, and Aristotle in 
particular, as the background for what he is bringing into existence. The 
possible can only be what had been thought to be impossible or, at least, 
what had never before been thought to be possible. 
The central role of possibility in Montaigne’s philosophical project 
makes sense of the fact that, in the Essays, extremes seem to replace 
essences. For example, cruelty is the “extreme of all vice,” and the extreme 
of that extreme is the enjoyment of the spectacle of another man’s suffer-
ing. We might expect, then, to see the essence of vice in cruelty and the 
essence of cruelty in extreme cruelty. But Montaigne does not say that. 
Extremes seem to be the limits of what is possible: extreme cruelty is 
“the uttermost point that cruelty can attain” (VS432, F316). Montaigne 
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is especially interested in the limits of the human soul. “It is very hard,” 
he says, “to assign limits to the achievements of the faculties of the soul” 
(VS723, F546). Montaigne, then, is open to possibilities of the soul that 
would have looked impossible from the perspective of Aristotle’s under-
standing of nature. 
Perfection and Hierarchy
Final cause is inseparable from form because final cause is just the per-
fection or the realization of form. In contrast to this Aristotelian picture, 
Montaigne emphasizes his deformity and his imperfections. In “To the 
Reader” he says that he wants to be seen in his simple, natural, and ordi-
nary form, “without striving.” Therefore, his defects will be an important 
aspect of his self-portrait (VS3, F2). In “Of Cripples” he tells us that he is 
astonished at his own deformity (VS1029, F787). He is a particular, “very 
ill-formed” (VS804, F610). The Essays do not conceal such imperfections 
any more than does his portrait which displays, not a perfect face, but his 
own face (VS148, F108).9
The Essays begin with Montaigne’s “end,” the end that he has pro-
posed to himself: “I have set myself no end but a domestic and private 
one. I have had no thought of serving either you or my own glory. My 
powers are inadequate for such a purpose” (VS3, F2). The Essays end 
with his judgment of human perfection: “It is an absolute perfection and 
God-like to know how to enjoy our own being rightly. We seek other con-
ditions because we do not understand the use of our own, and go outside 
ourselves because we do not know what it is like inside. Yet there is no 
use our mounting on stilts, for on stilts we must still walk on our own 
legs. And on the loftiest throne in the world we are still sitting on our own 
rump” (VS1115–16, F857). 
Human perfection is simply the enjoyment of “our own” condition. 
Montaigne intends to contrast this perfection with the philosopher’s 
attainment of the divine condition as well as with the condition of the 
prince who sits on “the loftiest throne in the world.” The “end” as the 
domestic and private is the locus of human perfection. This notion of 
human perfection amounts to a removal of man from the ancient, tra-
ditional hierarchy in which he is located between the divine, which is 
above him, and the bestial, which is below him. In this hierarchical view, 
man’s perfection must be seen as the attainment of the divine condition. 
Therefore, Montaigne’s valuation of the human as such might be seen 
as simply a kind of “lowering” of the standards of thought and action. 
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His insistence that he shows himself “without striving” lends itself to 
that interpretation, for he appears to demand less of himself than philo-
sophical and moral perfection would require. There is no struggle within 
himself between the higher and lower parts of his being. 
However, Montaigne’s restoration of the human should not simply be 
interpreted as a kind of lowering of the standards of human perfection. 
This estimation fails to recognize the radical newness of Montaigne’s 
project and persists in the framework of the tradition: it judges man as a 
being within and entirely determined by his place in the natural hierar-
chy. From that perspective, Montaigne’s perfection does indeed look like 
imperfection. In fact, however, Montaigne is introducing a new notion of 
perfection that cannot be measured by the old standards, even though it 
must be articulated in the terms of those old standards. This new notion 
of perfection is the free and entire possession of what is one’s own, “to 
enjoy our own being rightly.” Philosophy “belongs” to man. To fully pos-
sess our “end” is to enjoy our own being: possession means that there is 
no distance between what is and what ought to be.10
Montaigne’s description of the perfection of the Essays manifests this 
new notion of human perfection: “For this purpose of mine [mien des-
sein], it is also appropriate for me to write at home, in a backward region, 
where no one helps me or corrects me, where I usually have no con-
tact with any man who understands the Latin of his Paternoster and of 
French a little less. I would have done it better elsewhere, but the work 
would have been less my own; and its principal end and perfection is to 
be precisely my own” (VS875, F667). He writes the essays at home, and 
therefore they are his own. They would have been better had he written 
them elsewhere, but they are perfect because they are precisely his own. 
Unlike a perfection “all one’s own,” Aristotelian perfection implies 
hierarchy. Human beings either attain the perfection of the human form 
or they fall short in varying degrees. From this perspective, the lower is 
the imperfection of the higher. Again, this presupposes a common human 
essence or complete form against which the individual is to be measured. 
But for Montaigne, the low is not the imperfection of the high. He relates 
men to one another not in terms of sameness of essence but in terms of 
accidental similarity. In the first essay, for example, the lowly “common 
herd” is accidentally similar to the lofty princes, for the astonishment 
of the people is accidentally similar to the esteem of the princes. Or, to 
put it somewhat differently, the weakness of the people is accidentally 
similar to the strength of the princes, because both produce the same 
effect. Also, Montaigne describes himself as accidentally similar to the 
ancient philosophers: his weak mores conform “by accident” to many of 
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the teachings and examples of ancient philosophy. That is why he is “an 
unpremeditated and accidental philosopher” (VS546, F409).
The Good: Contemplation and Politics 
The Aristotelian notions of final cause, perfection, and the good are impos-
sible to separate. Final cause is the good and final cause is perfection. The 
good for man, or happiness, is the activity of the soul in accordance with 
virtue (NE. 1.7, 1098a1–16). Since there are two kinds of virtue, intel-
lectual and moral, Aristotle holds that there are two distinct kinds of 
perfection for man: the theoretical and the practical. The “good life” can 
be either the life of the philosopher, that is, the life of contemplation, or 
the life of complete moral virtue, which manifests itself most fully in the 
ruler who, above all, must exercise practical wisdom. Each of these ways 
of life is the outcome of man’s uniqueness within the whole of nature, 
within the natural hierarchy. Man is unique by virtue of his reason. 
Montaigne’s view of the uniqueness of man is very different. In the 
“Apology for Sebond” Montaigne examines an essentially Aristotelian-
Thomistic view of nature that is hierarchical.11 God is revealed in the 
book of nature, and man—on account of his reason—is the part of nature 
that most clearly reveals God. Whereas this understanding of nature sees 
human reason as unique and therefore as that which makes man to be 
in the image of God, Montaigne says that what is unique to man is the 
“unruliness of thought and freedom of imagination,” which make it 
impossible for man to remain within the bounds of nature (VS459–60, 
F336).
The second characteristic that is unique to man among all the animals, 
according to Montaigne, is shame. Adam and Eve eat of the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil. It is pride that makes them want to be God: 
their desire is not limited by their place within nature but is rather an 
infinite desire to become divine through the knowledge of good and evil 
(which is philosophy). When they realize what they have done, they cover 
their genitals. They cover the very parts that produce the human and thus 
they reveal their shame at being merely human. Man is the only animal 
that hides himself in the act by which he generates another member of his 
species (VS484, F356–57).
It should be noted here that Montaigne’s picture of man’s uniqueness 
strongly suggests belief in original sin. The original sin, the sin at the ori-
gins, is pride, and this manifests itself in both philosophy and politics, the 
two ways of life which Aristotle regards as the good for man. Montaigne 
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does not see either philosophy or politics as innocent. His refounding of 
both reveals the way in which he comes to terms with pride. 
With respect to Aristotle’s first and highest mode of the good life, 
that is, philosophy, Montaigne replaces Aristotelian contemplation with 
judgment. Contemplation is the receptivity of the mind to being and pre-
supposes a kind of harmony between the mind and the world. The mind 
receives the forms of things without the matter: the form in the mind 
and the form in the thing are identical (De An. 3.4, 430a). Montaigne’s 
“unruliness of thought and freedom of imagination” presuppose no such 
harmony. For Montaigne, the mind is not receptive but rather productive 
and generative. Judgment does not gaze at “the thing itself,” but subjects 
it and makes it “one’s own.” (These metaphysical and epistemological 
aspects of Montaigne’s reversal of Aristotle will be taken up in chapters 
3 and 4.) 
With respect to Aristotle’s second and lesser notion of happiness, that 
is, moral virtue or the life of politics, Montaigne reverses Aristotle’s order-
ing of the private and the political. For Aristotle, the good of moral virtue 
is the final cause or end of politics. Aristotle says that the city comes into 
existence for the sake of mere life but that it exists for the sake of the 
good life, the life of moral excellence (Pol. 1.2, 1252b25–35). The city 
emerges out of the pre-political forms of association, the family, and the 
village. These pre-political associations are imperfect: they achieve their 
perfection only in the city, which is complete and self-sufficient. The city, 
then, is the final end or completion of the pre-political. Montaigne, on the 
other hand, begins the Essays in “To the Reader” with his statement that 
his “end” is the domestic and private. His powers are not great enough 
for the end of public service or glory. That is, he reverses the Aristotelian 
order: he reorders philosophy to the imperfect and incomplete domestic 
and private association.
According to Hannah Arendt, the Greek and Roman world, and even the 
Christian world of the Middle Ages, knew only two realms: the public and 
the private. Arendt’s account of the distinction and the relation between 
the realms of the public and private is Aristotelian in its major outlines. 
For Aristotle, the city is the public space for the practice and display of 
virtue. The private sphere remains hidden, unworthy to appear in public. 
The private realm is that of the household where biological needs are met 
through a kind of activity called “labor.” Labor is tied to the life-processes 
of the body, including the labor of childbirth. Thus, the household is the 
domain in which the human bondage to necessity can be most clearly seen. 
Because the private realm of the household deals with the biological and 
the necessary, it remains hidden from public view. From the perspective 
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of the distinctly human, higher activities, the private is identified with the 
shameful. The ordinary daily functions of the body are hidden on account 
of what seems like an instinctual sense of shame. This includes, of course, 
the very act by means of which the species is continued. 
The public realm, on the other hand, is the place of self-disclosure 
and, thus, of honor and glory. The public realm is also the realm of free-
dom, which means, first of all, freedom from necessity and labor. It is 
only within the public sphere that action, as distinguished from labor and 
work, can take place. Action is the specifically human mode of associa-
tion, the way in which men are related to each other, not through the 
medium of material things but directly, through deeds and speech. It is 
here that men rise above the merely biological to the specifically human 
practice of virtue or excellence. Therefore, the public sphere is the place 
where men compete and distinguish themselves, where they display their 
uniqueness and superiority. The city is the space in which virtue appears 
in deeds and speech. It is only the political relationship that allows for the 
full exercise of virtue: prudence, justice, and courage come into their per-
fection in the greater scope for action that only the political can provide.
Arendt explains that “society” is the new, modern form of human asso-
ciation that comes about when the private realm rises into the public 
sphere. “The emergence of society . . . from the shadowy interior of the 
household into the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred the 
old borderline between private and political, it has also changed almost 
beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance 
for the life of the individual and the citizen.”12 
Montaigne not only reorders philosophy to the domestic and private, 
he also brings the domestic and private out into the public realm. In so 
doing, he refuses to hide out of shame for mere life. This emergence of the 
private into the public is the bringing into being of modern society. 
For Aristotle, the good of politics is the “common good,” a good that 
can only be achieved in common (Pol. 3. 6–7). Montaigne says that phi-
losophy has not been able to find a way to the good that is commonly 
shared. Therefore, “let each one seek it in his particularity” (VS622, 
F471). Montaigne rejects the notion of the common good as the foun-
dation of politics: his “end” is instead domestic and private. We should, 
consequently, expect that the good is to be found in the domestic and 
private, but the domestic and private brought into the public, that is, the 
social. To that end, he reorders the virtues and vices in accordance with 
the requirements of social, rather than political, life. (These moral and 
political aspects of Montaigne’s reversal of Aristotle will be discussed in 
chapters 5, 6, and 7.)
18 The Transformation of Philosophy
The Eternal and the Temporal 
For ancient philosophy as well as for Christian theology, human desire is 
ultimately desire for the divine, for eternity and immortality. The human 
good is the transcendence of the human: the completion and perfection 
of the human consists in the attainment of the divine condition. For Aris-
totle, even sexual desire is ultimately the desire for immortality, the desire 
to share in the eternal. The desires of the philosopher are fulfilled in con-
templation, which is a sharing in the activity of the eternal and the divine. 
Although Aristotle does not consider politics a divine activity, we see in 
his pupil Alexander (who believed himself descended from the gods) the 
desire of the prince for immortal glory.
The infinite desires of the philosophers, Christian contemplatives, 
and princes all appear on the very last pages of the Essays. There, Mon-
taigne refers to the philosophers who want to “get out of themselves and 
escape from the man.” He says of this desire: “That is madness: instead 
of changing into angels, they change into beasts; instead of raising them-
selves, they lower themselves.” Of the Christian ascetics who “scorn to 
give their attention to our beggarly, watery, and ambiguous comforts,” he 
says: “these are two things that I have always observed to be in singular 
accord: supercelestial thoughts and subterranean conduct.” And of Alex-
ander’s pretensions to divinity, he says: “I find nothing so humble and so 
mortal in the life of Alexander as his fancies about his immortalization.” 
When the oracle of Jupiter Ammon had placed Alexander among the 
gods, Philotas wrote to Alexander congratulating him on his elevation: 
“As far as you are concerned, I am very glad of it; but there is reason to 
pity the men who will have to live with and obey a man who exceeds and 
is not content with a man’s proportions” (VS1115, F856–57). 
For Montaigne, Alexander’s apotheosis is a delusion and therefore also 
the very reverse of human perfection: absolute perfection is, rather, to know 
how to enjoy our own being rightly. “We go out of our condition” only 
because we do not know what it is like inside ourselves. Human perfection 
is not the attainment of the divine condition but the enjoyment or complete 
possession of our own condition. But what does this mean? Would we not 
necessarily already have taken complete possession of our own condition 
as created and temporal beings? Montaigne rejects the attempt and even 
the possibility of becoming divine, of rising above the human condition by 
our own agency. He does the opposite: he brings the eternal into the tempo-
ral. And this amounts to a valuing of the temporal in a new way. 
Montaigne’s “stance,” the standpoint from which he looks at the world 
of human things in the Essays, is entirely new. He neither immerses himself 
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in the busyness of this world nor escapes to the eternal. That is to say, 
he takes neither a theoretical nor a practical attitude toward the human 
things. He transcends Aristotle’s distinction between the theoretical and 
the practical. Montaigne’s stance, or attitude, comes through especially 
in “Of Vanity.” There he tells us that he really knows very little about 
the actual workings of his household, even though he has retired there 
and is devoted to it as his inheritance from his father. He is ashamed, he 
says, that he doesn’t even know the names of some of the most common 
implements, or how wine is made. He is not immersed in the running 
of his chateau or in the economic details of his livelihood. On the other 
hand, he insists that “this is not a philosophical scorn for transitory and 
mundane things” (VS953, F728). So his attitude toward the everyday is 
not an attitude either of utility or of action within the practical world. Yet 
he has no philosophical disdain for these ordinary and common things. 
The ordinary and common is, in fact, the focus of his attention as a 
philosopher.
There is, then, a kind of theoretical or contemplative stance that Mon-
taigne takes in the Essays. But this is not the attempt to contemplate 
the divine, the eternal and unchanging. Rather, he looks at the human 
things, especially human action, examining them from different angles. 
That examination is the contemplative element in his thought. However, 
he does not look at the temporal realm from the perspective of eternity 
for, from that perspective, the temporal appears as nothing. “Of Vanity” 
expresses his stance so well because he seems to say: yes, the world, the 
temporal, and the fleeting are all vanity, but this is what we are, and there 
is value in the temporal world, there is good in what we are. 
Montaigne’s “contemplative” stance toward the temporal, however, 
includes an element of action, for he also reorders the temporal. He does 
not just ponder the world as it is, but transcends the Aristotelian distinc-
tion between the theoretical and the practical. He does not act within 
the flow of time, but stands, as it were, in a middle position between the 
eternal and the temporal.13 In reordering time, he stands above time. Yet 
he is not directing time to the eternal. Rather, he brings the eternal into 
the temporal. 
I will discuss three aspects of the Essays that display Montaigne’s new 
stance toward the eternal and the temporal. First, although he tells many 
stories, he includes no extended narrative of either his own life or of 
human history in general. Second, Montaigne refers to himself as “a new 
figure” of the philosopher: the new appears in time as a “figure.” Third, 
in spite of his insistence on his changeability, he also claims that he is, in 
some sense, consistent. 
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The Absence of Narrative in the Essays
The rejection of final cause introduces the possibility of a new kind of 
freedom with respect to the temporal order, for the temporal is no longer 
ordered to the eternal. Montaigne’s rejection of final cause is reflected in 
the way in which he presents eternity and time in the Essays. Final cause 
binds thought and action to the eternal, connecting the moments of time 
by ordering them to the end. The end is the origin: it is there from the 
beginning, guiding the temporal sequence, making the temporal sequence 
intelligible. The temporal is subordinated to the eternal and ordered to 
the eternal. For Montaigne, man cannot attain “the perfection of being” 
that belongs only to the eternal and divine. On the other hand, Mon-
taigne’s stance toward the temporal does manifest a new kind of freedom 
that follows from the rejection of final cause. Ends are no longer given by 
nature but are chosen as his purposes. Francis Slade puts this precisely: 
“It is this reduction of end to purpose that makes possible the argumenta-
tive strategy employed against teleological explanation. . . . Nature must 
be construed as end-less for modern freedom. . . . Ends are constituted 
by our choice. They are our ‘projects.’ ”14 The difference between ends 
and purposes is that “ends exist independently of our willing them to be; 
they do not originate in our willing them to be. Purposes take their origin 
from our willing them; purposes would not be if agents did not give them 
being. . . . [Aristotle’s] happiness is the end of human life whatever the 
purposes of human beings may be. Happiness is the end not because I 
choose happiness and make it my purpose, but because of what I am, the 
intrinsic character, or nature, of the human being itself.”15
Narrative implies final cause. “Narrative, presenting the interplay 
between purpose and end, is the classic form that allows us to contem-
plate human life in its completeness and incompleteness. . . . The narrative 
arts presuppose the ontological priority of ends to purposes because with-
out that priority, there is nothing to be revealed about the adequacy or 
inadequacy of human purposes to the completeness of human life, for 
in action a human being ‘purposes’ the realization of his life as a whole, 
complete in itself.”16
Narrative is made coherent in terms of some notion of completion, 
and that means change that is directed to an end. Montaigne says: “There 
is nothing so contrary to my style as an extended narrative” (VS106, 
F76). Men and events are presented in the Essays without regard to their 
place in an unbroken historical process and are given a new non-temporal 
order by the mind. Thus, although the Essays are full of stories, there is 
no concern for chronological order and no extended narrative either of 
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Montaigne’s own life or of human history. What we are told about Mon-
taigne’s life is given to us in fragments scattered throughout the work 
without regard to their place in any temporal sequence.
Compare the Essays to the presentation of Augustine’s life in the Con-
fessions. The nine narrative books begin with his conception and end 
with the death of his mother. In his reflections on this beginning and end, 
he emphasizes the bodily or biological aspect of his relationship to his 
parents, “the parents of my flesh,” by whose bodies he came into this life: 
“the father from whom, and the mother in whom, You fashioned me in 
time” (1.6). Thus, the nine narrative books present the natural, biologi-
cal life cycle of the human species, the way in which one generation gives 
birth to the next and then goes out of existence. We see, then, the fleet-
ing character of the life of individuals, held by the bonds of necessity to 
the merely biological and thus to time and mortality. This is the inheri-
tance of original sin and the condition of trial and temptation. In the later 
books on memory, time, and Genesis he presents the temporal character 
of all created things, but also the possibility of the transcendence of the 
temporal flow and the promise of eternal life. Narrative is transcended in 
the eternal now of God’s vision.
In Augustine’s narrative, we see the interplay of divine and human 
action. God, who is eternal and unchanging, acts in time, directing Augus-
tine to his end. That end is completeness, wholeness, found only in the 
eternal union with God in the next world. While Augustine is seeking 
happiness in lower things, God is secretly bringing him to the point of 
his conversion. The action of God looks like a cause, a necessarily supe-
rior cause that enters into the natural realm of causality and overrides 
all other causes. This interplay of divine and human action, which must 
result in the victory of divine grace, raises the question of human freedom 
in a new way. Augustine’s choices are not ultimate. Therefore, his freedom 
must be made compatible with divine agency. 
In contrast with Augustine’s Confessions, Montaigne is not appealing 
to the action of God within his life in order to explain who he is. When 
the factor of freedom is introduced into the picture of Montaigne’s life, 
any idea of an extended narrative must be abandoned. His freedom must 
be displayed in the discrete moments of time rather than in a story that 
holds the moments together in a temporal order of change directed to an 
end. The intelligibility of a particular human being therefore cannot be 
revealed in the story of his life. The absence of an extended narrative of 
Montaigne’s life points to his freedom from final cause.
Narrative is the attempt to tell what has happened in chronological 
order. Montaigne’s end is to tell not what has happened but what can 
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happen (VS105–6, F75). He is not concerned with the actual but with 
the possible. Therefore, his relation to time cannot be expressed in narra-
tive. There is no ordered movement in time, for there is no final cause of 
human action. His “transpositions of chronology” mean that his stories 
have their place in the Essays “according to their opportunity, not always 
according to their age” (VS964, F736). Their timeliness is dependent on 
his purposes. Montaigne is imposing his own order on the temporal. 
The presence of Montaigne’s father in the Essays, like the presence 
of Augustine’s mother in the Confessions, points to the origins and the 
biological dimension of human life, the way in which the generations 
of men come into being and go out of being. Perhaps the strangest of 
the “transpositions of chronology” involving his father appears at the 
beginning of the “Apology” in Montaigne’s account of how he came to 
translate Sebond’s book. The way in which he presents the chronology of 
his translation does not follow the natural temporal order. Montaigne’s 
father was given Sebond’s book as a gift by one of his learned house-
guests and, “a few days before his death,” he asked his son to translate 
it into French. Montaigne did the translation with which his father was 
very pleased and so ordered it to be printed. “And this was done after his 
death” (VS440, F320). Since the Theologia Naturalis is a work of nearly 
a thousand pages, how could he have translated it within a few days? In 
the dedicatory epistle to the translation, he lets it be known that he had 
been working on the translation some months before his father’s death 
(a fact that he does not mention in the Essays). M. A. Screech estimates 
that the translation would have taken at least a year. Stranger still, the 
dedication to his father wishes him a long life, yet it is dated on the very 
day of his father’s death, June 18, 1568.17 Now, perhaps this is all just a 
mistake on Montaigne’s part and nothing should be made of it. But if it 
is not a mistake, then we are faced with a deliberately incomprehensible 
chronology. The temporal order is thrown off so that the chronology does 
not match the natural order of things. He is imposing his own order 
on these events, a non-natural order which concerns the life and death 
of his father, his own origin. There is a strange sense here in which his 
father is “reborn,” a sense in which he is reversing the beginning and 
the end. 
Montaigne is subjecting the temporal to himself, taking power over 
the temporal order. Human agency is not captured in narrative, because 
action is not actualization. Action is a new beginning and has the power 
to wipe out the past. So there is no story behind his actions. The absence 
of narrative shows that Montaigne is complete at every moment, and at 
every moment has the power to make a new beginning.
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A New Figure 
Montaigne describes himself as “a new figure: an unpremeditated and 
accidental philosopher.” His choice of “figure” to express what is new 
about him brings to mind both medieval and ancient meanings of that 
term. In his essay “Figura,” Erich Auerbach goes through the history of 
“figure” beginning with ancient poetry where the term first arises as an 
expression for “form” and conveys the meaning of “new form.”18 The 
term has a rich and varied history among the ancients, but “the meaning 
which the Church Fathers gave the word . . . was of the greatest historical 
importance.”19 The figural involves concrete historical persons or events 
that are related to each other but that do not simply represent anything 
in any abstract way. “Figural interpretation establishes a connection 
between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself 
but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfills the first. The 
two poles of the figure are separate in time, but both, being real events 
or figures, are within time, within the stream of historical life.” So, for 
example, the persons and events of the Old Testament prefigure the Incar-
nation and the Gospels, which in turn are a promise of the kingdom of 
God at the end of time.20 
Figural interpretation “removes the concrete event, completely pre-
served as it is, from time and transposes it into a perspective of eternity.” 
The figures, then, have an eternal character and must be understood from 
the eternal divine perspective. “The future is represented figurally by past 
events” but for God there is no “difference of time.”21 Figure entails an 
“immediate vertical connection with a divine order.”22 
That the two events or persons are not simply related horizontally, in 
a temporal relationship of before and after, is due to the fact that “every 
future model, though incomplete as history, is already fulfilled in God 
and has existed from all eternity in His providence.” The figures are “the 
tentative form of something eternal and timeless; they point not only to 
the concrete future, but also to something that has always been and will 
always be. . . . which is at all times present, fulfilled in God’s providence, 
which knows no difference of time” because all of the moments of time 
are present to God at once. The figure is both a fragmentary temporal 
reality and a veiled eternal reality.23
Auerbach contrasts this understanding of time with the modern 
view in which “the provisional event is treated as a step in an unbro-
ken horizontal process.” From the perspective of the figural system, “the 
interpretation is always sought from above; events are considered not in 
their unbroken relation to one another, but torn apart, individually, each 
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in relation to something other that is promised and not yet present.”24 As 
Peter Burke explains in The Renaissance Sense of the Past, “this kind of 
interpretation clearly worked against the sense of the past, for it depends 
on taking men and events out of their historical context, and putting 
them into a spiritual one.”25 
In describing himself as a new figure, Montaigne is both preserving 
and transforming the ancient and medieval meanings of “figure.” Figure 
replaces Aristotelian form. Whereas form is eternal and universal, a figure 
is a concrete particular that is related to other particulars not through 
sameness of essence but through the accidental similarity of discrete and 
fragmentary stories: Montaigne finds that he is accidentally similar to the 
examples of many different philosophers. Whereas figure in the medi-
eval sense is directly related to the divine, Montaigne is a new figure and 
exemplar, not of God, but of the philosopher.
Montaigne takes from the medieval notion of figure the possibility of 
the transcendence of the temporal by a particular, a kind of transcendence 
that would not have been thinkable or possible for the ancients. He is 
a new possibility, the new type of the philosopher, an unpremeditated 
and accidental philosopher. He brings together and uses the fragments 
of the philosophers of the past in order to reveal himself. All of ancient 
philosophy is ordered to him: he transcends the temporal by bringing the 
fragments of ancient philosophy under his own judgment and directing 
them to his own purposes. It is as if the new had been there all along. 
Ancient philosophy had always expressed, in a fragmentary way, what 
he is.
Change and Consistency
Montaigne’s stance toward the temporal and the significance of the 
absence of narrative can also be seen in what he says about his changeabil-
ity and his consistency. On the one hand, he claims that he is constantly 
changing: “I do not portray being; I portray passing. Not the passing 
from one age to another, or, as the people say, from seven years to seven 
years, but from day to day, from minute to minute” (VS805, F611). In 
“Of the Inconsistency of Our Actions” he says that only about a dozen 
men among the ancients managed to achieve perfect consistency. Striv-
ing for perfection means directing all of one’s actions to a single end. 
Following Aristotle’s account of final cause, the perfection or complete 
actualization of form requires the rule of reason in the soul: this rule of 
reason brings about consistency of action because reason is such that it 
directs all action to a single end. Montaigne, however, presents himself 
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“without striving.” He includes himself among the common herd of men 
who are constantly moved and changed both from without and within: 
“Not only does the wind of accident move me at will, but, besides, I am 
moved and disturbed as a result merely of my own unstable posture; 
and anyone who observes carefully can hardly find himself twice in the 
same state” (VS335, F242). The rejection of final cause would mean that 
change has no natural direction and therefore may or may not be consis-
tent with previous or subsequent events. There is constant change, but it 
does not go anywhere. Each moment is discrete and unconnected to any 
other moment.
On the other hand, in spite of this picture of radical change, Montaigne 
says that he is consistent. In “Of the Useful and the Honorable” he gives 
an account of his actions as negotiator between princes: “If anyone fol-
lows and watches me closely, I will concede him the victory if he does not 
confess that there is no rule in their school that could imitate this natural 
movement and maintain an appearance of liberty and license so con-
stant and inflexible on such tortuous and varied paths, and that all their 
attention and ingenuity could not bring them to it” (VS795, F603). Mon-
taigne’s consistency cannot be captured in the rules of any philosophical 
school because it has gone beyond the limits of ancient philosophy and 
cannot be judged by its standards. His consistency is just his liberty and 
license: it is not due to final cause. But because it is without striving, his 
conduct appears natural. 
Montaigne is, in some way, holding all of his actions together. His 
liberty and license are, paradoxically, “constant and inflexible.” All of his 
actions are free, undetermined by an end. He produces these actions out 
of himself. Each action is a new beginning, yet his actions are not random 
but consistent. In some sense, he is always the same since the “springs 
of action” are always the same. He concludes “Of the Inconsistency of 
Our Actions” with a discussion of the fact that vicious motives some-
times underlie virtuous-looking actions. “In view of this, a sound intellect 
will refuse to judge men simply by their outward actions; we must probe 
the inside and discover what springs set men in motion. But since this 
is an arduous and hazardous undertaking, I wish fewer people would 
meddle with it” (VS338, F244). Montaigne’s actions are consistent from 
the inside, from the consistency of his free will. This is a consistency of 
beginnings, of “springs” rather than ends, a kind of consistency that is 
possible on account of the rejection of final cause. Why does Montaigne 
say that the discovery of the springs of action is a hazardous undertak-
ing? Perhaps he means that the rejection of final cause is desirable but 
dangerous because it implies a new understanding of human agency and 
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a new kind of freedom: the human will is now free from the causality of 
naturally given ends.
The New as What Was Always There:  
Replacing the Foundations
What are we to make of the absence of narrative, the strange transposi-
tions of chronology, the claim that he is a new figure, and his puzzling 
treatment of his own consistency? What is the meaning of his stance 
toward the temporal? The movement of the essay form is not to ascend 
to the eternal but rather to go back to the beginning and change the 
foundation. Montaigne is ordering the temporal, subjecting it to his own 
purposes, so as to accomplish his refounding. That is, he is going back 
to the origins and replacing them. The new is really what was there all 
along. Replacing the old foundations would have to be this kind of act if 
everything is, somehow, to remain the same and yet be radically different. 
Montaigne adopts this stance toward eternity and time because the 
production of the genuinely new requires freedom from both the past 
and the eternal. If change is grounded in the eternal, as it is for Aristotle, 
then the coming into being of the new is impossible. The new order that 
Montaigne imposes on time is the order of the possible: time is ordered 
not to the eternal but to the possible, which escapes the categories of 
potentiality and actuality. He can impose his own order on time because 
beginnings are not ends.
For Aristotle, the necessary condition for philosophy is leisure. It is 
only when all of the needs of life have been provided for that the theoreti-
cal life can occur (Meta. 1.2, 982b20–25). Leisure is the setting aside of 
time, removing it from the workaday world, and taking the theoretical 
attitude toward the world. The philosopher sets himself apart from the 
everyday. He is engaged in an activity that is higher than the activities 
of everyday life. For Montaigne, however, leisure must be understood in 
terms of his stance: neither immersed in busyness nor escaping to the eter-
nal. Montaigne brings philosophy back down into the temporal realm. 
“Unpremeditated and accidental” philosophy brings philosophy into the 
immediacy of the moment. 
The essay that Montaigne places last is “Of Experience.” He ends, then, 
not in the eternity of contemplation but in the temporality of experience. 
He reverses Aristotle’s order, the order of philosophy itself. Montaigne 
reverses Aristotle, because Aristotle’s foundation is weak. Montaigne 
replaces the weak foundation with his own good foundation. This is the 
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act of philosophy, the act of refounding. Aristotle’s foundation is weak 
because it is the presumption of the philosopher and the pride of the 
philosopher. Assuming the Aristotelian notion of perfection as the com-
pletion of the human form, only the philosopher is fully human or, to put 
it differently, only the philosopher bears the entire form of human nature. 
For Montaigne, on the contrary, “each man bears the entire form of the 
human condition” (VS805, F611). 
Aristotle does not separate the philosopher from the man. The man 
who philosophizes is essentially a philosopher, and therefore he is divine. 
In contrast, Montaigne’s unpremeditated and accidental philosophy is the 
separation of the man from the philosopher: the philosopher is only acci-
dentally a philosopher. 
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Chapter Two

Sticking to the Old Ways:  
Montaigne and Sacred Tradition
How is it possible for the philosopher to see himself as just a man? To 
what can he turn in order to ground his recovery of a common human-
ity? What is it that allows Montaigne to see the possibility of society? I 
argue that, in spite of his radical break with the philosophical and theo-
logical tradition, Montaigne finds in the core of sacred tradition—the 
tradition freed from Aristotle—the intimations of a new form of human 
association.
The Presence of Sacred Tradition in the Essays
Readers of Montaigne are sharply divided over the question of whether 
or not he was a sincere Catholic. Those who claim that he was indeed 
sincere generally defend their view on the basis of evidence external to 
the Essays. Although there are allusions to various Christian beliefs in 
the Essays, the work clearly lacks what might be called a pious tone, 
so defenders of his sincerity must point to his religious practices that he 
mentions in his Travel Journal. Many of his readers, then, see him as a 
“skeptic-fideist,” that is, as someone who believes what faith teaches but 
who also denies that we can have knowledge of these truths of the kind 
that theology seeks to attain.1
Those who claim that Montaigne is really an atheist, or at least an unbe-
liever, dismiss his professions of faith and his allusions to Christian belief 
as mere window-dressing intended to conceal his true opinions. Many, if 
not most, readers of Montaigne interpret his adherence to Catholicism 
as a purely prudential and practical position stemming from his convic-
tion that Catholicism could provide social and political stability. Thus, 
according to this view, he holds to the Catholic side in the civil wars of his 
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day simply because it is the tradition of his country, not because he sees 
any inherent value in the content of that tradition.2
The problem with this approach is that it requires the reader to simply 
dismiss a great deal of what Montaigne actually says and about which he 
claims to be truthful. In effect, it amounts to saying that he doesn’t really 
mean what he says. In some cases, this judgment is based on what appear 
to be contradictions in his writings. The interpreter then simply dismisses 
one of the apparently contradictory claims. But on what grounds? The 
effort to make a philosopher consistent by dismissing a significant por-
tion of what he says is ultimately arbitrary. If there are contradictory 
claims in his writings, then the first task of the interpreter is to attempt to 
understand how they might be reconciled. 
I propose to set aside the question of Montaigne’s sincerity and to con-
sider the Essays themselves, with their apparent contradictions and lack 
of piety, in an effort to understand Montaigne’s position on religion in 
general and on Catholicism in particular.3 I will argue that Montaigne is 
bringing philosophy and faith together in a new way. The medieval theo-
logian begins with the articles of faith as the first principles of his science. 
He then seeks to understand what he already believes: theology is “faith 
seeking understanding.” Thus, philosophy serves as the “handmaiden” 
of theology. In “Of Prayers” Montaigne says that he has heard certain 
writings reproached for being “purely human and philosophical, with no 
admixture of theology.” Nevertheless, a purely human consideration is 
precisely his project: “I set forth notions that are human and my own, 
simply as human notions considered in themselves, not as determined and 
decreed by heavenly ordinance and permitting neither doubt nor dispute; 
matter of opinion, not matter of faith; what I reason out according to me, 
not what I believe according to God” (VS323, F234).4 
On the other hand, in a remarkable statement of submission from a 
philosopher who prizes his freedom of judgment, Montaigne says that 
he submits his essays “to the judgment of those whose concern it is to 
regulate not only my actions and my writings, but even my thoughts. 
Equally acceptable and useful to me will be condemnation or approval, 
since I hold it as execrable if anything is found which was said by me, 
ignorantly or inadvertently, against the holy prescriptions of the Catholic, 
Apostolic, and Roman Church, in which I die and in which I was born. 
And therefore, always submitting to the authority of their censure, which 
has absolute power over me, I meddle rashly with every sort of subject, as 
I do here” (VS317–18, F229).5 
Montaigne, then, liberates philosophy from its status as the servant 
of theology. However, it is his submission to the Church (in which he 
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was born and in which he will die) that gives him the freedom to think 
and write as he does in the Essays: in the context of his submission to 
the Church, philosophy becomes “unpremeditated and accidental.” And 
in this unpremeditated and accidental way, certain aspects of religion in 
general and of Catholicism in particular are woven into the fabric of the 
Essays: the sacraments, the Mass, the angelus bell, and many allusions 
to the New Testament appear, unobtrusively, throughout the work. So, 
while Montaigne does not engage in arguments concerning the nature of 
the Trinity or the Incarnation, he does treat Catholicism as an integral 
part of everyday life in ways that might remind us of a Brueghel painting. 
Of course, this does not prove that he was a sincere believer, but it does 
indicate that he is, in some way, bringing the content of faith into his own 
practice of philosophy. The beliefs and practices of the Church are pres-
ent as the familiar, as what was always there, the unpremeditated source 
of his emergence into the public as a philosopher.
Montaigne’s adherence to Catholic tradition is more than formal, that 
is, it is based not only on the conviction that tradition as such is a force 
for stability, but also on the goodness and truth of the content of that 
tradition. Montaigne’s innovations incorporate the possibilities or inti-
mations that are available to him in Christian faith. Divine revelation 
means that certain things that were unthinkable, and that were therefore 
impossible, for ancient philosophy can now be possibilities for thought. 
The way in which Montaigne avails himself of the possibilities offered 
by Christian belief is to transform this world, to open up possibilities for 
human thought and action in this life.
Montaigne’s project of displaying the possible as the object of phil-
osophical thought is precisely the description of the role of reason in 
relation to faith as set out by Thomas Aquinas. Reason, Thomas says, 
cannot demonstrate the truths of faith. If the truths of faith could be 
demonstrated by reason, the intellect would be compelled, whereas faith 
must be free and must, therefore, include an act of the will. The task 
of reason with respect to faith is to remove the obstacles to belief by 
showing that “what faith proposes is not impossible.”6 Thus, the phe-
nomenon of faith offers to philosophy the possibility of a kind of thought 
that is free and open to the possible. Faith opens the way for the trans-
formation of the activity of philosophy. In contrast to the Aristotelian 
account of knowledge as the mind’s reception of forms, faith is a new 
kind of intellectual assent that requires an act of the will. Montaigne’s 
philosophical act transforms this possibility of the role of the will in 
thought into the fundamental act of the mind in bringing society into 
being.7 
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Sacred Tradition and the Permanent Things
Throughout the Essays, Montaigne insists on his changeability, instabil-
ity, and inconsistency. However, there is one way in which he remains 
constant from the very beginning: “Now from the knowledge of this 
mobility of mine I have accidentally engendered in myself a certain con-
stancy of opinions, and have scarcely altered my original ones. . . . Thus 
I have, by the grace of God, kept myself intact [entier], without agitation 
or disturbance of conscience, in the ancient beliefs of our religion, in the 
midst of so many sects and divisions that our century has produced” 
(VS569, F428). His religion (“in which I die and in which I was born”) is 
the basis of the unity of his life. 
In “Of Vain Subtleties” Montaigne distinguishes between two kinds of 
good Christians. Simple people, who are less curious and learned, believe 
simply through reverence and obedience. Great minds, on the other hand, 
have reached a deep level of understanding of the Scriptures and the 
Church through long study and investigation. Both of these types, the 
lowly and the learned, are good Christians. But “in the middle range of 
mental vigor and ability, error in opinion is engendered; those in this 
range follow the first plausible meaning, and have some claim to regard 
our sticking to the old ways—those of us who are not versed in these mat-
ters by study—as simplicity and stupidity.” Montaigne then places himself 
among those who stick to the old ways, but neither from simplicity nor 
through study and learning. These believers have reached “the extreme 
limit of Christian intelligence” for they stick to the old ways, but in a 
manner different from both the great minds and the simple. This captures 
the essence of Montaigne’s adherence to sacred tradition.
In Tradition: Concept and Claim, Josef Pieper discusses the concept of 
tradition in terms of the distinction between sacred tradition and tradi-
tion in the broader sense of what is in any way handed down, that is, 
the distinction between “The Tradition” and “traditions.” Pieper argues 
that “there is in the last analysis only one traditional good that it is abso-
lutely necessary to preserve unchanged, namely the gift that is received 
and handed on in the sacred tradition.”8 This is because what is believed 
in sacred tradition concerns “the center of the world” and the core of 
human existence.9 Sacred tradition, as Pieper presents it, is not primarily 
about unreflective modes of behavior or ways of doing things. It primar-
ily concerns belief—belief about what might be called the metaphysical 
and, in particular, about the relation of the human to the divine.
The character of sacred tradition is such that it becomes intertwined 
with all aspects of life so that what is truly essential to it can be difficult 
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to discern. On the one hand, it requires great caution to undertake the 
smallest changes even in customs that do not appear to be directly related 
to the essence. Pieper explains, “It is common for the essence of what 
must be preserved to become overgrown and entangled with the concrete 
forms of historical life, and a change in the outer may very well threaten 
the pure preservation of the essence, so that anyone who carelessly dis-
cards or makes light of the ‘outer’ traditions commits a dangerous act.” 
On the other hand, it is this distinction between the essence of sacred 
tradition and its nonessential accretions that sometimes make possible 
even significant changes in custom. Pieper explains that “the explicit 
respect for the unimpeachable character of the sacred tradition presup-
poses the possibility of relativizing other traditions and in fact makes it 
possible and reasonable.” Thus, a true appreciation of sacred tradition is 
not to be confused with any form of ideological conservatism. “Genu-
ine consciousness of tradition makes one positively free and independent 
in the face of conservatisms, which worry obsessively about the cultiva-
tion of the ‘traditions.’ Certainly, a ‘cultivation of tradition’ that attaches 
itself to a historically accidental external image of what has been handed 
down becomes a positive hindrance to a real transmission of what is truly 
worth conserving, which perhaps can occur only under changed histori-
cal forms. It is possible to imagine a real transmission of what is in the 
last analysis worth handing down, which a dogmatic conservatism could 
not even recognize.”10
Montaigne acknowledges this distinction between the changeable 
and the permanent things. In his essay “Of Custom” he cautions those 
who would introduce changes in the civil laws, but he also defends 
both the public status of the Church and its immunity from inno-
vation: “It seems to me very iniquitous to want to subject public and 
immutable institutions and observances to the instability of a private 
fancy (private reason has only a private jurisdiction), and to attempt 
against divine laws what no government would endure against civil 
laws” (VS121, F88, emphasis added). He criticizes the English who, 
in his own lifetime, have changed several times “not only in politi-
cal matters, in which people want to dispense with constancy, but 
in the most important subject that can be, [that is], religion” (VS579, 
F436). 
Montaigne’s radical reform of both philosophy and politics must be 
seen in light of the distinction between sacred tradition and non-sacred 
traditions. Not only does he introduce a new order within the philosophi-
cal and political spheres, but also his understanding of the essence of 
sacred tradition demands that new order.
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The Errors of Reformation
Montaigne’s adherence to sacred tradition often becomes explicit in 
response to the threat that the Reformation poses to Catholicism: in his 
lifetime, the reformers’ attack on the Catholic Church had brought about 
the condition of civil war in France. Montaigne opposes the Reformation 
for many reasons, but above all because he sees it as the dissolution of 
the social bond.11 Beneath this, however, lies a deeper opposition to the 
Protestant understanding of the human being and of the relationship of 
the human to the divine. 
The Church is a “public and immutable” institution. The “innovations 
of Luther” were already shaking “our ancient belief,” and the teaching 
concerning “personal consent” would inevitably lead to atheism (VS439, 
F320). The teaching concerning personal consent goes precisely against 
the authority of sacred tradition. So also does the practice of private 
interpretation of the Bible. The Protestant principle of personal consent, 
including private interpretation of Scripture, also means the privatiza-
tion of religion. As Francis Slade writes: “Christianity cannot live in the 
privacy of the heart. It is the religion of publicness. To cease to profess it 
publicly is ‘to lose the Faith.’ This is because Christianity is the religion of 
truth.”12 Tradition has an inherently public status and claim to authority. 
“Private reason” can have only a private status. 
Montaigne regards the Protestant attempt to reform morals as super-
ficial, and even dangerous, because it is based on new opinions: “Those 
who in my time have tried to correct the world’s morals by new opin-
ions, reform the superficial vices; the essential ones they leave as they 
were, if they do not increase them” (VS811, F615). Yet, Montaigne sug-
gests that he himself is engaged in a project of reform: “Oh what an easy 
and applauded route those superficial men take, compared with ours!” 
(VS888, F677). His reform, however, is not by new opinions but by old 
opinions. New opinions cannot reach to the essential level at which mores 
begin. 
The most fundamental level of Montaigne’s criticism, then, concerns 
the way in which the Reformation understands the human being himself. 
“As for those who, in recent years, tried to construct for us a system of 
religious practice that is all contemplative and spiritual, they should not 
be astounded if there are some who think that religion would have melted 
away and slipped through their fingers if it did not hold fast among us as 
a mark, title, and instrument of division and faction rather than by itself” 
(VS930, F710). His comments on Numa, the Roman king and legislator 
who tried to attach the piety of his people to a purely intellectual religion, 
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actually pertain to the Reformation: “The human spirit cannot keep on 
floating in this infinity of formless ideas; they must be compiled for it into 
a definite picture after its own pattern. The divine majesty has thus let 
itself be somewhat circumscribed within corporeal limits on our behalf; 
his supernatural and heavenly sacraments show signs of our earthly con-
dition; his worship is expressed by perceptible rituals and words; for it is 
a man that believes and prays” (VS513, F381).13 
The reformers’ attempt to institute a purely spiritual and intellectual 
religion is manifested clearly in the attack on images. In The Stripping of 
the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400–1580, historian Eamon 
Duffy demonstrates that “iconoclasm was the central sacrament of 
reform.” The eradication of sacred images is “the sacrament of forgetful-
ness” and thus one of the most important instruments for the destruction 
of the traditional religion.14 Against the iconoclasts, Montaigne defends 
the use of images, especially the crucifix: “I leave aside the other argu-
ments that are employed on this subject. But I could hardly be made to 
believe that the sight of our crucifixes and the pictures of that piteous 
agony, the ornaments and ceremonious movements in our churches, the 
voices attuned to the piety of our thoughts, and that stirring of the senses, 
do not warm the souls of the people with religious emotion very benefi-
cial in effect” (VS513–14, F381). Montaigne says of the sign of the cross: 
“it is a sign that I revere and continually use” (VS319, F231). For Catho-
lics at the time of the Reformation, “the Crucifix was the icon of Christ’s 
abiding solidarity with suffering humanity.”15 
The stance of the Reformation toward the human being might be 
considered a form of rationalism. The Reformation’s entirely spiritual 
and intellectual form of religion, with its disdain for the senses and for 
images as idolatry, betrays a misunderstanding both of what it means to 
be human and of who God is. Montaigne recognizes that his adherence to 
the Catholic faith in contemporary religious conflicts might appear unre-
flective and irrational simply because the faith is inherited. But he rejects 
explicitly what he regards as a presumptuous prejudice: “How fantastic 
seemed to me the imagination of those who in recent years had the habit 
of reproaching each and every man in whom there gleamed some light of 
intelligence and who professed the Catholic religion, with dissimulation; 
and who even maintained, thinking to do him honor, that whatever he 
said for appearance, he could not help having his belief within reformed 
according to their measure. . . . They may take my word for it: if anything 
were to have tempted my youth, ambition for the risk and difficulties 
that attended this recent enterprise would have played a good part in it” 
(VS320, F231–32). In admitting that ambition for the risk and difficulties 
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of the Reformation might have tempted him, Montaigne suggests that he 
himself is engaged in a project of reform. At the same time, however, he 
implies that, whatever innovations he himself intends, they will not be 
based on the rejection of the old ways, but rather on the foundation of 
the sacred tradition. 
In “It Is Folly to Measure the True and the False by Our Own Capacity” 
Montaigne makes Pieper’s point about the way in which sacred tradition 
holds together: even what appear to be trivial and therefore dispensable 
matters are actually very important. “Now, what seems to me to bring as 
much disorder into our consciences as anything, in these religious trou-
bles that we are in, is this partial surrender of their beliefs by Catholics. It 
seems to them that they are being very moderate and understanding when 
they yield to their opponents some of the articles in dispute. But, besides 
the fact that they do not see what an advantage it is to a man charging 
you for you to begin to give ground and withdraw, and how much that 
encourages him to pursue his point, those articles which they select as the 
most trivial are sometimes very important. We must either submit com-
pletely to the authority of our ecclesiastical government, or do without it 
completely. It is not for us to decide what portion of obedience we owe 
it. Moreover, I can say this for having tried it. In other days I exercised 
this freedom of personal choice and selection.” But now he accepts fully 
the authority of “our ecclesiastical polity.” The observances of the Church 
have “a massive and very solid foundation” (VS182, F134–35). 
Separating the Essential from the Nonessential
Montaigne’s opposition to the Reformation is crucial to understanding 
his stance toward sacred tradition. However, he also breaks with the 
Catholic tradition insofar as he sees it to be dependent upon classical 
philosophy, especially Aristotle, and classical values. This break comes 
through especially in his relationship with his father, from whom he 
inherited his Catholicism, his goodness, and his fortunate disposition. 
Throughout the essays he praises his father as “the best father that ever 
was” (VS440, F320); yet, Montaigne points to two important ways in 
which he himself differs from his father. 
At the beginning of the “Apology for Sebond” he recounts that he 
had translated Sebond’s book on natural theology into French at his 
father’s request. His father had been given the book by Pierre Bunel, a 
very learned man, who had been a guest in his house. Montaigne’s father 
was “inflamed with that new ardor” for letters and “sought with great 
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diligence and expense the acquaintance of learned men, receiving them at 
his house like holy persons having some particular inspiration of divine 
wisdom, collecting their sayings and discourses like oracles, and with all 
the more reverence and religion as he was less qualified to judge them; 
for he had no knowledge of letters, any more than his predecessors.” The 
son says: “Myself, I like them well enough, but I do not worship them” 
(VS439, F319). By saying that he does not worship learning Montaigne 
points to and rejects the Aristotelian teaching concerning the divinity of 
the intellect, a teaching that, strictly speaking, medieval theology also 
rejects (since nothing within the created world is divine), but which is 
nevertheless preserved in the theological claim that man is in the image 
of God by virtue of his intellect. Montaigne distances himself from his 
father’s almost religious reverence, which also reflects the tradition’s view, 
for human knowledge.
The second way in which Montaigne breaks with his father concerns 
the status of public service. In “Of Husbanding Your Will” Montaigne 
tells us that he warned the magistrates of Bordeaux, who had elected him 
mayor, that he does not have the same attitude toward public service as 
his father had. His father had grown old and sick because the weight of 
public affairs had lain so heavily upon him. “He was like that; and this 
disposition in him sprang from a great goodness of nature: there never 
was a more charitable and public-spirited soul.” However, “this course, 
which I commend in others, I do not love to follow, and I am not without 
excuse. He had heard it said that we must forget ourselves for our neigh-
bor, that the particular was not to be considered at all in comparison 
with the general” (VS1006, F769). Montaigne suggests that his father 
had identified his activities as mayor with the theological virtue of charity. 
Further, he implies that this is what his father had been taught, perhaps 
in connection with the admonition of Christ to love one’s neighbor as 
oneself. 
The two ways in which Montaigne breaks with his father seem to 
be about philosophical contemplation and political life, the two kinds 
of human perfection put forward by Aristotle and adopted, albeit in a 
transformed way, by medieval Christian thought. For Aristotle, human 
perfection is twofold: the philosophical act of contemplation in which 
the human being participates in the divine, and the life of moral vir-
tue displayed in the activity of politics. Medieval theology had adopted 
the classical view of the world, especially the Aristotelian hierarchical 
account of being, and classical philosophy had become thoroughly inter-
twined with Christianity. The contemplative life of the philosopher was 
preserved in the ascetic and contemplative life of the monastery. The 
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classical moral virtues persist while the theological virtues are added on 
to make a complete picture of the moral life. And the Aristotelian stan-
dard of “the common good” is preserved as the end of politics, so that the 
political realm remains the locus of the human good in this world. 
Montaigne’s separation of the core of sacred tradition from the phi-
losophy of Aristotle shows itself with respect to both forms of human 
perfection. Philosophy becomes unpremeditated and accidental, a merely 
human, not a divine, activity. The pride of the philosopher is thus over-
come. The philosopher is just a man, like any other. This “lowering” 
of philosophy and the philosopher makes the invention of society pos-
sible, for society requires the overcoming of the Aristotelian hierarchy. 
The social, rather than the political, becomes the locus of the human 
good. 
Repentance of the Intellect
Montaigne’s overcoming of the pride of the philosopher entails what 
might be called a “repentance of the intellect,” a kind of repentance that 
is understood in relation to the God who reveals himself in the Bible. 
In Mystery and Philosophy, Michael B. Foster contrasts the God of the 
Bible with the idea of the divine in Greek philosophy. God in the Bible is 
hidden, in contrast to the unhiddenness of being for Greek philosophy. 
The God of the Bible makes himself known, but only by an act of will or 
grace: “It is not his nature to be unhidden.”16 Foster claims that “belief in 
a divine Revelation seems to involve something like a repentance in the 
sphere of the intellect.”17 The philosopher, such as Aristotle, who thinks 
that the mind can not only know the divine but is itself also divine in the 
act of contemplation, is guilty of pride; it is this pride of the philosopher 
that Montaigne repents of. The requirement of repentance of the intellect 
is “alien to our main philosophical tradition which has inherited from 
Greek philosophy the belief in the divinity of the intellect.”18 
Montaigne’s essay “Of Repentance” is often cited to prove that his 
adherence to Catholicism is superficial at best, for he seems to deny 
that he has any need to repent. It is true that he says “I rarely repent” 
(VS806, F612), and “if I had to live over again, I would live as I have 
lived” (VS816, F620). But he also says: “I know no superficial, halfway, 
and perfunctory repentance. It must affect me in every part before I will 
call it so, and must grip me by the vitals and afflict them as deeply and as 
completely as God sees into me” (VS813, F617). He does repent, then, but 
only deeply and completely.
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There are two places in the Essays in which Montaigne suggests such 
repentance, and both have to do with a “descent” to the simple and lowly. 
Montaigne sticks to the old ways: he has come through error and has 
arrived at “the extreme limit of Christian intelligence.” Of those who 
have come through error, some have become violent and immoderate in 
the defense of the Catholic side in the civil wars. Others, however, have 
returned to the old ways “with marvelous profit and confirmation, as at 
the extreme limit of Christian intelligence, and . . . enjoy their victory 
with consolation, active gratitude, reformed conduct, and great modesty” 
(VS312–13, F227). Sticking to the old ways means being one with the 
simple and thus giving the appearance of stupidity. Repentance of the 
intellect necessarily entails moral reformation—a real outward, as well as 
inner, conversion—because the pride of the philosopher is only overcome 
in recognition of his common humanity and his oneness with the most 
lowly human beings.
In “It Is Folly to Judge the True and the False by Our Own Capacity” 
Montaigne tells of his youthful attempt to exercise his “personal choice” 
with respect to the beliefs of the faith. However, he came through that 
error and acknowledged the authority of the Church. Looking back on 
that time of his life, he writes: “It is foolish presumption to go around 
disdaining and condemning as false whatever does not seem likely to us; 
which is an ordinary vice in those who think they have more than com-
mon ability. I used to do so once; and if I heard of returning spirits, 
prognostications of future events, enchantments, sorcery, or some other 
story that I could not swallow, . . . I felt compassion for the poor people 
who were taken in by these follies. And now I think that I was at least as 
much to be pitied myself” (VS178–79, F132). His openness to the testi-
mony of the simple and his submission to the simplicity of the old ways 
manifest his complete and deep repentance.
The Dialectic of Faith and Reason in the “Apology for Sebond”
The “Apology for Sebond” is the strongest evidence for those who hold 
that Montaigne is a skeptic-fideist, i.e., that he is a skeptic on the philo-
sophical level and a believer who believes “simply,” without any support 
from reason. Montaigne wrote this apology as a response to two criti-
cisms commonly made to the theologian Sebond’s Natural Theology, or 
The Book of Creatures and other such works in natural theology. (Mon-
taigne reports that someone told him that Sebond’s book was actually a 
kind of distillation of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas.)19 
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In the “Prologue” to his work, Sebond claims that God has revealed 
himself both in the Bible and in nature and that it is possible to prove the 
truths of faith by reason. The first objection to Sebond’s theology is put 
forward in the name of piety by those who think of themselves as believ-
ers. They say that “Christians do themselves harm in trying to support 
their belief by human reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a 
particular inspiration of divine grace” (VS440, F321). The second objec-
tion is put forward by unbelievers and atheists. Sebond’s arguments, they 
say, are “weak and unfit to prove what he proposes,” and these unbeliev-
ers set out to shatter Sebond’s arguments with ease (VS448, F327). Those 
who see Montaigne as an atheist place him on the side of the second 
objection. Those who see him as a skeptic-fideist place him on the side of 
the first objection. Montaigne, however, refutes both objections and he 
also finds something true in each objection, so that any interpretation of 
the “Apology” that places him simply on either side must be inadequate. 
The two objections, as formulated by Montaigne, are usually regarded 
as opposites, as the opposing and contradictory voices of belief and unbe-
lief. Frédéric Brahami, for example, says that “the second objection is 
diametrically opposed to the first” and that “these two radical positions, 
that of belief and that of unbelief undermine the synthesis of Sebond.”20 
But when these objections are exposed more fully, they show themselves 
to be related to each other and even dependent on each other at a deeper 
level. The first objection defines faith in terms of its origin: faith is “belief 
that is conceived only by faith and by a particular inspiration of divine 
grace.” God inspires those whom it pleases him to inspire: that is why 
they believe, and others do not. There is a direct communication by God 
to the mind of the believer. Faith, then, is taken to be private, inarticu-
late, and incommunicable. The second objection is a reaction against the 
possibility of faith but it also accepts this understanding of what faith is. 
Unbelief must see faith as a private experience, an experience that it ulti-
mately regards as illusory because it is publicly indefensible. 
Rationality prides itself in being both public and common. In the first 
place, it is completely transparent and communicable: when the dem-
onstrations of Euclidean geometry are displayed, for example, they can 
be understood by any rational human being and they receive universal 
assent. The truths of faith, of course, do not receive universal assent. Sec-
ondly, rationality is universal, the defining characteristic of the human 
species, whereas particular inspiration is not universal. Therefore, on this 
view of reason, faith (understood as particular inspiration) cannot give a 
public account of itself. It is defenseless before the court of reason. The 
first and second objections, then, share the same understanding of the 
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meaning of faith. It is this shared understanding that gives rise to the 
dialectic of the two objections, and it is this shared understanding that 
Montaigne is most deeply concerned to refute. 
Montaigne’s defense of the mind’s place in the life of faith leads him 
directly into the second objection. In the process of responding to the 
understanding of faith in the first objection, he just suddenly finds him-
self speaking in the voice of unbelief. He says: “I have already, without 
thinking about it, half involved myself in the second objection” (VS448, 
F327). The way in which Montaigne falls into the second objection and 
the way he characterizes reason from the very beginning of his response 
suggests that, once reason is invited in, it claims for itself an authority 
that ultimately admits no other authority. Now it must be said that this 
presumption of reason is very similar to the position taken by Sebond’s 
natural theology: man is said to be in the image of God by virtue of his 
reason. This, of course, is why Montaigne’s “defense” of Sebond seems 
ambiguous and even ironic: an attack on reason is an attack on the second 
objection but, at the same time, it is an attack on Sebond’s entire project 
of natural theology. In attacking the arrogance of reason, Montaigne is 
acknowledging what is true in the first objection, namely, that Christians 
do themselves harm by seeking to support their faith by reason, if reason 
is presumed to be the autonomous reason of the second objection. So 
also, in refuting the first objection and thus demanding public evidence of 
faith, he acknowledges what is true in the second objection, namely, the 
indefensibility of claims to private inspiration. 
Montaigne’s skeptical response to the second objection leads to the 
conclusion that reason, to which we had turned for a common ground, 
is so highly particularized that it cannot serve as the common, public 
ground we were seeking. The logic of his response to the first objection 
drove Montaigne to the common, public, universal ground of reason. But 
autonomous reason, instead of being the solid rock on which to build 
anything common, turns out to be a mere dream or, worse, a nightmare 
that dissolves into chaos. 
Where, then, does Montaigne himself stand on the question of the rela-
tion of faith and reason, at least insofar as his stand is revealed in the 
dialectic of the two objections? Is he, in fact, a skeptic-fideist? We can begin 
to answer this by returning to the issue of his sincerity in calling this essay 
a “defense” of Sebond. The tendency has been to see Montaigne’s apology 
for Sebond as either completely ironic or as unselfconsciously ambiguous 
and self-contradictory because, if he is either an atheist or a skeptic-fideist, 
then he must deny any harmony or compatibility between faith and rea-
son, and compatibility is Sebond’s most fundamental assumption. 
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If we see the two objections in their relation to each other and follow 
the movement of Montaigne’s thought as he works his way through the 
objections and their shared understandings of reason and faith, we find 
that he is in fact defending a transformed version of Sebond’s assump-
tion. Montaigne calls this essay an apology for Sebond because he does 
affirm the harmony of faith and reason—but not faith as defined in the 
first objection and not reason as assumed in the second objection. Faith as 
defined in the first objection is incomplete, imperfect, and even presump-
tuous: it is unexamined belief and it must be completed and in some way 
transformed in its dialectic with reason. The autonomous reason of the 
second objection is proud and presumptuous: it must be reformed in its 
dialectic with faith. 
In “Of Vain Subtleties,” as we have seen, Montaigne refers to the error 
of those who regard his “sticking to the old ways” as due to simplicity and 
stupidity. It turns out that his sticking to the old ways is “the extreme limit 
of Christian intelligence.” In “It Is Folly to Measure the True and the False 
by Our Own Capacity” he comes to see that his skepticism concerning the 
testimony of the simple was pitiable because it was due to the presump-
tion of the learned that what they have never experienced themselves must 
be impossible. Now Montaigne is subject neither to the unthinking credu-
lity of the simple nor to the arrogant presumption of the learned. 
That same movement of thought is just what occurs in the dialectic 
of the two objections in the “Apology.” From simple inarticulate belief, 
he ascends through doubt to autonomous rationality and then descends 
through doubt to the truth of faith. Of course he cannot simply return 
to or deliberately adopt the stance of unthinking belief as if he had never 
ascended from it. He ends up in a kind of middle position that transcends 
both simple credulity and learned skepticism, and that, in philosophical 
terms, would be called “learned ignorance.”
Perhaps this is what T. S. Eliot has in mind when he says that “what 
makes Montaigne a very great figure is that he succeeded . . . in giving 
expression to the skepticism of every human being. For every man who 
thinks and lives by thought must have his own skepticism, that which 
stops at the question, that which ends in denial, or that which leads to 
faith and is somehow integrated into the faith which transcends it.”21 
Montaigne’s skepticism is integrated into the faith which transcends it. 
The faith that has transcended and transformed doubt is not an unthink-
ing and inarticulate faith but Montaigne’s way of living the examined life 
as a Christian. 
At the beginning of his reply to the second objection, Montaigne says 
that the means he will take to beat down the pride and presumption of 
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those who advance the second objection is “to make them feel the inan-
ity, the vanity, and the nothingness of man” (VS448, F327). How will 
he do this? “St. Augustine, arguing against these people, has good cause 
to reproach them for their injustice in that they hold those parts of our 
belief to be false which our reason fails to establish. And to show that 
there can have been plenty of things whose nature and causes our reason 
cannot possibly establish, he puts before his adversaries certain known 
and indubitable experiences into which man confesses he has no insight.” 
Presumably, Montaigne is referring to the City of God (especially book 
21, chapter 5), where Augustine makes this argument and gives exam-
ples, mostly from Pliny, of natural marvels. But Montaigne does not 
propose to follow Augustine’s procedure. Rather, he says, “we must do 
more, and teach them that to convict our reason of weakness, there is 
no need to go sifting out rare examples” (VS449, F328). “Doing more 
than St. Augustine” might plausibly be understood to imply a defense 
of a thoroughgoing skepticism. But seen within the dialectic of faith and 
reason, “doing more than St. Augustine” means showing the ordinary to 
be extraordinary. Montaigne’s movement of thought reveals the strange 
in the familiar, the extraordinary in the ordinary. The world is restored 
through true faith to its astonishing strangeness. A world created out of 
nothing, a world in which the Word was made flesh, is revealed as such 
in the philosophical activity that ends in wonder at the most familiar.22
Sacramental and Incarnational Metaphysics
The way in which Montaigne holds fast to sacred tradition amounts to 
nothing less than a reordering of the mind and of being itself. He sticks 
to the old ways because his understanding of the world is what might be 
called a sacramental and incarnational metaphysics: the reversal of the 
Aristotelian order and the relocation of the divine in the lowest rather 
than the highest. The Catholic tradition brings into everyday life its sacra-
mental and incarnational metaphysics: the everyday world is thoroughly 
intertwined and imbued with the sacred. 
Montaigne says: “In my opinion, from the most ordinary, common, 
and familiar things, if we could put them in their proper light, can be 
formed the greatest miracles of nature and the most marvelous examples, 
especially on the subject of human actions” (VS1081, F829). The “proper 
light,” the way in which the most ordinary, common, and familiar things 
can be seen as marvelous and miraculous, is that they embody the 
sacred. Indeed, this is what happens in the Essays: the familiar becomes 
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astonishing. The everyday is not astonishing because of something extra-
neous being brought into it. The everyday shows the presence of God 
not through reason, not in the highest, but in the lowest and most hid-
den human actions. Sacred tradition gets down into the lowest aspects of 
“mere” life. The everyday is the incarnation of the sacred. 
In his “Notes Towards the Definition of Culture,” T. S. Eliot describes 
the conditions for the kind of common culture that Montaigne presup-
poses: “While we believe that the same religion may inform a variety of 
cultures, we may ask whether any culture could come into being, or main-
tain itself, without a religious basis. We may go further and ask whether 
what we call the culture, and what we call the religion, of a people are 
not different aspects of the same thing: the culture being, essentially, the 
incarnation (so to speak) of the religion of a people.”23 The situation that 
Eliot describes is one in which “the culture of an artist or a philosopher 
is distinct from that of a mine worker or a field labourer; the culture of a 
poet will be somewhat different from that of a politician; but in a healthy 
society these are all parts of the same culture.”24 Specifically, the mode of 
being of Europe cannot be understood apart from its Christian culture: 
“It is in Christianity that our arts have developed; it is in Christianity 
that the laws of Europe have—until recently—been rooted. It is against a 
background of Christianity that all our thought has significance.”25 Eliot’s 
account of the way in which culture is the incarnation of religious belief, 
the embodiment, as it were, of religion in everyday life, articulates how 
culture can be the source of unity through the metaphysical beliefs of 
religion that penetrate to the deepest levels of everyday life.
What I have called Montaigne’s sacramental and incarnational meta-
physics can be seen especially in the way the sacraments are present in 
the Essays. The sacraments are related to incarnational metaphysics 
because they gather the everyday materials of life itself (water, bread, 
and wine) and make these elements sacred. Montaigne brings baptism, 
penance, extreme unction, and the Eucharist into the flow of his thought 
and expression in a way that is so “natural” that it is easy to miss their 
significance. His father had him held over the baptismal font by villagers 
of the lowest condition in order to attach him and oblige him to them 
(VS1100, F844). In the sacrament of extreme unction (the last rites), the 
priest anoints all of the five senses in the sign of the cross. Montaigne 
says that, when he becomes very ill, “I reconcile myself with God by the 
last Christian offices, and find myself thereby more free and unburdened” 
(VS982, F751). He mentions that the Mass is still celebrated in the cha-
pel in his house, while all of the churches around his house have been 
emptied and ruined by the reformers (VS966, F738). The Essays have the 
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sense of confession, and Montaigne refers to his work as a public confes-
sion (VS846, F643). His repentance is both deep and complete for it is a 
repentance of the intellect and of the will. 
The apparent absence of piety in the Essays leads most readers to 
conclude that Montaigne is insincere in his professions of faith. I would 
argue, on the contrary, that this absence is in fact meant to make the 
sacred fit into the flow of everyday life. When he says, for example, that 
“we are Christians by the same title that we are Perigordians or Ger-
mans” (VS445, F325), he does not intend to reduce Catholicism to the 
status of custom but rather to acknowledge the way in which the divine, 
as sacred tradition, is embedded in the accidents of human life.
The clearest expression of the presence of the sacred in the everyday 
concerns the Eucharist. As Eamon Duffy says of the Mass on the eve of 
the Reformation: the body on the communion cloth is “the emblem and 
the instrument of all truly human embodiment.”26 Our own being is nei-
ther divine nor angelic, but embodied. The domestic and private are the 
anchor of that embodiment and the locus of the human good.
In “To the Reader” Montaigne elaborates on what he means by his 
domestic and private end. His essays are the means by which his friends 
and relatives will “nourish” more completely and vividly their knowledge 
of him after he dies.27 This allusion to food is then taken up again at the 
very end of the Essays, where Montaigne mentions food in a very unusual 
way. Speaking of those Christian ascetics and contemplatives who despise 
the bodily pleasures, Montaigne says that they anticipate, “by dint of 
keen and vehement hope, the enjoyment of eternal food, final end and 
last stop of Christian desires, sole constant and incorruptible pleasure” 
(VS1114, F856). These are the ascetics whose “transcendental humors” 
frighten him. Here, he brings them down to the everyday, to this world, in 
this extraordinary reference to the Beatific Vision—the supposed purely 
spiritual and intellectual pleasure of the contemplation of God—as eter-
nal food. Montaigne describes even this purely spiritual and intellectual 
joy of the vision of God in terms of the everyday enjoyment of the plea-
sures of eating.
According to Eamon Duffy, “the rhythms of the liturgy on the eve of 
the Reformation remained the rhythms of life itself.”28 The sacramental 
and incarnational character of the Essays accounts for the way in which 
Montaigne’s Catholicism is almost invisible in this work. The sacred and 
the mundane are linked in such a way that the everyday is permeated with 
the divine, which is therefore not easily distinguished from the lowliest 
actions. Pascal’s thought also moves within this hiddenness of the divine: 
“Just as Jesus remained unknown among men, so the truth remains 
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among popular opinions with no outward difference. Thus the Eucharist 
and ordinary bread.”29 The sacred is just “in there” with the everyday, but 
this does not destroy its character as sacred and divine. As C. S. Lewis 
puts it: “Common bread, miraculous bread, sacramental bread—these 
three are distinct, but not to be separated.”30 What is revered in the sac-
rament is what is already present in common matter. Sacred tradition is 
hidden first in everyday life (bread and wine) and is made visible, that is, 
public, in the sacramental life of the Church.
Oakeshott’s view of religion might well serve as a description of 
Montaigne’s own stance toward sacred tradition: “Religion, then, is not 
. . . an interest attached to life, a subsidiary activity; nor is it a power 
which governs life from the outside with a, no doubt divine, but certainly 
incomprehensible, sanction for its authority. It is simply life itself, life 
dominated by the belief that its value is in the present, not merely in the 
past or future, that if we lose ourselves, we lose all.”31 To say that reli-
gion is life itself is to say that we do not need to transport ourselves into 
the “other world” or to the “supernatural” realm in order to experience 
the divine in our lives. Rather, the divine is present in our lives in this 
world.
Refounding Society
Montaigne insists that the Church is a public institution that constitutes 
the social bond: it is the Church that makes society possible. The nature 
of the society that Montaigne regards as possible is a union of men that 
is determined not by territory, but by the universal bonds of truth and of 
goodness. Montaigne’s adherence to the old ways is not merely formal: 
the truth and goodness required for the social bond are the essential con-
tent of sacred tradition. It is this essential core that Montaigne preserves 
and brings to light in his invention of modern society.
Montaigne says that, whereas the ancient philosophers taught that reli-
gion is merely a human contrivance to bind society together, our sovereign 
creator has “freed our belief” and “based it on the eternal foundation of 
his holy word” (VS579, F437). The basis of the classical forms of human 
association is a lie, albeit a “noble lie.” The foundation of Montaigne’s 
new form of society is truth. Not only does Christianity claim to be true, 
but it also holds that truth to be accessible to all men, to the most simple 
peasant woman as to the most learned theologian. Thus, the pride of the 
philosopher (that he is among the few who possess the truth) is overcome 
in the submission of the philosopher to the old ways of the simple.
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Although Montaigne claims that the Essays are entirely human, with 
“no admixture of theology,” there is one instance in which he does, in 
fact, call upon the help of theology. In “Of Cruelty” he defends his sym-
pathy with the animals, a sympathy that makes him appear weak. “And 
so that people will not laugh at this sympathy that I have with them, 
Theology herself orders us to show some favor in their regard; and con-
sidering that one and the same master has lodged us in this place for his 
service, and that they, like ourselves, are of his family, she is right to enjoin 
upon us some respect and affection toward them” (VS433, F316). Mon-
taigne is here elaborating on the principal theme of this essay: cruelty is 
the extreme of all vice. Although cruelty had always been regarded as a 
vice in both classical and Christian morality, Montaigne is the first to 
claim that it is the extreme of all vice. His reordering of the virtues and 
vices is intended to foster the social virtues by overcoming the distance—
of which cruelty is the outward expression—between weak and strong 
through sympathy and compassion.
In the “Apology for Sebond,” especially in his reply to the first objec-
tion, Montaigne is highly critical of the cruel conduct of those who call 
themselves Christians on both sides in the civil wars of his day. They use 
religion as a pretext for giving vent to their vicious passions, their cruelty, 
ambition, hatred, and avarice. So also, in “Of Coaches,” he describes the 
extreme cruelty of the Spanish conquerors toward the people of the New 
World. “Would it be as a testimonial to their justice or their zeal for reli-
gion? Truly, those are ways too contrary and hostile to so holy an end. 
If they had proposed to extend our faith, they would have reflected that 
faith is not spread by possession of territory but by possession of men” 
(VS913, F697).
In “Of Cruelty” it is sympathy that ultimately shows itself to be the 
goodness that he inherits from his father. And it is sympathy rather than 
the strength of virtue that serves as the new basis for morality. Sympa-
thy looks weak—and that is why he must call in the help of theology to 
defend himself from the derision of the strong—but it is actually divine. 
In “The Nature and Meaning of Sociality” Oakeshott argues that “God is 
the only principle of sociability which will explain the facts of life. Society 
becomes possible [only] by religion.” Thus, Oakeshott interprets “God is 
Love” to mean “God is the only principle of sociality.”32 
For Montaigne, the spiritual power of the Church is inextricably linked 
to the transformation of the relation between the nobility and the people. 
It is, after all, his baptism that unites him to the poorest of the poor. 
Montaigne’s father had sent him to the poorest village in his neighbor-
hood to be nursed and had him held over the baptismal font by villagers 
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of the lowest condition in order to attach and oblige him to them. “His 
plan,” Montaigne says, “succeeded not at all badly. I give myself willingly 
to the little people, whether because there is more glory in it, or through 
natural compassion, which has infinite power over me” (VS1100, F844). 
Glory, natural compassion, and the grace of baptism are indistinguish-
able in him, and therefore he shares in the life of both the lowest and the 
highest in society. Eamon Duffy insists on “the social homogeneity of 
late medieval religion.”33 As he demonstrates: “Rich and poor, simple and 
sophisticate could kneel side by side, using the same prayers and sharing 
the same hopes.” In spite of the differences of sophistication about the 
faith, “they did not have a different religion.”34
The Church offers the possibility of a union among men that tran-
scends natural and social inequality and is based on a foundation of 
truth. In both “It Is Folly to Measure the True and the False by Our 
Own Capacity” and “Of Vain Subtleties,” Montaigne’s turn to the lowly 
and common is identified or associated with his return to the Church 
and a renewed grasp of the meaning of the Church. In both of these 
accounts of his submission to sacred tradition, Montaigne descends, as it 
were, to the simple and identifies himself with their beliefs. The Church 
is “that great common way” (VS520, F387). The distinction between the 
learned and the common herd does not obtain within the Church for 
there “we are all the vulgar” (VS570, F429). As Roger Scruton observes: 
“When religious faith declines it becomes difficult for intellectuals 
to believe that they really belong to the same community as ordinary 
people.”35 
Montaigne is, I believe, the only modern political philosopher who 
defends the Catholic Church in its universality, the only one who does 
not recommend that it be subordinated to the state, or that it merely be 
tolerated as one among many religions within the state. By his allegiance 
to the Church as the universal bond, Montaigne does indeed weaken the 
national bond. From the point of view of the universal bond, the national 
bond is secondary and appears arbitrary. The Church transcends the lim-
its of the political and stands as an independent authority and, therefore, 
as a limit on the power of the state. 
The universal and common bond has its source in a universal and com-
mon city. Rome is “the only common and universal city. The sovereign 
magistrate who commands there is acknowledged equally elsewhere. It 
is the metropolitan city of all Christian nations; the Spaniard and the 
Frenchman, every man is at home there. To be one of the princes of that 
state one need only be of Christendom, wherever it may be” (VS997, 
F763). In his Travel Journal, Montaigne makes a similar claim: Rome 
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is “the most universal city in the world, a place where strangeness and 
differences of nationality are considered least; for by its nature it is a 
city pieced together out of foreigners; everyone is as if at home. Its ruler 
embraces Christendom with his authority; his princely jurisdiction is 
binding on foreigners in their own homes just as here. At his own election 
and that of all the princes and grandees of his court the consideration 
of their origin has no weight.”36 The Church is the society in which the 
origins do not matter. 
The Church is the proof of the possibility of society and is also the 
only possibility for multicultural society. This means, however, that soci-
ety cannot be understood in terms of the boundaries of territory and 
language. The society of men is a union that is not limited by space and 
time. “We embrace both those who have been and those who are not 
yet” (VS976, F746). As Pieper maintains: “We should not forget that the 
common possession of the sacred tradition creates a fundamental unity of 
all mankind, really a unity in relation to that foundation of spiritual life 
that—hidden but very real—first makes communication among human 
beings possible and worth attempting.”37
In his essay “Where Is Christendom?” Etienne Gilson reflects upon his 
travels in the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union. Recalling the 
moment when he entered a church in Chicago, he asks “Where was I? 
Neither in America nor in France, nor at any geographical point on earth. 
Yet I had surely reached a journey’s end, since I was at home: I was in 
Christendom.” Wherever there is a parish church, there is Christendom.38 
Gilson explains the basis for this sentiment: “The same Mass, the same 
priests, the same communion in the same God given by the same priests 
to the faithful of the same faith—all this creates, at every moment and in 
every place, an immense spiritual society which knows neither geographic 
barriers nor political boundaries and in which the Christian always feels 
that he is at home.”39 
This universal society of Christendom is not to be identified simply 
with the Church itself. “As subject to the State, we Christians are all mem-
bers of a society of which the State is seeking the common temporal end; 
as subject to the Church, we are all members of a society of which the 
Church is seeking the common spiritual end, and the very temporal part 
of the Church is integrally directed to this end; as members of Christen-
dom, we are part of a third social group, one that is neither quite the State 
nor quite the Church, but one that is formed by the various members of 
the various states in so far as they are aware of belonging to the same 
Church and of being all disciples of Christ.”40 This third level of society 
might be described as the common culture of Christendom.
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Montaigne expresses this sentiment when he writes: “If I were afraid 
to die in any other place than that of my birth, if I thought I would die 
less comfortably away from my family, I should scarcely go out of France; 
I should not go out of my parish without terror” (VS978, F747). He is, 
however, careless about where he will die because he is “at home” every-
where and “at home” in this world. In fact, Montaigne (who did not want 
his death to say anything that his life had not already said) died in his 
home at Mass at the elevation of the Host. 
Montaigne refounds philosophy and human society by bringing out 
the core of sacred tradition, by discovering and bringing to light what 
was always there but hidden. The new is really the old. In this way, he 
changes the relationship between the eternal and the temporal as it was 
understood by ancient philosophy and as it was inherited by medieval 
theology. The temporal is not subsumed under the eternal. Rather, in 
Montaigne’s incarnational metaphysics, the eternal is brought into time.
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Chapter Three

The Philosophical Act (I): Judgment
For Montaigne, the philosophical act is neither contemplation nor practi-
cal wisdom, neither escape to the eternal nor immersion in the immediacy 
of practice. Rather, the philosophical act is judgment, purged of the self of 
the philosopher. Judgment subjects reason to the good. The philosophical 
act overcomes the traditional hierarchy and brings the new out of the old. 
In redefining this act, Montaigne surmounts the presumption of Aristotle, 
the pride of the philosopher, and separates the man from the philosopher.
To claim that the philosophical act is judgment is also to deny that Mon-
taigne is a skeptic. The outcome of skepticism is not true judgment but the 
suspension of judgment. Although in some ways Montaigne’s practice of 
essaying resembles the skeptical practice of weighing opposing perspectives 
on a given topic, his goal is neither suspension of judgment nor the imper-
turbability that results from it. And although Montaigne is cautious in giving 
assent, he does make judgments throughout the essays. Further, his judgment 
is not passively receptive: it effects a reordering of the human world.1 
In chapter 2 I offer a reading of the “Apology for Sebond,” the essay 
which provides the strongest evidence for the claim that Montaigne is 
a skeptic. In spite of his high praise of skepticism and the skeptics in 
that essay, Montaigne goes beyond traditional skepticism to be open to 
the possible and the astonishing character of the familiar. This aspect of 
his thought will be brought out more fully in chapter 4. In chapters 5, 
6, and 7, I discuss the moral and political judgments that are central to 
Montaigne’s philosophical project. Here again, in spite of his remarkable 
tolerance for differences of opinion, the freedom and autonomy that he 
introduces are not grounded in moral skepticism.
Beginning in Thought
The Essays present a man immersed in the world of thought, a man 
who must achieve his own mind within the world of inherited opinion. 
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Montaigne brings forth something new against the background of that 
inherited world. He brings forth the possible out of what would have 
seemed impossible.
The world of inherited opinion is a confused world in which true 
and false are mixed together with no obvious way to distinguish them. 
Montaigne shows us three conditions of error and falsehood which the 
philosophical act must overcome. The contexts in which he presents these 
conditions reveal the nature of the philosophical act in its overcoming of 
error and falsehood.
First, true opinions are mixed in with false opinions. Montaigne says 
that he is able to sift the true from the false. In “Of Presumption” he writes: 
“This capacity for sifting truth, whatever it may amount to in me, and this 
free humor not to subject my belief easily, I owe it principally to myself: 
for the most firm imaginations that I have, and the most general, are those 
which, in a manner of speaking, were born with me. They are natural and 
all mine. I produced them crude and simple, of a production bold and 
strong, but a little troubled and imperfect. Since then I have established 
and fortified them by the authority of others, and by the sound discourse 
of the ancients, with whom I found my judgment conformed: these have 
assured me a firmer grip on them and have given me the enjoyment of 
them and a more entire possession” (VS658, F499). He can distinguish 
the true from the false because his most firm and general “imaginations” 
were produced by himself, or generated by his own mind. They are his 
first beliefs. What he has always believed is true because he has always 
believed it. His study of the ancient philosophers has only confirmed these 
first opinions and made them more “his own.” This, in fact, just looks 
like presumption: what is his own is true and ancient philosophy simply 
confirms him in this presumption. The philosophical act, then, must over-
come, in some way, this most basic form of presumption. In returning to 
his first opinions, Montaigne actually introduces something new.
The mind’s activity of generation is central to Montaigne’s understand-
ing of the philosophical act. “I let fly my caprices all the more freely 
in public, inasmuch as, although they are born with me and without a 
model, I know that they will find their relation to some ancient humor; 
and someone will not fail to say: ‘That is where he got it’ ” (VS546, F409). 
His caprices are original. That is, they are born with him, generated by his 
mind, and not copied from anyone else: they are “without a model.” But 
they resemble the sayings of ancient philosophy, and that is why he is “an 
unpremeditated and accidental philosopher.” His caprices are new, but he 
does not want them to appear to be new. Rather, he is content to let them 
appear to be old for he is bringing the new out of the old. 
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Montaigne provides the second formulation of the condition of error 
in “Of Vain Subtleties.” He always presents himself as a nameless type 
that must be articulated in the terms of the ancient hierarchy but that 
cannot really be accounted for within that hierarchy. There are, he says, 
two kinds of good Christians: the simple who accept without question 
the beliefs of the Church, and the learned who have made a profound 
study of the Church and Scripture and have penetrated into the meaning 
of what is believed. Then there is a third type: those who “stick to the old 
ways” but not on account of simplicity and stupidity and not on account 
of study. Unlike the reformers who reject the tradition, this third type 
does stick to the old ways, but in a way that is different from both the 
simple and the learned. This third type has reached “the extreme limit of 
Christian intelligence.” This, we assume, is Montaigne himself. However, 
in this “middle region” of men, the region between the simple and the 
learned, error is “engendered.” Those who “stop at the appearance of the 
first sense” assume that men like Montaigne, who stick to the old ways, 
do so out of simplicity and stupidity. They mistake the cause because they 
cannot get beyond first appearances. This means that first appearances 
are, or can be, misleading. The error here pertains to causes. They assume 
that the same effect must be produced by the same cause. The “middle 
region,” then, offers two opposing possibilities: error and the extreme 
limit of Christian intelligence.
In this essay, Montaigne offers several other presentations of his sta-
tus as a nameless third type.2 First, there are two kinds of good men: 
the simple peasants and the philosophers who are strong and enriched 
by learning. Then there are the “half-breeds” who have disdained igno-
rance of letters but are unable to reach the status of the philosophers: 
“their rear-end between two stools, like me, and so many others.” These 
half-breeds are “dangerous” and “trouble the world.” Montaigne, how-
ever, has pulled himself back as far as possible to the first condition of 
ignorance. Second, Montaigne considers an “abecedarian ignorance” that 
precedes knowledge and a “doctoral ignorance” that comes after knowl-
edge, “an ignorance that knowledge generates and engenders, just as it 
undoes and destroys the first” (VS312–13, F226–27). Third, Montaigne 
concludes this essay with the claim that his mind has “opened up a pas-
sage,” and that it is easy to discover “an infinite number of examples” in 
which high and low are similar. The third, middle way, however, offers 
two different possibilities: error or the limit of Christian intelligence. 
The Essays, he says, would not appeal either to common, vulgar minds 
or to singular, excellent minds, but “they might get by in the middle 
region.” 
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Of the two possibilities offered to the middle region of men (among 
whom Montaigne counts himself), one is associated with violence and 
danger, the other with “descending,” as it were, to the lowest condition. 
Simple souls are “good Christians,” and great minds who have studied 
the Scriptures are “good Christians.” Of those in the middle region, some 
who have renounced the error of the Reformation have become extreme 
and violent in the defense of their side in the civil wars. Others, like Mon-
taigne, stick to the old ways and “enjoy their victory with consolation, 
active gratitude, reformed conduct, and great modesty.” They have come 
to a deeper understanding of Scripture and of “the mysterious and divine 
secret of our ecclesiastical polity.” So also, both the simple peasants and 
the philosophers of his day are “good men.” The half-breeds, those in the 
middle region, are dangerous and trouble the world. Montaigne pulls 
back, as far as possible, to the condition of ignorance.
If error is “stopping at the appearance of the first sense” (or in Frame’s 
translation: “following the first plausible meaning”), then Montaigne is 
presenting the discovery of truth as getting beyond the appearance of the 
first sense to the true meaning. Going beyond the appearance of the first 
sense means testing our common impressions. Montaigne criticizes the 
philosophy of the schools for its unquestioned acceptance of the teachings 
of Aristotle; his criticism makes much of the fact that we never question 
our “common impressions.” Our imagination is prone to receive “impres-
sions of falsehood by frivolous appearances” (VS1034, F791). 
Montaigne discusses one of the most important instances of “stopping 
at the appearance of the first sense” in “Of Cruelty.” He here describes 
himself as merely innocent and good, rather than as virtuous. He is, there-
fore, lower in rank within the moral order than both the perfectly virtuous 
man, whose rule over the passions is absolute, and the imperfectly virtu-
ous man, who must struggle with the passions. Montaigne’s own, third 
condition of goodness and innocence is, he says, “so close to imperfection 
and weakness that I do not very well know how to separate their confines 
and distinguish them. The very names of innocence and goodness are for 
this reason to some extent terms of contempt” (VS426, F310). Stopping 
at the appearance of the first sense means misunderstanding the nature 
of goodness, mistaking it for weakness, and assuming that it is caused by 
weakness. This confusion of goodness with weakness and imperfection 
is based on the Aristotelian hierarchy of strong over weak. Montaigne’s 
refounding replaces the weak with the good, thus overcoming error by 
establishing the strength of goodness.
The third condition of error and falsehood is brought about through 
what Montaigne calls “the violent prejudice of custom.” He begins “Of 
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Custom” with an account of the “power” of custom. Habit or custom 
“is a violent and treacherous schoolmistress.” She gains her power and 
authority over us stealthily, little by little. After a mild and humble begin-
ning, “she soon uncovers to us a furious and tyrannical face against which 
we no longer have the liberty of even raising our eyes” (VS109, F77). 
Montaigne tells us that, at one time, he was charged with the responsi-
bility of defending a certain custom, the content of which he does not 
specify. His approach was to uncover the origin of this custom, presum-
ably because the origin would show him the reason and the justification 
for it. To his great surprise, he found the origin so weak that he became 
almost disgusted. 
There are, he continues, two kinds of reaction to the discovery of the 
weakness of the origins of custom: “Our masters”—presumably the phi-
losophers and theologians who are “directors of conscience”—make no 
attempt to defend custom on the basis of reason; they simply take refuge 
in the ancientness of usage. The Cynics, on the other hand, simply aban-
don custom and return to nature as the standard of reason. Montaigne, 
however, is a third type: “Whoever wants to [essay himself in the same 
way and] get rid of this violent prejudice of custom will find many things 
accepted with undoubting resolution, which have no support but in the 
hoary beard and the wrinkles of the usage that goes with them; but when 
this mask is torn off, and he refers things to truth and reason, he will feel 
his judgment as it were all upset, and nevertheless restored to a much 
surer status” (VS117, F84–85).3 Unlike our masters, he does not simply 
defer to the authority of custom on account of its hoary beard. Unlike the 
Cynics, he does not simply abandon custom by returning to some version 
of original nature. His judgment is “restored” to a much surer status. 
The beginnings of all things, he says, are always “weak” (VS1020, F780). 
They must be weak because they are not ends; the end is not inherent in 
the beginning. To “restore” means to lead things back “to their true end” 
(VS118, F85). 
The very meaning of “essaying,” then, is the overcoming of the violent 
prejudice of custom. Essaying is exposing the weakness of the beginnings 
and the disproportion of those beginnings to the power of custom. Cus-
tom is the violence that is exerted over the mind, the violence that the 
philosopher must first recognize and then combat. But Montaigne also 
says that the opinions of the Cynics, who reject the authority of custom, 
are “barbarous.” Therefore, Montaigne breaks with custom in an unusual 
way. He refounds custom, not by violently overturning everything, but 
by replacing its foundation: he replaces the weak with the strength of the 
good. Thus is his judgment restored to a much surer status.
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Thought begins in conditions of error and falsehood because the mind 
is not receptive of “what is.” For Aristotle, thought is measured by being: 
the mind is like a blank writing tablet, ready to receive the forms of things. 
In contrast, Montaigne does not claim that his mind receives the forms of 
things. Rather, he says, his mind “generates” and “produces” out of itself. 
The origin of thought is the mind itself.
In the Aristotelian tradition, the highest activity of the mind is con-
templation because contemplation is a participation in the activity of 
the divine (Meta. 12.7, 1072b13; NE. 10.7, 1177a13–1177b8). It is the 
divine that establishes the hierarchy, and the divine is the highest in the 
order of things. Despite his great admiration, Montaigne cannot stomach 
the ecstasies of contemplation reported of Socrates (VS1115, F856), that 
he stood in a trance for an entire day and night in the midst of the army, 
“overtaken and enraptured by some deep thought” (VS1109, F852). 
The contrast between the traditional notions of knowing and contem-
plation as essentially receptive activities and Montaigne’s presentation 
of the mind as generating and producing comes through clearly in “Of 
Idleness.” He intends by this title to bring to mind the traditional idea 
of leisure as the condition for contemplation. Idleness, in the tradition, 
is the opposite of leisure, which is time devoted to the divine in worship 
and contemplation. Leisure is not idleness because it involves activity, the 
highest activity; it is “useless” in the best sense, that is, it is not directed 
to an end outside itself but is an end in itself. Idleness, on the other 
hand, is useless in the worst sense: it is not good in itself but good for 
nothing. 
In this essay, Montaigne tells of his withdrawal from the affairs of 
politics into the solitude of his study. He intends to let his mind “entertain 
itself in full idleness and stay and settle in itself, which I hoped it might 
do more easily now, having become weightier and riper with time.” But 
that is not what happens. He finds instead that his mind “gives birth to so 
many chimeras and fantastic monsters, one after another, without order 
or purpose [propos].” He decides that “in order to contemplate their 
ineptitude and strangeness” at his pleasure, he will put these chimeras and 
monsters in writing, “hoping in time to make my mind ashamed of itself” 
(VS33, F21). Montaigne is playing on the traditional notions of leisure 
and contemplation, conflating leisure with idleness. Contemplation is not 
the beholding of form but the generation of chimeras and fantastic mon-
sters, “unformed” productions of his own mind. The activity of the mind 
in idleness is not the measuring of the mind by eternal being but the mind 
entertaining itself in time. By emphasizing the role of time, he distances 
himself from the philosopher’s escape to the eternal.
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Because he says that he puts these fabrications in writing, it would 
seem that the Essays are just these productions of his own mind. But 
why should his mind be ashamed of itself? Shame suggests a moral and 
social dimension of his thought. The mind alone with itself is the mind 
withdrawn from the affairs of the world and from other men. Montaigne 
wants to make his mind ashamed of its chimeras, which have no order 
or purpose because they have no “definite subject” and “no fixed end” 
(VS32, F21). By putting the mind’s fantastic productions into writing, he 
exposes them to public view and therefore exposes himself to the possibil-
ity of shame. Perhaps he is suggesting that the proper place of the mind’s 
activity is the world of human affairs and that he must order his thought 
to that world.
Representation 
The generative power of the mind, and thus the source of error and false-
hood, is manifested in the capacity for representation. This capacity is 
one of the very few things that is said to be unique to man in the long 
comparison of man with the other animals in the “Apology.” The ability 
to have the images of things in the mind without the matter, that privi-
lege in which our soul glories, is not peculiar to man but is shared by the 
beasts (VS481, F354). Representation, however, shows that man is not 
constrained within the natural hierarchy. “If it is true that man alone, of 
all the animals, has this freedom of imagination and this unruliness of 
thought, that represents to him that which is, that which is not, and that 
which he wants, the false and the true, this is an advantage that is sold 
him very dear and in which he has very little to glorify himself, for from 
it springs the principal source of the evils that press him” (VS459–60, 
F336). 
Representation is the source of evils because it gives us both the true and 
the false, both what is and what is not. Representation is not the mind’s 
reception of the intelligible forms of things. A form can only be what is 
and what is true, whereas a representation is produced by the mind itself. 
If the capacity to receive the intelligible forms of things were distinctively 
human, then man would remain within the order and limits of nature. His 
capacity for thought would be located in a continuous ascent from sensa-
tion, which he shares with all animals, to contemplation, which he shares 
with the divine. But the human mind does not docilely receive the forms 
of things as they are; it also actively represents its own productions to 
itself and the world, and the capacity for representation means freedom 
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and unruliness. “We have emancipated ourselves from [nature’s] rules to 
abandon ourselves to the vagabond freedom of our fancies” (VS58, F39).
Montaigne writes: “Others form man; I tell of him, and represent a 
particular one, very ill-formed” (VS804, F610).4 A form is an essence, 
a universal, fully achieved in a single end or notion of perfection. Mon-
taigne, in contrast, represents a particular. Whereas forms must be 
articulated only in their perfection, representation allows for the expres-
sion of imperfection: this particular is “very ill-formed.” Since form is 
perfect, it is what the thing ought to be. Montaigne’s representation of 
himself is true because it is not in terms of what ought to be but of what 
is: “what is” is particular and imperfect. Yet the power of representation 
replaces the power of the universal; for Montaigne, the imperfect par-
ticular stands for all men: “each man bears the entire form of the human 
condition” (VS805, F611).
Imagination and Invention
Montaigne’s essay on the imagination is entitled “Of the Power of the 
Imagination.” In his view, “that faculty is all important, at least more 
important than any other” (VS1087, F833).5 While the imagination is all-
important and powerful for him, Montaigne’s memory is “monstrously 
deficient.” There is almost no trace of memory in him, and in this he is 
unique. “I do not think there is another one in the world so monstrously 
deficient. All my other faculties are low and common; but in this one I 
think I am singular and very rare, and thereby worthy of gaining a name 
and reputation” (VS34, F21). This apparently ironic assertion about him-
self is usually not taken seriously but is attributed to his penchant for 
self-deprecation. After all, his book is filled with hundreds of quotations 
and borrowed stories, all from the storehouse of his memory. But if we 
take him at his word, then this monstrous deficiency must tell us some-
thing about the mind itself.
Montaigne’s lack of memory frees him from the past, from the inher-
ited, from learning, and from custom. Therefore, he stands in a relation 
of distance from ancient philosophy and history. His mind is not held 
under the unexamined authority of the tradition. As Tzvetan Todorov 
says of Montaigne: “The activity of the mind itself must be freed from 
the grip of tradition in order to rely solely on its own forces.”6 That is 
why Montaigne is free to invent with respect to the stories taken from the 
histories. Absence of memory is freedom from the actual, from what has 
happened. 
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Montaigne’s mind, then, is not memory. Most people, he says, make 
no distinction between memory and mind and therefore assume that 
deficiency of memory is deficiency of understanding (VS34, F22). The 
identification of mind with memory would seem to refer to the Socratic 
formula, “knowledge is recollection,” and to the Augustinian formula, 
“memory itself is mind.” These formulations attempt to capture the expe-
rience of discovery in the process of learning something new. It is as if 
we are discovering something that was already there, already present in 
the mind. What seems new is not really new. The new is in fact eter-
nal. Knowledge is, in the tradition, ultimately recollection of the eternal 
unchanging forms. 
Kierkegaard gives us an especially clear description of the alterna-
tives in his Philosophical Fragments: either all learning is recollection, as 
Socrates had concluded, or the moment of learning, in time, must have 
“decisive significance.”7 For “viewed Socratically, any point of departure 
in time is eo ipso something accidental, a vanishing point, an occasion.”8 
The moment in time is merely the occasion for remembering. From the 
Socratic viewpoint, “the temporal point of departure is nothing, because 
in the same moment I discover that I have known the truth from eternity 
without knowing it, in the same instant that moment is hidden in the 
eternal, assimilated into it.”9 
Montaigne’s “monstrously deficient” memory means that his mind is 
not subsumed under the eternal: the action of his thought is a true begin-
ning and not merely an occasion for remembering. That is the only way 
in which the new can emerge in his thought. Discovery is not remember-
ing but inventing. In compensation for the imperfection of his memory, 
Montaigne has been given invention (VS35, F22). 
The Essays are at the center of Grahame Castor’s analysis of the mean-
ing of “invention” in his Pleiade Poetics: A Study in Sixteenth-Century 
Thought and Terminology. The principal conclusions of this analysis are 
that invention is most closely associated with the faculty of the imagina-
tion, and that invention is not the creation of something entirely new but 
a discovery of something that was already present but hidden. Castor says 
that “the sixteenth century made no absolute distinction between the pro-
cess of imagining and that of inventing.”10 “Invention” and “imagination” 
are more or less interchangeable terms for Montaigne.11 Castor describes 
invention as, in some ways, a pre-rational activity, because invention 
seeks out particulars that are appropriate to a general topic. The func-
tion of the imagination is to assemble images and present them to reason. 
“Imagination and invention were thus the servants of reason; but this was 
a rather ambiguous relationship, for the reason was to a very large extent 
The Philosophical Act (I) 59
dependent upon them in its dealings with things outside itself. They were 
the powers which reason employed in order to move outwards, beyond 
itself, the means whereby it was able to act upon external things, and to 
enter into a relationship of knowledge with them.”12 Montaigne says that 
“we hold [not only the past but] even present things by the imagination” 
(VS996, F763). Thus, imagination and invention replace memory in the 
activity of knowing. And it is through the imagination that reason is able 
to exercise power.
Although invention later came to mean something like creation, “in 
the sixteenth century . . . invention was still quite definitely a finding, a 
discovery, or a finding out, rather than a creating.”13 This means that “the 
concept behind invention is not so much that of producing something 
entirely new, ex nihilo, as it were, but rather that of coming into and 
revealing for the first time something which already exists.”14 To invent 
was “to come into something which already existed and to make it mani-
fest for the first time.”15 This understanding of invention is also found in 
Ullrich Langer’s Invention, Death and Self-Definitions in the Poetry of 
Pierre De Ronsard. According to Langer, in the Renaissance “any discov-
ery is only a discovery of that which is already there, both in the universe 
and in the mind. Therefore it would simply make no sense to say that 
the mind may construct anything essentially different from all that pre-
cedes or surrounds it.” Langer maintains that “the only certain statement 
about invention in the Renaissance is that it does not designate the cre-
ation ex nihilo, by a transcendent and separate subject, of an essentially 
distinct object. The rhetorical sense must be located anywhere between 
an ‘accidental coming-upon’ and a ‘discovery through research’ of some-
thing already there. . . . Any analysis of ‘newness’ will be relativized by 
this conservative meaning of invention in a full universe.”16 
Castor says that “in talking of invention Montaigne is quite obviously 
dealing with a group of ideas which he considers to be familiar to his 
readers, and which requires no special elaboration on his part. Therefore 
Montaigne never deliberately sets out to explain what he means by inven-
tion; there was no need for him to do so.”17 It is true that Montaigne 
does not usually define his terms, and to that extent he does rely upon 
the accepted meaning of terms. But he also bends and turns language out 
of its ordinary course: his invention gives unaccustomed significance to 
words (VS873, F665). The “new” has a stronger sense for Montaigne 
than it does for Castor, the sense of the possible, and so we must take 
Castor’s analysis of invention in the Essays a step further.
Invention cannot be distinguished from discovery, because the imagi-
nation is generative. It does not receive images from “external things” 
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to present them to reason but generates images or representations. To 
say that invention is discovery is not to say that it finds what is already 
there actually or potentially, but rather that it discovers the possible and 
the new in thought itself. To discover possibilities is to bring them forth 
from the mind. In other words, Montaigne does not remember what was 
always already there. He invents it, and that is how he introduces the new. 
Castor rightly points out that the change in thought represented by 
the prominence of invention must be understood in contrast to Aristotle’s 
understanding of thought. But he sees this as a kind of falling off: “The 
weakening, or coarsening, of Aristotle’s ideas can be seen in the move-
ment of thought from ‘potentiality’ to ‘possibility,’ where the idea of an 
existent (unexercised) power, which is expressed in the Latin potential . . . 
is watered down to that of mere accidental perhaps-ness.”18 “Possibility” 
is “a falling-away from Aristotelian ‘potentiality.’ ”19 
Possibility would have the sense of a weakening of Aristotelian poten-
tiality only if one accepts the truth of form and final cause. Potentiality is 
relative to final cause: potentiality is a mode of being such that, when it is 
actualized, the completion and perfection of the thing in question comes 
closer to fulfillment. Potentialities are given by nature; they are given with 
form. Possibility means the absence of form. In other words, potentiali-
ties are discovered in things, whereas possibilities are invented by the 
mind. Truth is no longer the conformity of the intellect to the object of 
knowledge, such that the form in the object is the same as the form in the 
intellect. Truth becomes a matter of judgment.
In a world without forms, in a world of accidental similarities, imagina-
tion and invention are essential to seeing things as they are and to judging 
men and their actions. One of the most important functions of invention 
in the Essays is the discovery of the possible causes and accidental similar-
ities of human actions. Invention allows him to get beyond the appearance 
of the first sense. For example, in “By Diverse Means We Arrive at the 
Same End” Montaigne goes beyond “the appearance of the first sense” by 
calling into question the first plausible explanation of why the princes are 
moved only by esteem and not by compassion. The first credible meaning 
is that the princes are strong souls who revere only virtue and strength, 
whereas the common people are weak and are therefore moved not by 
esteem but by compassion. Montaigne finds two stories that show that the 
common people can be moved by astonishment at heroic virtue. Esteem 
and astonishment produce the same effect of mercy. In those two particu-
lar instances, the entire natural hierarchy of strong and weak is called into 
question. Montaigne concludes “Of Vain Subtleties” with the claim that, 
once “a passage is opened to the mind,” our invention can find infinite 
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examples of the similarity of high and low and of the appearance of the 
nameless middle region of men to which he himself belongs. This nameless 
middle region is the space in which the new can appear. 
Reason
Montaigne’s descriptions of reason, especially in the “Apology,” have led 
most commentators to the conclusion that he is a skeptic. Reason appears 
to be weak and powerless, unable to know anything or to find the causes 
of anything. This would amount to a return to the position of the ancient 
skeptics, who called for the suspension of judgment as the only legitimate 
response to the weakness of reason. But Montaigne does make judgments 
all the time, and so it is necessary to distinguish among the different 
senses of reason that emerge in the Essays in order to determine what 
allows him to make these judgments.
Montaigne says: “I always call reason that appearance of intellect that 
each man forges in himself. That reason, of which, by its condition, there 
can be a hundred contradictory ones about one and the same subject, is 
an instrument of lead and of wax, stretchable, pliable, and adaptable to 
all biases and measures; all that is needed is the ability to mold it” (VS565, 
F425). Each man forges reason in himself: reason is produced, gener-
ated, within each individual man. Therefore, reason has “many forms” 
(VS1065, F815). In contrast with the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of rea-
son as universal and the same in all men, Montaigne presents reason as 
inherently biased and contradictory. It is not the case that any rational 
human being would arrive at the same conclusions on the basis of reason. 
Reason is, in its very origins, self-interested. Reason is an instrument for 
measuring, but it is not a fixed, unchanging measure or rule because it is 
private and particular, adaptable to all measures. 
There is, however, another description of reason that is very much at 
odds with this notion of biased reason. In “Of the Disadvantage of Great-
ness” Montaigne says: “There are few things on which we can give a 
sincere judgment, because there are few in which we have not in some 
way a private interest. Superiority and inferiority, mastery and subjec-
tion, are forced into a natural envy and contention; they must pillage one 
another perpetually. I do not believe either one about the rights of the 
other; let us leave it to reason, which is inflexible and impassive, when 
we are able to end it” (VS918, F701). Reason can become “inflexible and 
impassive” and can also make sincere and unbiased judgments when we 
are able to bring it to an end. 
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But what does it mean to end reason? First, it seems that reason has 
no natural end in the Aristotelian sense, for the conflicts of self-interested 
and biased reason are perpetual. Therefore, reason must be brought to an 
end, directed to an end, by the will. Ends have become effects. The effect 
with which Montaigne is here concerned, the impetus for his raising the 
possibility of an inflexible and impassive reason, is the resolution of the 
conflict between mastery and subjection.
Second, if reason is to be brought to an end, or made to produce a 
certain effect, its origin in the private individual must be overcome and 
self-interest must be transcended. Reason inflexible and impassive, then, 
has a public status. The possibility of the transcendence of private interest 
is associated here with “sincere judgment.” 
Third, bringing reason to an end means freeing it from the limitations 
of experience. In a discussion of the uncertainty of judgment with respect 
to political matters, Montaigne writes: “Machiavelli’s arguments, for 
example, were solid enough for the subject, yet it was very easy to com-
bat them; and those who did so left it no less easy to combat theirs. In 
such an argument there would always be matter for answers, rejoinders, 
replications, triplications, quadruplications, and that infinite web of dis-
putes that our pettifoggers have spun out as far as they could in favor of 
lawsuits . . . For the reasons have little other foundation than experience, 
and the diversity of human events offers us infinite examples of all sorts 
of forms” (VS655, F497). Therefore, proofs and reasons that are founded 
on experience and fact have no end (VS1032, F790).
But how can reason be independent of experience? What else is there 
on which to ground our conclusions? At the beginning of his reply to the 
second objection to Sebond’s natural theology, Montaigne refers to the way 
in which Saint Augustine argues against those who reject Christian belief 
because it cannot withstand reason’s scrutiny. Augustine’s approach is to 
try to demonstrate the weakness of reason by pointing to the many “known 
and indubitable experiences” into which we have no insight and of which 
we do not know the causes. Montaigne finds this mode of argument insuffi-
cient. “We must do more” than Augustine. Rare examples are not necessary 
to convict reason of weakness: Montaigne will show that even the most 
familiar is impenetrable to reason. Montaigne rejects Augustine’s mode of 
argument because it is based on experience (VS449, F328). This rejection 
is what makes the “Apology” appear so skeptical. But that, I would argue, 
is not Montaigne’s ultimate intention. Rather, in making the causes of the 
familiar suddenly unknown, he opens the question of possible causes.
Reason inflexible and impassive is not based on experience, because 
experience is merely what has been; it is the actual, not in the Aristotelian 
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sense of actuality but in the sense of simply what has happened in the past. 
Reason inflexible and impassive, however, is based not on experience but 
on possibility, not on what has happened but on what might happen. 
“So in the study that I am making of our behavior and motives, fabulous 
testimonies, provided they are possible, serve like true ones. Whether they 
have happened or no, in Paris or Rome, to John or Peter, they exemplify, 
at all events, some human capacity. . . . There are authors whose end it 
is to tell what has happened. Mine, if I could attain it, would be to talk 
about what can happen.” Hence, his attitude toward testimony, even fab-
ulous testimony, is not rejection, as is the practice of the philosophers and 
theologians of “exquisite and exact conscience,” and not acceptance, as is 
typical of the simple, but a kind of openness to the possible. “I refer the 
stories that I borrow to the conscience of those from whom I take them. 
The reflections are my own, and depend on the proofs of reason, not of 
experience” (VS105–6, F75, emphasis added).
This openness to the possible accounts in some measure for the fact 
that Montaigne stays closer to the simple than to the learned. The learned 
tend to reject as impossible anything that is not familiar to them. This is 
the presumption of the learned. They tend to identify the possible with 
the probable, whereas the simple, who do not presume to know the 
causes of things, are more open to the strange and unfamiliar. In one of 
the very rare places in the Essays in which Montaigne points to a radi-
cal change within himself, he cites the beliefs of the simple in such things 
as enchantments, prognostications, and returning spirits: “I used to feel 
compassion for the poor people who were taken in by these follies. And 
now I think that I was at least as much to be pitied myself. Not that 
experience has since shown me anything surpassing my first beliefs, and 
that through no fault of my curiosity; but reason has taught me that to 
condemn a thing thus, dogmatically, as false and impossible, is to assume 
the advantage of knowing the bounds and limits of God’s will and of 
the power of our mother nature” (VS179, F132, emphasis added). Rea-
son inflexible and impassive is not limited by experience: “How many 
things of slight probability there are, testified to by trustworthy people, 
which, if we cannot be convinced of them, we should at least leave in 
suspense! For to condemn them as impossible is to pretend, with rash 
presumption, to know the limits of possibility” (VS180, F133). It is not 
experience but reason that teaches him to be open to the possible.20 Rea-
son surpasses his first beliefs and thus becomes inflexible and impassive. 
This, then, is the first moment of the philosophical act: the ascent of rea-
son from first beliefs and the freedom of reason from the limitations of 
experience. 
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Judgment
The second moment of the philosophical act is the act of judgment, in 
which reason is subjected to the good and the good becomes his own: 
judgment is what is all one’s own. The Essays are quite literally the essais, 
the tests, of Montaigne’s own judgment (VS301, F219; VS653, F495).21 
In his essay on the education of children, he works out the distinc-
tion between mere learning and true education in terms of the difference 
between simply borrowing from the ancients, which is only an exercise of 
memory, and forming one’s own judgment. The student should be taught 
what to do with the pieces borrowed from others: “he will transform and 
blend them to make a work that is all his own, to wit, his judgment. His 
education, work, and study aim only at forming this” (VS152, F111). 
Within the tradition, contemplation is regarded as the highest human 
activity because, in contemplation, the mind escapes the temporal and 
is united with the divine, eternal, and unchanging: the human becomes 
divine. The Essays, however, are not directed to the divine, eternal, and 
unchanging, but to the human, temporal, and changing. Montaigne can-
not stomach the contemplative ecstasies of Socrates. But he admires the 
Socrates “who brought human wisdom back down from heaven, where 
she was wasting her time, and restored her to man, with whom lies her 
most proper and laborious and useful business” (VS1038, F793). 
Unlike contemplation, judgment is human, a purely human activity 
concerned only with the human. The Essays are about human beings and 
human action: in them, Montaigne encounters the human itself and as 
such. He considers it “purely,” judging it as it is in itself, without relation 
to anything else. To judge within the traditional hierarchy, by contrast, is 
to judge by the standard of what is above. Man is between the divine and 
the bestial and judges himself by the standard of the divine. To judge man 
as he is in himself and to identify judgment as the defining human activity 
is to change everything about what it means to be human. 
Contemplation is the ecstatic beholding of the thing itself, but judgment 
is the subjecting of the thing itself, thus making it one’s own. Montaigne’s 
praise of Socrates for bringing philosophy back down from the heavens 
reveals the way in which contemplation has been transformed. “It is only 
for first-class men to dwell purely on the thing itself, consider it, and 
judge it. It belongs to the one and only Socrates to become acquainted 
with death with an ordinary countenance, to become familiar with it and 
play with it. He seeks no consolation outside the thing itself; dying seems 
to him a natural and indifferent accident. He fixes his gaze precisely on it, 
and makes up his mind to it, without looking elsewhere” (VS833, F632). 
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In contrast, the disciples of Hegesias, who were inflamed by fine argu-
ments for immortality, “do not consider death in itself; they do not judge 
it. It is not there that they fix their thoughts; the goal to which they run 
is a new existence” (VS833, F632). To dwell on “the thing itself,” to fix 
one’s gaze on it, is not to contemplate it but to judge it, subject it, make 
up one’s mind to it. Socrates was “always one and the same, and raised 
himself, not by sallies but by disposition, to the utmost point of vigor. 
Or, to speak more exactly, he raised nothing, but rather brought vigor, 
hardships, and difficulties down and back to his own natural and original 
level, and subjected them to it” (VS1037, F793). 
The Socrates of Montaigne’s invention does not contemplate the thing 
itself; he judges it, subjects it to himself, by bringing it down and back to 
what is his own. He makes the thing itself his own, and what is his own 
is natural to him. He makes it natural. That is what it means to restore 
philosophy to man. 
Georges Poulet explains what judgment is for Montaigne in just this 
way: “Judgment is the act by which the mind makes something its own. 
It is an act of the mind . . . the motion of the mind by which it envelops 
and unites the self and the object. . . . Far from being an adhesion of the 
mind to things, judgment is an integration of things within the mind by 
the mind. . . . This freedom of judgment is of value only when it is trans-
formed into a choice and into an act.”22 
Freedom of Judgment: The Self-Ordered Soul
Montaigne asks himself: “And then, for whom do you write?” The learned, 
who pass judgment on books, recognize only erudition and art and value 
only learning. Common and popular souls, on the other hand, cannot 
recognize the grace and the weight of lofty and elevated discourse. These 
two human types almost exhaust the possibilities; nevertheless, there is 
a third. “The third type into whose hands you fall, that of souls ordered 
and strong in themselves, is so rare that for this very reason it has neither 
name nor rank among us: it is time half lost to aspire and strive to please 
them” (VS657, F498). The third type has no name because it has no rank. 
In pointing to the fact that this type has no rank among us, Montaigne 
implies that his project involves a transcendence of the traditional hierar-
chy, the traditional order of high and low, strong and weak. The strength of 
the self-ordered soul is not measured by its perfection within the hierarchy 
but by its freedom of judgment: “Indeed there are few souls so regulated, 
so strong and well-born, that they can be trusted to their own conduct, and 
who are able, with moderation and without temerity, to sail in the liberty 
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of their judgments beyond the common opinions” (VS559, F419–20). 
Freedom of judgment must be distinguished from unruliness of thought. 
Although the self-ordered soul is free and not bound by the common opin-
ions, he acts with moderation. “Our mind is an erratic, dangerous, and 
heedless tool; it is difficult to impose order and moderation [mesure] upon 
it. And in my time those who have some rare excellence beyond the others, 
and some extraordinary quickness, are nearly all, we see, incontinent in the 
license of their opinions and conduct [mœurs]. It is a miracle if you find a 
sedate and sociable one” (VS559, F419). To judge is to order. Order is not 
given by nature: the origin of order is the mind itself.23 The self-ordered 
soul imposes order and measure upon itself. This is Montaigne’s new kind 
of strength. The self-ordered soul is strong in itself because it has subjected 
reason to the good and made the good its own. 
Subjecting Reason to the Good
Montaigne begins “Of Cruelty” with the distinction between goodness 
and virtue: “It seems to me that virtue is something other and nobler 
than the inclinations toward goodness that are born in us. Souls natu-
rally regulated and wellborn follow the same path, and show the same 
countenance in their actions, as virtuous ones. But virtue means some-
thing greater and more active than letting oneself, by a happy disposition, 
be led gently and peacefully in the footsteps of reason” (VS422, F306). 
Goodness looks weaker than virtue: it seems to be nothing more than a 
“natural mildness and easygoingness” in contrast with the strength of 
virtue that requires struggle and self-mastery. Yet, goodness shows “the 
same countenance” as virtue.
Montaigne explains the origins of his goodness and why he holds most 
vices in horror. “I hold them in horror, I say, from an attitude so natural 
and so much my own that the same instinct and impression that I brought 
away from my nurse I have still retained. Nothing has been able to make 
me alter it, not even my own reasonings, which, having in some things 
broken away from the common road, would easily give me license for 
actions which this natural inclination makes me hate” (VS428, F312). 
Montaigne goes further: “It is a monstrous thing that I will say, but I will 
say it all the same: I find in that area, in many things, more restraint and 
order in my morals than in my opinions, and my lust less depraved than 
my reason” (VS428, F312). In “Of Cruelty” goodness is identified with 
sympathy, a natural inclination.
Montaigne’s reason gives him license for vicious actions that his incli-
nations make him hate. His judgment, however, affirms his inclinations. 
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He hates cruelty and judges it the extreme of all vice: “Among other vices, 
I cruelly hate cruelty, both by nature and by judgment, as the extreme of 
all vices” (VS429, F313, emphasis added). Reason is brought to an “end” 
by judgment, which rejects reason’s justifications of cruelty.24 Reason must 
instead be directed to the good, subjected to the good by judgment. Mon-
taigne’s judgment affirms his earliest impressions and natural inclinations 
to goodness or sympathy. Now, through judgment, he has a “more secure 
possession” of them than he did as a young child. 
This is Montaigne’s new strength, the strength of the self-ordered 
soul. It is not the mastery of reason over the passions but rather the 
harmony of judgment and natural inclination. However, not all natural 
inclinations are good. Montaigne hates cruelty by nature, yet there are 
others—“bloodthirsty” souls—who seem to have an inclination to cru-
elty. “Nature herself, I fear, attaches to man some instinct for inhumanity” 
(VS433, F316). Cruelty, “so unnatural a vice,” nevertheless seems to dwell 
in us by nature (VS790, F599). Natural inclinations themselves must be 
judged.25 This act of choosing well among natural inclinations is the 
freedom of the self-ordered soul. Through judgment Montaigne chooses 
his natural disposition, his “nature.” His disposition is no longer simply 
“given.” Whatever Montaigne’s “original” nature or natural disposition, 
he presents it as good solely because he has made it good. 
After confessing the monstrous fact that his reason would give him 
license for actions that his inclinations make him hate, Montaigne asks: 
“Could it possibly be true that to be wholly good we must be so by some 
hidden, natural, and universal property, without law, without reason, 
without example?” (VS428, F312). Goodness, he says, is hidden. There-
fore, we must get beyond the appearance of the first sense in order to see 
it. Goodness is also natural because it is a natural inclination chosen and 
affirmed by judgment: it has been made his own in a new way. Third, 
goodness is universal because it includes the entire man: it is his integrity 
and consistency. Finally, goodness is a property, a possession of the indi-
vidual, not an end for which the individual must strive. It is not caused 
by law, reason, or example. Rather, through judgment a man makes the 
good his own, his possession, his property. In his possession of the good, 
the self-ordered soul becomes sociable, as is reflected in the way he judges 
other men.
Judging “What Is”: Imperfection
Judging is, in the tradition, held to be the subsuming of a particular under 
a universal, determining that a particular is an instance of a certain kind, 
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and that it is the same as other particulars in an essential way. A particular 
man, then, is judged by the standard of the universal “man,” by the stan-
dard of the perfection of the human form. In the first essay, Montaigne 
concludes: “Truly man is a marvelously vain, diverse, and undulating sub-
ject. It is hard to found any constant and uniform judgment on him” (VS9, 
F5). When his friends ask for his judgment of their actions, he avoids gen-
eralizations: “So I reveal to my friends, by their outward manifestations 
[productions], their inward inclinations. I do not attempt to arrange this 
infinite variety of actions, so diverse and so disconnected, into certain 
types and categories, and distribute my lots and divisions distinctly into 
recognized classes and sections” (VS1076, F824). On the whole, he finds 
universal judgments to be useless. “These universal judgments that I find 
so common signify nothing. They are like men who salute a whole people 
in a crowd and in a body. Those who have a real acquaintance with them 
salute them and notice them by name and individually. But that is a risky 
undertaking” (VS936, F715). Montaigne refers to this as “risky” perhaps 
because it undermines the standard of the perfection of form in judging 
men and their actions. 
In fact, we “strengthen and enlighten our judgment by reflecting on this 
continual variation of human things” (VS297, F216). In the formation of 
judgment, the study of history is of the greatest importance. History, he 
says, is “the skeleton of philosophy, in which the most abstruse parts of 
our nature are penetrated.” The student should be taught “not so much 
the histories as how to judge them. That in my opinion, is of all matters 
the one to which we apply our minds in the most varying degree” (VS156, 
F115). Learning how to judge the histories means something more than 
learning the “facts” given by the historians: it means probing the inside to 
the springs of human action. 
The way in which judgment acts in the Essays has to do first with 
determining “what is,” whether something is actually the case. This is 
usually assumed in the rush to universal judgments about why something 
is the way it is. In determining whether something is, in fact, the case, 
judgment is a very different kind of act from the act of ascertaining why 
a thing is the way it is. Judgment must first overcome the presumption 
of custom. It must resist the attraction to the universal—a very difficult 
resistance, indeed—because human beings believe, following Aristotle, 
that they know particulars only through the universal. How is it even 
possible to see something as a particular? 
For Montaigne, judgment as the determination of “what is” includes 
two related aspects. First, to see “what is” as it is means to see it without 
the measure of what it ought to be, to judge without the standard of final 
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cause. Aristotle’s account of human action is in terms of final cause or 
happiness: all men, whether they know it or not, always act for the sake 
of happiness, which is the final and self-sufficient good. If all of one’s 
actions are directed to the same end, then human actions should be con-
sistent. But consistency is an extremely rare achievement. Thus, Aristotle’s 
account of human action in terms of final cause or happiness cannot 
really explain the actions of most men who are merely tossed about by 
desires, circumstances, passions, and so forth. Montaigne says: “I do not 
recognize in Aristotle most of my ordinary actions: they have been cov-
ered and dressed up in another robe for the use of the school” (VS874, 
F666). Montaigne concludes “Of the Inconsistency of Our Actions” with 
the admonition that we must not judge men simply by their outward 
actions but must probe the inside to find the springs of action (VS338, 
F244). To see and understand human action as it is, not as it ought to be, 
means to judge it in its beginnings and implies, therefore, an acceptance 
of imperfection and incompleteness.
This understanding of judgment is thus, at the same time, the over-
coming of the traditional hierarchy. Action is not the actualization of a 
potentiality. Instead, Montaigne replaces potentiality by possibility, and 
that is why invention is indispensable for judgment. Judging “what is” 
requires openness to the possible: “We must not judge what is possible 
and what is not, according to what is credible and incredible to our sense” 
(VS725, F548). This is especially true of human actions: while it is easy to 
judge the limits of what the body can do, it is very difficult to know the 
limits of the soul (VS723, F546). Judging as determining “what is” means 
judging by the standard, or the limits, of the possible. 
The mind “represents” to itself both what is and what is not, the true 
and the false, as well as what it wants to possess. Since representation 
gives us no way of separating the true from the false, judgment is the 
only way to determine what is, or what is true. Whereas for Aristotle we 
can know the truth about what something is only in the light of what it 
ought to be, for Montaigne determining what is true is inseparable from 
inventing the possible. Montaigne’s conscience allows him to accept or 
to borrow testimony and stories: “I refer the stories that I borrow to 
the conscience of those from whom I take them.” And he is free to alter 
the details of the stories he borrows, to omit and replace the explana-
tions offered by the historians, and to fill in details that are not given in 
the histories because the historians are themselves inventing. “My con-
science does not falsify one iota; my knowledge, I don’t know.” This sets 
him apart from the philosophers and theologians who are closed to tes-
timony. The philosophers and theologians are people of “exquisite and 
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exact conscience” who would not be willing to testify concerning even 
what happens right before their eyes or to accept the testimony of others 
because they would not stake their fidelity on the fidelity of a common 
man (VS105–6, F75–76). 
Montaigne does not judge others by the standard of the perfection of 
final cause; but neither does he judge others by the standard of himself, 
as most men do. He judges each man as he is in himself. “Of Cato the 
Younger” begins with a statement of Montaigne’s practice of judgment: 
“I do not share that common error of judging another by myself. I easily 
believe that another man may have qualities different from mine. Because 
I feel myself tied down to one form, I do not oblige everybody to espouse 
it, as all others do. I believe in and conceive a thousand contrary ways 
of life, and in contrast with the common run of men, I more easily admit 
difference than resemblance between us. I am as ready as you please to 
acquit another man from sharing my conditions and principles. I consider 
him simply in himself, without relation to others; I mold him to his own 
model. I do not fail, just because I am not continent, to acknowledge sin-
cerely the continence of the Feuillants and the Capuchins, and to admire 
the manner of their life. I can very well insinuate myself by imagination 
into their place, and I love and honor them all the more because they are 
different from me. I have a singular desire that we should each be judged 
in ourselves apart, and that I may not be measured in conformity with the 
common examples” (VS229, F169). 
Montaigne’s judgment is unique. Most men judge others according to 
the measure of themselves: “It seems to each man that the ruling pattern 
of nature is in him; to this he refers all other forms as to a touchstone. 
The ways that do not square with his are counterfeit and artificial. What 
brutish stupidity!” (VS725, F548). Montaigne does not share that “com-
mon error” for, “in contrast with the common run of men,” he judges by 
a standard that is not biased. “My weakness in no way alters my neces-
sarily high regard for the strength and vigor of those who deserve it. 
‘There are men who praise nothing except what they are confident they 
can imitate’ [Cicero]. Crawling in the slime of the earth, I do not fail 
to observe, even in the clouds, the inimitable loftiness of certain heroic 
souls” (VS229, F169). 
In the case of Cato, for example, he indicates his disgust with those 
who insist on attributing base motives to great men: these detractors 
“play at ingenuity” clumsily and crudely. “The same pains that they take 
to detract from these great names, and the same license, I would willingly 
take to lend them a shoulder to raise them higher. These rare figures, 
whom the consensus of the wise has selected as examples to the world, I 
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shall not hesitate to restore to their places of honor, as far as my ingenu-
ity [invention] allows me to interpret them in a favorable light” (VS231, 
F170). Montaigne says that “to judge of great and lofty things we need 
a soul of the same caliber; otherwise we attribute to them the vice that is 
our own” (VS67, F46). Although Montaigne’s deeds are lowly, his soul is 
of the same caliber as Cato’s because his judgment is true and good. Since 
he does not judge others in relation to himself, his esteem is not based 
on his own lowliness and weakness but on his strong and free judgment. 
How is it possible for an individual to judge each man as he is in 
himself, “without relation to others”? Judgment would seem to require 
a universal standard against which individuals can be measured and 
compared with each other. Yet, Montaigne says: “I mold him to his own 
model.” It appears, then, that he judges each man according to that man’s 
own standard, according to that man’s own conscience or judgment. At 
the same time, however, Montaigne is not a moral relativist nor does he 
claim that the good is simply what it appears to be for each man. He does 
condemn vices and vicious actions, but he condemns the action, not the 
man; he hates the vice, not the man. He weighs both the good and the bad 
in order to arrive at an assessment of the individual. Judgment is “weigh-
ing” or “assaying.” Weighing or assaying implies a standard against which 
the action or the man is measured, and that standard must be the good. 
Because he does not judge according to the standard of the perfection of 
form, he accepts imperfection and is able to see the good in the imperfect. 
He sees how men are. That is, indeed, our experience of other men. In 
fact, the social requires the acceptance of imperfection. 
Montaigne uses imagination and invention to enter into the conscience 
of the other and to judge that other from his own perspective. Montaigne 
insinuates himself by his imagination into the place of those whose way 
of life is entirely different from his own: “Thinking about the poor beggar 
at my door . . . I put myself in his place, I try to fit my mind to his bias” 
(VS243, F179). Montaigne’s judgment of other men can be described as 
generous, for the tendency of his judgments is toward esteem for others. 
“I find it a rough task to judge a man in whom the bad qualities exceed 
the good” (VS1077, F825). He loves and admires Cato the Stoic, the Epi-
cureans, the Skeptics, Plato, Socrates, the Capuchins, and countless others 
who pursue the good in very different ways. 
Montaigne judges each man as he is in himself, without relation to oth-
ers, and yet he also ranks men. These two actions seem mutually exclusive: 
the first kind of judgment rejects a universal standard, while the act of 
ranking appears to require it. How is it possible for Montaigne to escape 
the charge that he is contradicting himself? The answer lies in the locus of 
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his standards: he judges not by outward actions—by the standard of final 
cause—but by the internal springs of action. Montaigne judges each man 
according to that man’s own conscience, and he ranks men according to 
the purity of their consciences. That is how it is possible for Montaigne 
to rank incommensurables. 
Montaigne’s ranking can be seen especially clearly in “Of the Most 
Outstanding Men.” Epaminondas is ranked as the most outstanding man, 
surpassing Alexander the Great, Caesar, and even Socrates because his 
conscience is innocent. The valor of Epaminondas is as great as that of 
Alexander and Caesar, “but as for his character and conscience, he very 
far surpassed all those who have undertaken to manage affairs. For in this 
respect, which must principally be considered, which alone truly marks 
what we are, and which I weigh alone against all the others together, he 
yields to no philosopher, not even to Socrates. In this man, innocence is 
a key quality, sovereign, constant, uniform, incorruptible” (VS756, F573, 
emphasis added). The standard by which Montaigne judges is the stan-
dard of innocence or goodness: the “extreme goodness” of Epaminondas 
(VS757, F573). Innocence and goodness are “so close to weakness and 
imperfection” that it is difficult to distinguish them: judgment must get 
beyond the appearance of the first sense.
In his act of judging “what is” in its imperfection, we can understand 
the way in which Montaigne’s judgment accomplishes the many “rever-
sals” that occur throughout the Essays, including the reversals of high 
and low, strong and weak. The weak is stronger than the strong, the low 
is higher than the high. When the traditional hierarchy is undermined, 
these oppositions collapse. Yet, Montaigne must use the language of the 
hierarchy in order to undermine it. Truth is in these reversals.
Montaigne’s judgment overcomes the three conditions of error and 
falsehood from which thought begins. He is able to sift the true from the 
false by returning to his first opinions, to the truth that was always there, 
and by subjecting reason to the good. He goes beyond the appearance of 
the first sense through the overcoming of the traditional hierarchy. And 
he gets rid of the violent prejudice of custom by bringing the new out of 
the old and replacing the weak with the good.
Judgment Reformed
Montaigne criticizes those who seek to reform morals through new opin-
ions. “Oh what an easy and applauded route those superficial men take, 
compared with ours!” (VS888, F677). Montaigne’s own reform is the 
deepest possible, because he seeks to effect the purification of judgment, 
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the reform of conscience itself, the reform of the will. Judgment is con-
science, and conscience is determined by the will.26 Neither contemplation 
nor prudence admits an act of the will. 
In his description of the act of judgment, Montaigne points to the role 
of the will in judgment and to the possibility of the uncorrupted will: 
“It is a great deal for me to have my judgment regulated, if my actions 
[les effects] cannot be, and to maintain this sovereign part free from cor-
ruption. It is something to have my will good when my legs fail me” 
(VS229–30, F169). The will can be “good” and uncorrupted, even if one’s 
actions are weak and unregulated. 
In “Of Prognostications” Montaigne says that his task is “to give some 
authority” to “the prompt, vehement, and accidental” opinions that 
sometimes come to us. These are impulsions of the will or “inclinations,” 
and in a purified soul, such as Socrates’s, they are important and wor-
thy of being followed. Montaigne himself has experienced such stirrings, 
which were “as weak in reason as violent in persuasiveness” and “by 
which I let myself be carried away so usefully and fortunately that they 
might be judged to have in them something of divine inspiration” (VS44, 
F30). Such is perhaps the desire that “seized” him to tell his ways of being 
in public, the desire that is the beginning of the Essays. These impulsions 
of the will are “weak in reason”; the good is irrational, and it is the will, 
not reason, that gives rise to these accidental opinions. The Essays, then, 
must be seen as Montaigne’s attempt to “give some authority” to the 
impulsions of the pure will. 
Montaigne produces his thoughts out of himself, and that is why they 
are his own. But the decisive act, the act that makes them entirely and 
precisely his own, is the removal of the self. Reason, representation, and 
judgment are all purified of his self. It seems that the more the Essays 
are his own, the less of himself is present in them. The act of judgment 
does include the will, but purity of judgment means eliminating the 
self-assertion of the particular will. The self, then, appears as pride, self-
assertion, and the desire to dominate. The self-ordered soul can be left to 
go its own way, beyond the common opinions, in the freedom of its judg-
ments, because its will is purified of self. 
In the “Apology” Montaigne says that “our first and original malady” 
is presumption (VS452, F330) and that presumption is the first tyranny 
of the evil spirit (VS449, F328), implying that presumption is original 
sin. Presumption, then, must be essential to that “unruliness of thought” 
that is said to distinguish man from the other animals. When Montaigne 
describes himself as “innocent” he is pointing to the way in which he 
escapes our first and original malady.
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In “Of Presumption” Montaigne says that the only thing he esteems 
himself for is just what every man esteems himself for: “My recommen-
dation is vulgar, common, and popular, for who ever thought he lacked 
sense?” We recognize the superiority of others in courage, strength, and 
beauty, “but an advantage in judgment we yield to no one” (VS656, 
F498). This is the presumption that is universal. Montaigne, then, is just 
like every other man. But here he does offer a way in which he can justify 
the uniqueness and the soundness of his opinions: “I think my opinions 
are good and sound; but who does not think as much of his? One of the 
best proofs I have of mine is the little esteem I have for myself; for if these 
opinions had not been very firm, they would easily have let themselves 
be fooled by the singular affection I have for myself” (VS657, F499). His 
lack of self-esteem is the best proof of the truth of his opinions. This is a 
new sense of proof: not the proof of demonstration, but proof based on 
the removal of the bias of self-esteem, the proof of reason.
But the Essays are all about himself. How, then, can his self be elimi-
nated? Montaigne represents a particular, “very ill-formed.” By the 
standard of the traditional hierarchy, he is imperfect. His representa-
tion of himself is without self-esteem. The removal of self-esteem from 
Montaigne’s representation, reason, and judgment is the condition for his 
transcendence of the traditional hierarchy, the hierarchy that establishes 
the superiority of the philosopher to all men, of masters over slaves and 
strong over weak. In removing his self-esteem, he eliminates the identi-
fication of himself with the philosopher’s perfection of the human form. 
At the same time, he affirms his imperfection: he is “ill-formed.” In other 
words, the new type that emerges against the background of the tradi-
tional hierarchy transcends that hierarchy but also incorporates within 
itself the imperfection that it has in relation to that hierarchy.
Montaigne does not judge others by the measure of himself, pulling 
others down to the level of his own lowly deeds. His judgment is uncor-
rupted. “Judgment holds in me a magisterial seat, at least it carefully tries 
to. It lets my feelings go their way, both hatred and friendship, even the 
friendship I bear myself, without being changed and corrupted by them. 
If it cannot reform the other parts according to itself, at least it does not 
let itself be deformed to match them; it plays its game apart” (VS1074, 
F823). 
From the perspective of the purified judgment, then, ancient philoso-
phy never sees itself for what it is. It never purifies itself of the self of the 
philosopher in spite of the fact that it goes beyond the self to the eter-
nal and divine. That is why it sees being as hierarchical. The reason that 
justifies the traditional hierarchy of master and subject is merely private 
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reason, biased and self-interested. Reason becomes inflexible, impassive, 
and able to transcend the hierarchy when it is purified of “private inter-
est.” It becomes public when it is purified of the self of the philosopher. 
Purging the will of self-interest and self-esteem eliminates the pride of 
the philosopher and the desire for mastery. Montaigne’s own judgment 
is superior, but his elimination of self-esteem from his judgment is the 
renunciation of any claim to superiority and mastery: the purified judg-
ment subjects pride and mastery itself. Montaigne thus achieves a public 
reason and a public will.
Reason inflexible and impassive requires the self-effacement of the 
philosopher in an act of extreme generosity. The requirement of the self-
effacement of the philosopher helps us to make sense of what has to be 
one of the strangest statements in the Essays. In his discussion of the 
motives for suicide, Montaigne mentions first the desire to escape the 
evils of this world. But, as usual, he offers another possible cause: “men 
also sometimes desire death in the hope of a greater good.” Then, as he 
frequently does, he points to a Christian and a pagan example: “I desire,” 
says Saint Paul, “to be dissolved, to be with Jesus Christ.” And Cleom-
brotus of Ambracia threw himself into the sea because his reading of 
Plato’s Phaedo had given him such a strong desire for the life to come. 
Montaigne, again, is a third type: “Whence it appears how improperly we 
call ‘despair’ that voluntary dissolution to which we are often borne by 
the ardor of hope, and often by a tranquil and settled inclination of our 
judgment” (VS360, F260). This is an inclination of judgment, no longer 
a mere natural inclination of sympathy: it is an act of the will made con-
stant and consistent. Voluntary dissolution means that the will is purified 
of the self; the will is good. This third type of voluntary dissolution of the 
self, this tranquil and deliberate inclination of judgment, refers, I believe, 
to Montaigne’s own self-effacement, the self-effacement of the philoso-
pher for a greater good.
The philosopher must become a new figure: an unpremeditated and 
accidental philosopher. He subjects ancient philosophy to himself, disap-
pearing behind the face of the tradition while doing something radically 
new. In the same act through which he effaces himself, he refounds phi-
losophy. He refounds because he effaces himself. This is the separation of 
the man from the philosopher.
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Chapter Four

The Philosophical Act (II):  
Ending in Experience 
Montaigne’s unpremeditated and accidental philosophy is the reforma-
tion of philosophy because it separates the man from the philosopher 
and thus humanizes him. The philosopher, in the tradition, believes that 
he alone bears “the entire form of the human condition.” In accordance 
with the traditional hierarchy, the philosopher alone is the complete 
actualization of the human form because he participates in the divine 
activity of contemplation. This identification of the philosopher with the 
human as such, that is, the human at its highest, in fact dehumanizes 
the philosopher because it separates him from all other men. Mon-
taigne, however, is only accidentally a philosopher. His thoughts are 
born with him and “without a model,” but when he brings them out into 
the public, he finds that they resemble the teachings of ancient philoso-
phy. His mores are natural and weak, for he has not called in the help 
of any discipline to build them. Yet, he discovers, to his astonishment, 
that his thoughts and mores are conformed by accident to many differ-
ent philosophical teachings. Because ancient philosophy has not formed 
him, however, there is only an accidental similarity—not a sameness of 
essence—between his thoughts and mores and the teachings of ancient 
philosophy. 
Philosophy, as understood by Aristotle, dehumanizes the philosopher 
also because it destroys sympathy. The philosopher sees himself as divine 
and loses the sense of his common humanity. In “Of Cruelty” Montaigne 
identifies sympathy with the good. If the philosopher loses the capacity 
for sympathy, he does not possess the good. He may contemplate the 
good, but he does not possess it. The good, according to Montaigne, is a 
property, a possession, not an object of contemplation. 
A third way in which the tradition dehumanizes the philosopher (and 
the theologian) is in the attempt to separate the soul from the body in 
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order to attain the divine and the eternal; this is a kind of violence to 
the man. Montaigne repeatedly shows that any attempt to rise above 
our humanity, to attain the divine or the angelic, makes us inhuman, not 
more fully human. Reflecting on those who despise the bodily pleasures 
of “that brattish rabble of men that we are,” Montaigne says: “These are 
two things that I have always observed to be in singular accord: superce-
lestial thoughts and subterranean conduct. . . . They want to get out of 
themselves and escape from the man. That is madness: instead of chang-
ing into angels, they change into beasts; instead of raising themselves, they 
lower themselves. These transcendental humors frighten me” (VS1115, 
F856). 
The unpremeditated and accidental philosopher, in contrast, is the self-
ordered soul who is free in his judgments to go beyond common—or 
traditional—opinions. It is, however, very difficult to impose order and 
measure on the unruly mind. Most of those who possess some rare excel-
lence of mind are “incontinent in the license of their opinions and conduct 
[mœurs].” Therefore, “it is a miracle if you find a sedate and sociable 
one” (VS559, F419). Excellent minds, then, are inclined to be solitary, 
unsociable, immoderate, and dangerous. The miracle is the self-ordered 
soul that is sociable. That is why philosophy itself must be refounded and 
reformed, why Montaigne becomes the new figure of the philosopher. To 
paraphrase Hume: Montaigne is a philosopher but, in the midst of all his 
philosophy, he is still a man.1 
Inventing the Essay, Inventing Society
Montaigne invents society as a new form of human association and he 
invents the essay as a new form of philosophy. It might be said that he 
invents society by inventing the essay. David Hume, in his essay “Of 
Essay-Writing,” argues that this form brings together what he calls the 
learned and the conversible worlds: “The separation of the learned from 
the conversible world,” he says, “seems to have been the great defect of 
the last age, and must have had a very bad influence both on books and 
company.” The social world suffers because, without the influence of phi-
losophy, conversation is reduced to stories and gossip. But philosophy 
itself also suffers from this separation. Cut off from the world, philosophy 
becomes barbarous because it lacks “that liberty and facility of thought 
and expression which can only be acquired by conversation.” Philosophy, 
Hume says, “went to wrack by this moaping recluse method of study, and 
became as chimerical in her conclusions as she was unintelligible in her 
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stile and manner of delivery.” In becoming social, in “descending” into 
the social, philosophy is freed from philosophical presumption and self-
esteem. Further, philosophy suffers when practiced in isolation, because 
experience, upon which philosophy rests, is to be found only “in common 
life and conversation.”2
Thus, Pascal describes Montaigne’s style as “totally composed of 
thoughts born out of the ordinary conversations of life.”3 That is why the 
Socrates of Montaigne’s invention is not the Socrates who ascends to the 
Forms but rather the Socrates who descends to the most lowly opinions 
of the most ordinary men. At the same time, as Auerbach claims, Mon-
taigne was the first author who wrote for the non-specialized but educated 
reader: “By the success of the Essays the educated public first revealed its 
existence.”4 That is, Montaigne actually brings this public into existence 
by revealing it. The Essays, then, include all men—the learned and the 
simple—in the conversation that they initiate.
Michael Oakeshott sees the Essays as the clearest example of what he 
calls “the conversation of mankind.” This conversation, he says, “is not 
only the greatest but also the most hardly sustained of all the accomplish-
ments of mankind. Men have never been wanting who have had this 
understanding of human activity and intercourse, but few have embraced 
it without reserve and without misgiving, and on this account it is proper 
to mention the most notable of those who have done so: Michel de Mon-
taigne.”5 That Montaigne embraced this activity “without reserve and 
without misgiving” is a manifestation of his generous sociability.
The Essay Form
T. S. Eliot describes the Essays as “apparently formless and disconnected, 
but subtly unified.”6 The appearance of formlessness is the perfect form 
of unpremeditated and accidental philosophy because the essay form is 
the submission of reason to experience. I will consider five features of the 
essay form in order to bring out the ways in which it produces this effect.
Quotation
Montaigne’s learning is present in the Essays as direct quotations, usually 
in the original Latin (or rarely, Greek) of the author. The practice of quo-
tation allows him to distance himself from the philosopher in question by 
showing that he is using him as the occasion allows. Ancient philosophy 
has not made him what he is, has not formed him. He tells us that he has 
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studied the opinions of others “not at all to form my opinions, but cer-
tainly to assist, second, and serve those which I formed long ago” (VS666, 
F505). In “Of Presumption” he says that ancient philosophy has given 
him only a more secure and complete possession of his own original opin-
ions and has helped him to make his judgments more his own (VS658, 
F499). He uses ancient philosophy, in fragments, to say what he himself 
wants to say. “I do not speak the minds of others except to express myself 
better” (VS148, F108). 
Robert Sokolowski’s analysis of the phenomenon of quotation helps us 
to account for Montaigne’s stance toward ancient philosophy: “I can be 
. . . related to things either on my own cognitive authority or refractedly, 
through the authority of another speaker. When I quote someone, I have 
the quoted state of affairs as proposed by someone else; but in principle it 
is always possible for me to go on to possess the state of affairs by myself 
without an intermediary, to register the situation on my own. . . . When, 
after having quoted, I thus see for myself, I do not just register the situ-
ation; I register it as confirming or disconfirming what someone else has 
said. . . . The immediacy of my own cognitive possession of a situation 
becomes itself a qualified immediacy because I now know that I can be 
cognitively related to it not only by myself but also through another. By 
myself takes on a deeper hue.”7 In this way, Montaigne brings the phi-
losophers into conversation through his expression of himself: he makes 
ancient philosophy his own.
In “Of the Education of Children” Montaigne says of the young man 
who is to be educated: “Truth and reason are common to everyone, and 
no more belong to the man who first spoke them than to the man who 
says them later. It is no more according to Plato than according to me, 
since he and I understand and see it in the same way. The bees plunder 
the flowers here and there, but afterward they make of them honey, which 
is all theirs; it is no longer thyme or marjoram.” The student will do the 
same with the pieces borrowed from others: “he will transform and blend 
them to make a work that is all his own, to wit, his judgment” (VS152, 
F111). 
By his practice of quotation, in fragments and as the occasion allows, 
Montaigne is forcing the philosophers into ordinary conversation, sub-
mitting them to the practice of everyday life. At the same time, he also 
brings common opinions out into the open through the “they say,” or on 
dit, one of the most frequently used expressions in the Essays. The on 
dit is the way in which he takes the stance of quotation toward common 
opinion. Thus, he brings the learned and the common into conversation 
with each other.
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Sokolowski says that there are two types of people who do not under-
stand the stance of quotation. First, the gullible person simply takes over 
what others say, repeating it without making it his own. Second, the 
obstinate person is so convinced of his own opinion that he can only see 
what others say as either confirming his own views or as foolish fancies 
not to be taken seriously.8 Montaigne presents these same two types in 
terms of the learned and the simple. He escapes both the presumption 
of the learned, who cannot accept what they have not themselves expe-
rienced, and the presumption of the simple, who are under the power of 
common opinion. 
The Language of the Streets, Markets, and Taverns
Like Socrates, who brought philosophy down from the heavens and into 
the cities of men, Montaigne brings philosophy down from the heav-
ens and into the streets and markets and taverns of France. The Essays 
are written in French, rather than Latin (the language of the learned). 
Montaigne’s first language was Latin. His father, who had formed cer-
tain unusual ideas about education, hired a tutor who spoke nothing but 
Latin with the young boy. In fact, the entire household joined in this 
project, so that Montaigne heard and spoke only Latin until he was six 
years old. As a young man, he was sent to the Collège de Guyenne in Bor-
deaux where he excelled in the study of Latin literature. Yet, Montaigne 
chose to write the Essays in French, giving only his quotations from the 
ancient philosophers and poets in their original Latin. French, he says, is 
a “weaker idiom” than Latin (VS440, F320).9 
Not only does he choose the weaker idiom, but Montaigne also insists 
that he simply follows common usage in his writing (VS796, F604). He 
makes no attempt to dress up his thoughts in the manner of those who 
want to seek the world’s favor. “In language,” he says, “the search for 
novel phrases and little-known words comes from a childish and pedantic 
disposition. Would that I might use only those that are used in the mar-
kets of Paris!” (VS172, F127). He tells us that he does not avoid any of 
those words that are used in the streets of France (VS875, F667). And he 
asks: “Do we witness more of a jumble in the chatter of fishwives than 
in the public disputations of the professional logicians? I would rather 
have my son learn to speak in the taverns than in the schools of talk” 
(VS926–27, F707). The Essays are written in the language of the markets, 
the streets, and the taverns of France, not in the language of the schools 
or the courts. Montaigne writes in the ordinary everyday language of the 
people, the language which forms the social bond. 
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Impropriety
Montaigne sometimes goes beyond the bounds of propriety in speaking 
about the parts and functions of the body and about sexual matters. And 
he defends what he calls his “excessive license” and his “immoderation” 
in speaking about the sexual (VS845, F642). He asks: “What has the 
sexual act, so natural, so necessary, and so just, done to mankind, for us 
not to dare to talk about it without shame and for us to exclude it from 
serious and decent conversations?” (VS847, F644). He disdains “those 
petty, feigned, customary, provincial rules” of propriety and ceremony 
that would keep him from presenting a complete portrait of himself to the 
public. And so, he concludes that “whoever would wean man of the folly 
of such a scrupulous verbal superstition would do the world no great 
harm” (VS888, F677).
Montaigne’s violation of the norms of propriety with respect to speak-
ing about the body is intended to bring the philosopher down from the 
heights of disembodied contemplation to the lowest, most common bodily 
functions which he shares with all men.10 So he imagines the philosopher 
in the sexual act: “The most contemplative and wisest of men, when I 
imagine him in that position [of making love] seems to me an impostor to 
put on wise and contemplative airs; here are the peacock’s feet that hum-
ble his pride: ‘Against truth said in laughing/Is there a law?’ ” [Horace] 
(VS877, F669). He makes the philosopher look ridiculous and shameful: 
“Kings and philosophers shit, and so do ladies” (VS1085, F831). Philoso-
phers and kings need to be reminded that they are just human beings: 
“I love to see these leading souls unable to shake off our common lot. 
Perfect men as they are, still they are men, and most heavily so” (VS835, 
F634). It is “thanks to our sickly, kill-joy mind” that we are disgusted 
with the ordinary pleasures of life. Montaigne says “I, who operate only 
close to the ground, hate that inhuman wisdom that would make us dis-
dainful enemies of the cultivation of the body” (VS1106, F849). 
Montaigne also therefore rejects any philosophical understanding of 
the human that would separate soul from body: “Plato fears our hard 
bondage to pain and pleasure, since it obligates and attaches the soul too 
much to the body; I, on the contrary, because it detaches and unbinds it” 
(VS58, F39). This is the basis for his moderation of pleasure, to keep the 
soul attached to the body, not to master the appetites. His body and soul 
are one: “my two ruling parts, of their own volition, live in peace and 
good accord” (VS1059, F811). 
Therefore, Montaigne rejects both Stoic imperturbability and Epicu-
rean apathy. He feels the passions and suffers the evils and accidents of 
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human life. Unlike the Epicureans, he wants to feel even the evils of life: 
“Crantor was quite right to combat the apathy of Epicurus, if it was built 
so deep that even the approach and birth of evils were lacking. I have no 
praise for the insensibility that is neither possible nor desirable. I am glad 
not to be sick; but if I am, I want to know I am; and if they cauterize or 
incise me, I want to feel it. In truth, he who would eradicate the knowl-
edge of good and evil would at the same time extirpate the knowledge of 
pleasure, and in fine would annihilate man” (VS493, F364). 
Montaigne says: “I am no philosopher. Evils crush me according to 
their weight” (VS950, F725). Yet, he also says that he is a new figure of 
the philosopher. This apparent contradiction—that he is not a philoso-
pher and that he is a philosopher—helps us to see that his reformation of 
philosophy involves the humanization of the philosopher. The unpremed-
itated and accidental philosopher does not escape the human condition. 
In the tradition, it is the body that the philosopher regards as most 
shameful. Nevertheless, the body is what makes us present to each other. 
Montaigne is overcoming the shame of the body by bringing its lowliest 
actions into the light of the public. He makes philosophy look ridiculous 
and shameful by exposing the pride and pretensions of the philosopher. 
Thus, he makes the philosophical mind ashamed, not of the body, but of 
itself.
Testimony and Stories
The sociability of the essay form can be seen in the stance that Montaigne 
takes toward testimony and also in the central role he gives to stories and 
examples in the expression of his thought. In “It Is Folly to Judge the True 
and the False by Our Own Capacity” Montaigne confesses that he used 
to pity the simple who claimed to have witnessed all kinds of supernatu-
ral events. He had been guilty of the presumption of the learned, who 
cannot accept anything as true which they themselves have not experi-
enced. Now, however, he is open to the testimony of the simple because 
he has recognized that the limits of the possible are not determined by his 
own limited experience. 
In “Of the Power of the Imagination” he tells us that fabulous tes-
timony is just as useful to him as true testimony, for his task is to tell 
not what has happened but what can happen. Throughout the Essays, 
Montaigne displays this openness to the testimony of others, an attitude 
that reflects his openness to the possible. He takes neither the attitude of 
the learned, who refuse to testify concerning actions that have happened 
right before their eyes and who will not stake their belief on the belief of 
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a common man, nor the attitude of the simple, who think they see what 
is not there (VS106, F76). 
David Hume, accounting for the fact that men are so unequal in the 
degree of understanding they achieve, says that: “After we have acquired 
a confidence in human testimony, books and conversation enlarge much 
more the sphere of one man’s experience and thought than those of 
another.”11 By not rejecting out of hand the testimony of others, Mon-
taigne enlarges his own experience; his experience is no longer limited 
to what has happened to him, but now expands to include a kind of 
philosophical attitude toward his own experience. That is, he does not 
experience what happens to him in a presumptuous way: he overcomes 
both the presumption of the learned and the presumption of the simple. 
Experience itself is changed for him.
Montaigne’s openness to testimony is especially evident in the stories 
that fill the pages of the Essays. Although he says the work is to be only 
about himself, the stories that he recounts are in fact almost exclusively 
about other men. In “Of the Disadvantage of Greatness” Montaigne says 
that the disadvantage of greatness is the inability of the great to “essay” 
themselves against other men, causing them to miss one of the most impor-
tant of all human pleasures, the playful testing of one’s strength in struggle 
with others (VS918, F701). In order to experience this essaying of himself, 
the great man must “step down” from the heights of power (VS916, F699).
Montaigne essays himself against philosophers, poets, historians, 
princes, and common people. The stories of other men are forms of expe-
rience, of what is possible, and of the limits of the human soul. Montaigne 
is not testing himself against the standard of the universal, but measuring 
himself against other individuals. Thus, to essay himself is essentially a 
social act. 
The Order of Shepherds and Shopboys
It must be acknowledged that the Essays look unphilosophical. There 
are no arguments, no syllogisms, and no conclusions. Neither does Mon-
taigne seem concerned to arrive at universals or essences. As the title essais 
suggests, he weighs opinions, looking at many sides of a given topic. His 
topics themselves are generally unphilosophical—thumbs, smells, coaches, 
drunkenness—and appear trivial; they are not the weighty and essential 
topics of philosophy. His topics present themselves in an accidental way: 
“I take the first subject that chance offers. They are all equally good to 
me” (VS302, F219). These are the topics of everyday life which come into 
conversation in a haphazard way.
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Montaigne’s mind seems to move in a world of accidental similarities 
rather than a world of forms and essences. Thus, the Essays seem to be 
without any rational order: they move from accident to accident. Yet, he 
says that there is an order, albeit a very strange one: “it is the only book 
in the world of its kind, a book with a wild and eccentric plan” (VS385, 
F278). Indeed, it is order that he most concerned with: “the order that we 
see everyday in the altercations of shepherds and shopboys, never among 
us [the learned]. . . . at least they understand one another” (VS925, F706). 
Because the Essays descend below and behind the most common opinions 
to the level at which everyone can understand them, they do not follow 
the order of philosophical argument. Rather, the order of the Essays is the 
order of shepherds and shopboys, the order of everyday life. 
Once again, the Socrates of Montaigne’s invention can help us to see 
what Montaigne himself is doing. Montaigne re-forms Socrates, affirm-
ing and elevating him, yet at the same time lowering him, transforming 
him, and subjecting him to Montaigne’s own purposes. The Socrates of 
the Essays does not ascend to the knowledge of the Forms; instead, he 
descends to the most lowly opinions of the most common men. Socrates 
“makes his soul move with a natural and common motion. So says a peas-
ant, so says a woman. His mouth is full of nothing but carters, joiners, 
cobblers and masons. His are inductions and similes drawn from the com-
monest and best-known actions of men; everyone understands him. . . . By 
these vulgar and natural motives, by these ordinary and common ideas, 
without excitement or fuss, he constructed not only the best regulated but 
the loftiest and most vigorous beliefs, actions, and morals that ever were. 
It is he who brought human wisdom back down from heaven” (VS1038, 
F793). To those who think that the discourse of Socrates is far above com-
mon opinions, Montaigne responds: “I judge otherwise, and hold that it 
is a speech which in its naturalness ranks far behind and below common 
opinions. In an unstudied and artless boldness and a childlike assurance 
it represents the pure and primary impression and ignorance of Nature” 
(VS1054, F807). Indeed, it is possible to see in the Essays themselves much 
of what Montaigne describes as the lowliness of Socrates. The strength of 
the philosopher is in descending, not in ascending. This is the new kind 
of strength of the self-ordered soul, which is strong “in itself.” The self-
ordered soul orders his thought to the lowest and most common. The 
order of the Essays, then, is not the order of the syllogism. Rather, it is the 
order of a new logic of possibility which looks very much like the haphaz-
ard order of the conversations of ordinary human beings.12
Although Montaigne is not concerned with universals or essences, he 
does point to a capacity that belongs to all human beings: the capacity for 
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communication, for making oneself understood. In the course of setting 
out the context for his claim that he is an unpremeditated philosopher, 
Montaigne tells us: “In Italy I advised a man who was at pains to speak 
Italian, that provided he sought only to make himself understood, with-
out wishing to excel at it otherwise, he should simply use the first words 
that came to his mouth, Latin, French, Spanish, or Gascon; and that by 
adding the Italian ending, he would never fail to hit some dialect of the 
country. . . . I say the same thing about philosophy; it has so many faces 
and so much variety, and has said so much, that all our dreams or rever-
ies are found in it” (VS546, F408). Using “the first words that come to 
his mouth” points to the spontaneity of everyday communication and 
the way in which philosophy can make him understood, accommodating 
itself to the immediacy of the occasion. 
One of the first characteristics of men and animals that Montaigne 
discusses in the “Apology for Raymond Sebond” is the ability to commu-
nicate and, in particular, the ability of men to communicate not simply 
by words but also by gestures.13 “Our mutes dispute, argue, and tell 
stories by signs. I have seen some as supple and versed in this, that in 
truth they lacked nothing of perfection in being able to make themselves 
understood.” He then goes through a long list of gestures of the hands, 
head, eyebrows, and shoulders by which we communicate our desires and 
passions. “There is no movement that does not speak both a language 
intelligible without instruction, and a public language; which means, see-
ing the variety and particular use of other languages, that this one must 
rather be judged the one proper to human nature” (VS454, F332). The 
ability to communicate, whether by words or gestures, belongs to all men 
regardless of their differences and inequalities of intellect. The universal 
ability to communicate is the basis of society. The Essays are the perfect 
instantiation of that ability to communicate.14 
Montaigne’s Generous Gesture and Great Deed
There are, however, two instances in the Essays where neither philosophi-
cal nor everyday language can express precisely what Montaigne wants 
to convey. The first instance concerns his intended audience, “souls regu-
lated and strong in themselves,” which is an audience so sparse that it 
has “neither name nor rank among us” (VS657, F498). It has no name 
because it has no rank. In pointing to this lack of rank, Montaigne implies 
that his project involves a transcendence of the traditional hierarchy, the 
traditional order of high and low, strong and weak.
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The second instance in which Montaigne finds both philosophical and 
everyday language insufficient concerns the confusion in both types of 
language, the confusion of goodness and innocence with imperfection and 
weakness. These conditions look so much alike that it is difficult to distin-
guish them. That is why “the very names of innocence and goodness are 
for this reason to some extent terms of contempt” (VS426, F310). Mon-
taigne, then, must overcome this confusion and articulate his overcoming 
of the traditional hierarchy while using only the everyday language that is 
thoroughly imbued with that hierarchy. He continues to use the language 
of perfection and imperfection, high and low, strong and weak; he must 
also, however, find a way to convey the radical changes in the meaning of 
those terms effected by his own philosophical project. Since language fails 
him in these two decisive instances, he cannot communicate by words 
alone but only by a gesture or great deed.
Still, Montaigne insists that he has no great deeds to tell, so that he 
must come into the public with only words. That is what makes his emer-
gence into the public potentially shameful and it is why his self-revelation 
is always enacted against the background of the accusation of weakness 
and the possibility of ridicule. He is bringing the private and common 
into the public where, until now, only great deeds justified such acts of 
self-revelation. It seems, then, that his self-communication could only be 
idle, frivolous, and ineffective. 
The central action, the great deed, of the Essays, however, is the inven-
tion of society. We look through the various essays for arguments and 
conclusions in vain, because judgment is not an argument but an act. 
Montaigne’s judgment is not expressed in propositions but in the very act 
of bringing the private into the public, the act of reordering the mind to 
the common and lowly, of reversing the traditional hierarchy, and finally 
of subordinating the high to the low. This is the generous gesture of the 
philosopher in and through which he reveals and communicates himself; 
it is the action by which he reveals the meaning of the self-ordered soul 
and the strength of goodness. Montaigne’s generous gesture is the great 
deed which does justify his emergence into the public.
Reordering and Reversing
When the desire to tell his weak mores seizes him, Montaigne calls upon 
the help of philosophy to express them so that he might go out a bit 
more decently in public. He is a common, private man who claims no 
great learning or great deeds but who nevertheless emerges into the public 
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wearing the fig leaf of ancient philosophy. This emergence of the private 
man into the public is the defining action of the Essays for it is the bring-
ing into existence of the new realm of the social. 
In the tradition, the private is the hidden and shameful, hidden because 
it is shameful. The actions of private life are the actions that are merely 
necessary, that is, unfree or servile, for they are associated with mere life.15 
The deeds of great men, on the contrary, are great because they show con-
tempt for mere life, a contempt that manifests itself most clearly in risking 
life in the face of imminent and violent death. The great philosophers, 
too, show contempt for mere life. This philosophical contempt manifests 
itself in several ways: in the view that philosophy is the separation of 
the soul from the body; in the contempt that the philosopher has for the 
pleasures of the body; in the claim that philosophy is the highest activity 
of leisure which is freed from the servility of labor and work; in the phi-
losopher’s escape from the temporal and from this world to the eternal 
and celestial realm. 
But here is Montaigne, a common, private, and weak man, presuming 
to bring out into public view everything that the philosophers and the 
great actors of history despise. By bringing the private out into the public, 
into visibility, Montaigne is overcoming its shame. He makes his mind 
ashamed of itself for its attempt to be divine, and by bringing the body 
and its everyday needs into the public, he overcomes the shame of the 
human. Thus, he initiates a reform of the great and of the philosophers. 
Without great deeds or learning, the particular is anonymous, and yet 
Montaigne emerges into the public as a particular. The Essays are The 
Essays of Michel de Montaigne. He emerges out of the anonymity of the 
common in his concrete particularity. Thus, he overcomes the anonymity 
and invisibility of the individual who is merely an undifferentiated part of 
the common herd. He presents himself, the particular, as weak: his mores 
have not been formed by philosophy. It is the accidental conformity of his 
weak mores to the teachings and examples of philosophy that astonishes 
him. Philosophy allows him to see the weak, the private, and the shameful 
in a new light. Unpremeditated and accidental philosophy is the subor-
dination of ancient philosophy to his desire for self-revelation, and the 
subordination of philosophy itself to the social. 
The very first words of the Essays assert the primary significance of this 
emergence of the private into the public: Montaigne’s end is merely domes-
tic and private. This is the reversal of the Aristotelian order. Once again, 
he presents himself as too weak for the lofty goals of glory or public ser-
vice. He simply wants to present himself in his “simple, natural, ordinary 
form, without striving.” Thus, he concludes his address to the reader: “you 
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would not be rational to spend your leisure on such a frivolous and vain 
subject” (VS3, F2). He is presenting his particularity, his weak and defec-
tive particularity, as it is in the realm of the domestic and private, not in 
the studied posture of the learned or of one seeking the favor of the world. 
To say that his end is domestic and private is to say that his end is the 
social, for the social is the domestic and private brought into the public. 
The reader would not be “rational” to study Montaigne’s self-revelations, 
because the traditional notion of reason makes his reversal of the hierarchy 
look irrational. Thus, the generous gesture that brings the private into the 
public, which is a free act of the will, looks like a mere caprice. 
Montaigne describes his decision to study only himself as a lowering 
of his mind: “Other men study themselves in order to elevate their minds 
and hoist them up tight; I to lower it and lay it to rest” (VS821, F623). He 
supports this claim with a quotation from Horace’s Odes that illustrates 
the turn from the glorious enterprise of war to merely domestic concerns: 
“You sing of Aeacus’ line and the wars beneath the sacred walls of Ilium: 
but you do not say how much I must pay for a jar of Chian wine, or who 
will heat my water on his fire, where I shall find shelter and when I shall 
escape from the cold of the Pelignian mountains” (Horace, Odes, 3.19, 
3–8). But this lowering to the domestic and private actually turns out to 
be a new kind of perfection, for the bringing into existence of the social—
his end—is the good.
Montaigne reorders philosophy to the human, rather than to the 
divine; to the lowest, rather than the highest; to the weak, rather than 
the strong; to the imperfect, rather than the perfect; to what is, rather 
than what ought to be; to the particular, rather than the universal; to the 
domestic and private, rather than the political; to the ordinary, rather 
than the extraordinary. In the terms of the traditional hierarchy, this reor-
dering looks like a mere “lowering” of the mind. However, Montaigne’s 
overcoming of the hierarchy is in fact a new kind of freedom, the free-
dom of the mind to order itself and to order the world. The order of the 
great and the everyday, the extraordinary and the ordinary is reversed: 
the lowest is higher than the highest. This reversal is very difficult to 
express, because ordinary language is imbued with the traditional hierar-
chy, confusing goodness and innocence with weakness and imperfection. 
Montaigne’s subordination of the great to the everyday shows that we 
already possess the good, in the domestic and private. Enjoyment is pos-
session. The good is not an end that we must strive for. It is already our 
own, “without striving,” in the everyday. Thus, Montaigne’s project is not 
simply the lowering of the high but rather the reversal of high and low 
and finally the subordination of the high to the low. 
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In pursuit of this project, Montaigne reorders the mind, and thus phi-
losophy itself, to the familiar and the everyday, thereby overcoming the 
natural tendency of the mind to prefer the strange and extraordinary. 
Through the movement of Montaigne’s thought in the Essays, the ordi-
nary becomes extraordinary, the familiar becomes astonishing. From the 
most ordinary, common, and familiar things, if we could put them in 
their proper light, the greatest miracles of nature and the most marvel-
ous examples would appear, especially on the subject of human actions 
(VS1081, F829). 
Considering “the things that are right in our hands, it is rather famil-
iarity than knowledge that takes away their strangeness.” If these now 
familiar things were presented to us for the first time, we would be sur-
prised by them and find them incredible (VS179, F132–33). The everyday 
is marvelous and miraculous because it subjects the extraordinary, rare, 
and strange to itself. Philosophy allows him to see the everyday—to put 
the everyday—in a new light. This is Montaigne’s transformation of expe-
rience. The experience in which he ends is not the same as the experience 
in which he began, that is, experience formed by inherited philosophical 
opinion, for it is now freed from philosophical presumption.
Ending in Experience
“Of Experience” is the last of the essays. Montaigne literally, then, ends 
in experience. Experience, he says, is “weaker” than reason (VS1065, 
F815), yet reason must submit to experience. The first sentence of “Of 
Experience”—“There is no desire more natural than the desire for knowl-
edge”—echoes the first sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics—“All men by 
nature desire to have knowledge.”16 Aristotle begins in experience and 
ends in knowledge. In the first book of the Metaphysics, he sets out the 
ascent of the mind to the first causes of all things, the subject matter of 
“first philosophy.” From sensation the mind ascends to memory. Memory 
is higher than sensation because it does not require the actual presence 
of the object: memory recalls the object to mind. Experience is “many 
memories of the same thing” (Meta. 1.1, 980b25–981a1). Thus, experi-
ence is the first level at which the mind unifies, bringing together many 
memories into one experience. Experience, however, knows only “that” 
something is the case but not “why” it is the way it is. From experience, 
then, the mind ascends to art, which is higher than experience because it 
involves the knowledge of causes. Finally, the mind ascends to knowledge 
and to the first science, which is most comprehensive because it deals 
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with being as such and the first causes of all things. Thus, metaphysics is 
the highest of the sciences. In “Of Experience” Montaigne says: “I study 
myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that is my 
physics” (VS1072, F821). At the conclusion of that essay, he writes: “Of 
our sciences, those seem to me most terrestrial and low which have risen 
the highest” (VS1115, F856).
Aristotle’s description of experience—many memories of the same 
thing—reveals the way in which the mind draws the particulars into 
a unity: the particular is seen from the start as an instance of form. 
Montaigne’s understanding of experience, on the other hand, might be 
described in terms of the invention or imagination of the accidental sim-
ilarities of particulars. Thus he is able to articulate the weak through 
accidental similarity to the strong, the lowest through accidental similarity 
to the highest. Whereas Aristotle’s experience leads to form, Montaigne’s 
experience leads to astonishing new particulars which, by virtue of their 
particularity, are “deformed.”17
Montaigne reverses the Aristotelian order: he begins in knowledge and 
ends in experience. The knowledge in which he begins is the knowledge 
that comes from familiarity. Montaigne ends in experience, but this is 
not Aristotle’s notion of experience, that is, many memories of the same 
thing, for Montaigne’s memory is “monstrously deficient” (VS34, F21). 
Indeed, experience for Montaigne requires “the science of forgetfulness” 
(VS494, F365). The experience in which he ends is what I would call 
“astonished familiarity.” He begins in familiarity and ends in astonished 
familiarity: unpremeditated and accidental philosophy is just this move-
ment of thought. When he wants to tell his thoughts and mores in public, 
to tell what is most familiar to him and thus what he already knows, he 
calls on the help of philosophy to express himself and then is astonished 
to find that his mere caprices and his weak mores conform, by accident, 
to so many of the teachings and examples of ancient philosophy.
In “Of Cripples” he writes: “I have seen no more evident monstrosity 
and miracle in the world than myself. We become habituated to anything 
strange by use and time; but the more I frequent myself and know myself, 
the more my deformity astonishes me, and the less I understand myself” 
(VS1029, F787). He has not experienced the miracles that the simple have 
seen. Rather, the most familiar, himself, is astonishing to him. The more 
he is familiar with himself the more he knows himself. But this knowl-
edge, this familiarity, has not accustomed him to his own strangeness. And 
the more he knows himself, the less he understands himself: he does not 
know why he is the way he is. This is a kind of Socratic ignorance, “a cer-
tain strong and generous ignorance that concedes nothing to knowledge 
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in honor and courage, an ignorance that requires no less knowledge to 
conceive it than does knowledge” (VS1030, F788).18 This strong and 
generous ignorance destroys knowledge and replaces knowledge with 
wonder. Montaigne’s “master-form” is ignorance (VS302, F219) because 
he remains in this condition of astonished familiarity.19 
The knowledge that is unastonished familiarity might be described as 
presumptuous knowledge or custom. Thus it could be said that Montaigne 
begins in presumptuous knowledge or custom and ends in philosophical 
experience or astonished familiarity. Custom, he says, is the tyrant, the 
master of thought. “The violent prejudice of custom” is the traditional 
hierarchy of high and low, strong and weak, in which the familiar and 
common are despised. Philosophy, understood as astonished familiar-
ity, overcomes the violent prejudice of custom which dulls the mind and 
makes it so difficult to recognize the possible and the new. The new is 
just the most familiar seen in its proper light. The familiar itself, then, is 
transformed. That is how Montaigne both brings out the familiar into 
the light and, at the same time, introduces the new: the familiar is new. 
Philosophy, then, is just experience, but it is experience without presump-
tion.20 Experience, stripped of all presumption and arrogance, becomes 
philosophical. Philosophy, then, does not begin in wonder. Rather, the 
philosopher effects wonder.
But why is the most familiar astonishing? How are the most common 
human actions miracles of nature? What is the “proper light” in which 
they appear as astonishing miracles? The domestic and private realm is 
the place of the most common human actions, which are undifferentiated 
from man to man. It would be only in great deeds that men distinguish 
themselves and appear as individuals, while the most common human 
actions display what the individual has in common with all other men, 
that is, subjection to the necessities of life and the possession of “life 
itself.” The individual disappears into the common, and the common 
therefore seems to lack any possibility of provoking astonishment. 
For Aristotle, then, freedom is freedom from work and labor, from the 
need to labor and work for the necessities of life, in order to devote one-
self to the “higher” activities of politics and philosophy, activities which 
are free because they are not instrumental but are “ends in themselves.” 
Therefore, the life of the polis, to which leisure is essential, is made pos-
sible by the institution of slavery. 
Once again, Montaigne reverses Aristotle: the most common human 
actions are not servile but free. How is this possible? The Aristotelian lives 
of politics and of philosophy are the striving for immortality. Thus, what 
at first appears to be contempt for death is really the attempt to escape 
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death: the prince by achieving immortal glory and the philosopher by 
attaining the eternal causes of all things. The prince and the philosopher 
both want to escape our mortality and our temporality. The unpremedi-
tated and accidental philosopher is content to live “in the moment.” One 
way to describe what is presented in the Essays, then, is as the picture of 
human life when the striving for immortality—insofar as it is attainable 
by human power—has been given up.
In their “proper light” the most common and familiar human actions 
show themselves to be non-instrumental. Society is “for its own sake.” 
Society is the practice of everyday life freed from the shame of servility. In 
effect, then, Montaigne frees the slaves. 
Further, the most familiar and common human actions are astonishing 
because in them the violence of great deeds is subordinated to the domes-
tic and private. “When I see both Caesar and Alexander, in the thick of 
their great tasks, so fully enjoying natural and therefore necessary and 
just pleasures, I do not say that that is relaxing their souls, I say that it is 
toughening them, subordinating these violent occupations and laborious 
thoughts, by the vigor of their spirits, to the practice of everyday life: wise 
men, had they believed that this [the violent] was their ordinary occupa-
tion, the other [the everyday] the extraordinary” (VS1108, F850). In their 
submission to the body’s constant demands for food, digestion, sleep, and 
sexual pleasure, Alexander and Caesar are “toughening” their souls: the 
good is not weak but strong because it subjects the strong and violent to 
itself. 
If the “proper light” is Montaigne’s view of the human condition—in 
which the violent becomes ordinary and the everyday extraordinary—
then the human condition must be the condition of war, of violence, and 
of the natural conflict between masters and slaves. The most common 
human actions are astonishing miracles because they overcome that natu-
ral condition of war. When the violent prejudice of custom is stripped 
away, when our most common impressions of weakness and strength are 
called into question, the weak reveals itself as stronger than the strong.
For Montaigne, the philosophical attitude or stance is neither con-
templative nor practical for it is the stance of judgment, the attitude of 
possession and enjoyment. Judgment makes the object of contempla-
tion—“the thing-itself”—one’s own. The subjection of the thing itself to 
judgment is, at the same time, an ordering to the lowest. Thus, Socrates 
“brings down” the thing itself to his own “original level.” In “Of Experi-
ence” Montaigne says that pleasure and pain, love and hate are the “first 
things” that a child feels (VS1111, F853). Judgment subjects the thing 
itself to these first things: for example, Montaigne “cruelly hates cruelty.” 
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For Aristotle, these first things—pleasure and pain—originate at the low-
est level of animal life, the level at which animals are distinguished from 
plants. It is to this lowest level that Montaigne returns in the philosophi-
cal act of judgment.
In the single philosophical act of making the familiar astonishing, 
Montaigne both reforms philosophy and frees the servile realm of the 
domestic and private from its bondage to the violent. By that single 
action, philosophy transcends the Aristotelian distinction between the 
theoretical and the practical. That is, the philosophical act itself refounds 
human association.
Unlike the ecstatic beholding of the thing itself, which the Aristotelian 
philosopher experiences in those few moments of his life when he escapes 
to the eternal and participates in the divine activity of contemplation, 
experience is simply the here and now, fully present to the unpremeditated 
and accidental philosopher. When the familiar is seen in its proper light, 
the light of the purified judgment of the philosopher, the divine reveals 
itself as the good of the everyday. That is why the ordinary is miraculous. 
The new is just the most familiar, what was there all along, but hidden. 
The act of reversing the most familiar and the most extraordinary, then, 
is a kind of revelation, bringing the divine out of its hiddenness. Truth is 
just this astonishing revelation.21 
Thus, philosophical experience is not Aristotelian contemplation, but 
neither is it immersion in the temporal realm of practice or dissipation 
in the immediacy of the moment; that is, philosophy is neither theoreti-
cal nor practical. The astonishment of “astonished familiarity” suggests 
a kind of contemplative attitude directed toward the temporal realm of 
human life and action, but it is not a contemplative attitude that disdains 
the fleeting temporal as nothing. It is not a subjection of the temporal to 
the eternal but rather a subjection of the philosopher’s stance toward the 
eternal to the merely temporal. In this way, Montaigne’s philosophical 
attitude brings the eternal into the temporal and makes the eternal his 
own in time. Tzvetan Todorov captures this sense of Montaigne’s stance 
toward the everyday in his explication of Montaigne’s admonition that 
“the practice of everyday life should be an aim unto itself” (VS1051–
52, F805). Todorov writes: “The sage will try to achieve this intransitive 
state, the rejection of instrumentalization, in each of his actions.”22 The 
actions of “mere life” become the philosophical experience of life “for its 
own sake.”
Thus, leisure for Montaigne is not the condition for the philoso-
pher’s escape to the eternal and divine. His sense of leisure appears 
especially clearly in “Of Experience.” Here, he disapproves of Socrates’s 
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contemplative ecstasies, of the theologian’s “transcendental humors,” and 
of the philosopher’s attempt to escape from the man. But he approves 
wholeheartedly of the Socrates “who never refused to play cobnut with 
children or to ride a hobbyhorse with them” (VS1110, F852), as well 
as of the legendary “theological drinking and feasting” at the Sorbonne 
(VS1108, F851). Montaigne clearly hates to be told that we must keep 
our minds in the clouds while our bodies are at table. He is, he says, 
“intellectually sensual, sensually intellectual” (VS1107, F850). 
Experience, understood as astonished familiarity, is the source of the 
philosopher’s constant joy, for experience is ever present to the whole 
man, body and soul. “The surest sign of wisdom is constant joy” (VS161, 
F119). Philosophy is constantly joyful because the philosopher actually 
possesses the good in this world and in this life. The philosopher is not 
transported to the “other world,” but rather experiences “this world” in 
a new way. 
“Of Experience” begins with Aristotle’s claim that all men desire 
knowledge and it ends with Montaigne’s claim that the absolute perfec-
tion of knowing how to enjoy our own being rightly is “gay and sociable 
wisdom” (VS1116, F857). In “Of Experience” leisure is philosophical 
drinking and feasting, the bringing together of philosophy and society. 
Philosophy thereby becomes merely unpremeditated and accidental, and 
the philosopher is separated from the man. This joining with his fellow 
human beings in their astonishing particularity is the free act, the gener-
ous gesture, of the philosopher in which he rediscovers his own humanity. 
Montaigne himself is the miracle of the self-ordered soul that is sociable. 









Unpremeditated and accidental philosophy is both the separation of the 
man from the philosopher and also the humanization of the philosopher 
through the submission of philosophy to the social. In the same way, the 
overcoming of natural mastery is both the separation of the man from 
the prince and also the humanization of the prince through the submis-
sion of the political to the social. Montaigne refounds human association 
by introducing a new kind of rule, one which eliminates the master-slave 
relationship. The new foundation replaces the old foundation of “the 
common good,” which Montaigne sees as the pretext for the mastery of 
the strong over the weak.1 
Montaigne’s Project of Refounding
In “Of Vanity” Montaigne makes what is perhaps his strongest statement 
against innovation in human association: “Nothing presses a state hard 
except innovation; change alone gives form to injustice and tyranny. When 
some part is dislocated, we can prop it up; we can fight against letting the 
alteration and corruption natural to all things carry us too far from our 
beginnings and principles. But to undertake to refound so great a mass, 
to change the foundations of so great a structure, that is a job for those 
who wipe out a picture in order to clean it, who want to reform defects of 
detail by universal confusion and cure illnesses by death, ‘who desire not 
so much to change as to overthrow everything’ [Cicero]” (VS958, F731). 
This opposition to innovation entails rejecting the classical notion of 
perfection, that is, “the best cities” of Plato and Aristotle. Even the worst 
forms of political association “have nevertheless maintained their bodily 
health and long life as well as those of Plato and Aristotle could do. And 
indeed all those descriptions of a government imagined by art prove 
ridiculous and unfit to put into practice. These great, lengthy altercations 
99
about the best form of society and the rules most suitable to bind us, are 
altercations fit only for the exercise of our minds. . . . Such a description 
of a government would be applicable in a new world, but we take men 
already bound and formed to certain customs; we do not create them, like 
Pyrrha or Cadmus. By whatever means we may have the power to cor-
rect and reform them, we can hardly twist them out of their accustomed 
bent without breaking up everything” (VS956–57, F730). However, this 
opponent of innovation makes the surprising statement that “it is always 
a gain to change a bad state to an uncertain one” (VS972, F743). But the 
man who seeks to introduce change “must be very sure that he sees the 
weakness of what he is casting out and the goodness of what he is bring-
ing in” (VS121, F88). 
Montaigne reforms without destroying because he replaces the weak 
with the good. The weak foundation in the politics of the tradition is 
the presumed strength of natural mastery. The good foundation, in Mon-
taigne’s re-formed politics, is the presumed weakness of submission. 
If the prince believes himself to be the natural master, he justifiably 
identifies himself with his unlimited power; thus, his power is in the ser-
vice of his interest and his passions. He sees himself as superior to all 
other men and perhaps even as a god among men. Montaigne, however, 
separates the man from the prince, an act effected by the attainment of 
reason inflexible and impassive. Only reason inflexible and impassive can 
settle the conflict between masters and slaves. This separation seems to 
bring about the dehumanization of the prince, taking his very self out of 
his exercise of rule; Montaigne, however, effects this separation through 
the submission of the prince to the social. Thus, he in fact humanizes the 
prince.
Montaigne begins the Essays in “To the Reader” with the statement of 
his purpose: his book was written in good faith. He warns us from the 
outset that he has set himself merely a domestic and private end (VS3, F2). 
This, as we have seen, is the reversal of the Aristotelian order: for Aristotle, 
the domestic and private is not the end but the beginning. The domestic 
and private finds its completion in the city, the political association, and 
the end of political association is the common good. The standard of the 
common good is Aristotle’s answer to the claim that all rule is really the 
rule of masters over slaves. In other words, for Aristotle, genuine political 
rule is not the rule of masters over slaves: whereas the master rules in his 
own interest, the ruler who acts for the common good rules for the good 
of the ruled (Pol. 3. 6–7). In the tradition, Aristotle’s principle of the com-
mon good is the standard of moral virtue, especially justice. It is a very 
high standard and it is rarely, if ever, achieved in practice. 
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Montaigne, however, rejects the standard of the common good for he 
sees it as the justification for natural mastery. Given the fact of natural 
inequality, the pursuit of a common good requires the rule of the supe-
rior, wiser men. Hobbes characterizes this Aristotelian view that natural 
inequality justifies the rule of one man over another: “I know that Aris-
totle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, 
maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the 
wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to 
Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers 
as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, 
but by difference of Wit.”2 Hobbes, then, like Montaigne, sees natural 
superiority as the foundation of Aristotle’s political philosophy. 
Montaigne’s rejection of the common good is ultimately grounded in 
his rejection of the idea of a single, common human form. Since philoso-
phy has not been able to find a way to the good that is common, “let 
each one seek it in his particularity” (VS622, F471). The individual must 
be free to pursue the good in his own way. Therefore, any attempt to 
enforce a standard of the common good would require an illegitimate use 
of force. The common good justifies coercion and force.
For Montaigne, the idea of the common good is simply the “pretext of 
reason” for the actions of vicious men (VS802, F609–10). The political 
realm is not rule for the sake of the common good but the rule of masters 
over slaves. Virtue itself betrays this origin of political association: “It is 
probable that the first virtue that manifested itself among men and gave 
some advantage over others was this one, by which the strongest and 
most courageous made themselves masters of the weaker” (VS384, F277). 
If rule is to overcome the distinction between masters and slaves, then 
natural inequality cannot justify the domination of one man over another.
Montaigne’s project of refounding is the resolution of the conflict 
between masters and subjects through the introduction of a new kind 
of rule and a new kind of freedom based on the overcoming of natural 
mastery. In “Of Custom” he writes: “Peoples brought up to liberty and to 
ruling themselves consider any other form of government monstrous and 
contrary to nature. Those who are accustomed to monarchy do the same. 
And whatever easy chance fortune offers them to change, even when with 
great difficulties they have rid themselves of the importunity of one mas-
ter, they run to supplant him with a new one, with similar difficulties, 
because they cannot make up their minds to hate mastery itself” (VS116, 
F83–84). 
Peoples must hate mastery itself, not simply this or that master. The 
admonition to “hate mastery itself” suggests that all of the old forms of 
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rule are essentially the same: they are all forms of domination or mastery.3 
This is a radical break with the Aristotelian tradition for which regimes 
are judged to be either good or bad, just or unjust, depending upon the 
criterion of the common good: regimes that pursue the common good are 
just; those that pursue only the interests of the rulers are unjust. Regimes 
that do not pursue the common good are all versions of the master-slave 
relationship.4 
Rousseau says in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of 
Inequality: “It is very difficult to reduce to obedience one who does 
not seek command.”5 In order to be free, in order not to be a slave, one 
must first renounce the desire to be a master. The desire to rule and the 
willingness to serve are two sides of the same coin. The master-slave is 
within each man. Freedom just is the condition of being “neither master 
nor slave.” Montaigne’s love of freedom expresses itself in his hatred of 
“every sort of tyranny, both in words and acts” (VS931, F711). When he 
says: “I am disgusted with mastery both active and passive,” he explains 
what he means through a story. Otanes, who had the right to pretend to 
the throne of Persia, abandoned that right to his companions provided 
that he and his family be allowed to live in the empire “outside of all 
subjection and mastery” except to that of the ancient laws. He could not 
support either commanding or being commanded. Montaigne says that 
Otanes took the course of action that Montaigne himself would willingly 
have taken (VS917, F700).
But how can the condition of “neither master nor slave” become the 
principle of political association, since the political is necessarily the 
relation of ruler and ruled, of masters and subjects? Montaigne answers 
with a distinction that brings out the nature of princely power: he sepa-
rates private will and public power. “The souls of emperors and cobblers 
are cast in the same mold. Considering the importance of the actions of 
princes and their weightiness, we persuade ourselves that they are pro-
duced by some causes equally weighty and important. We are wrong: 
they are led to and fro in their movements by the same springs as we are 
in ours. . . . Their will is as frivolous as ours, but their power is greater” 
(VS476, F350). If the souls of emperors and cobblers are cast in the same 
mold, then there are no natural princes, no natural masters: the emperor 
is essentially a private man. If the only difference between the will of the 
emperor and the will of the cobbler is the power of the emperor, then the 
will of the emperor is only a private will and therefore merely as frivolous 
as that of the cobbler.
Montaigne says that “the judgment of an emperor should be above 
his imperial power, and see and consider it as an extraneous accident; 
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and he should know how to find pleasure in himself apart, and to reveal 
himself like any Jack or Peter, at least to himself” (VS1012, F774). Judg-
ment reveals that princely power is only an extraneous accident: the man 
is not essentially a prince. This is the separation of the man from the 
prince. Whereas for Aristotle, rule is justified by the natural superiority of 
the prince, for Montaigne there is no natural prince. All men are equally 
and essentially private men. If there is no natural prince, then overcoming 
natural mastery requires separating the man from the prince so that the 
power of the prince is no longer in the service of the man. 
Speaking of his own exercise of rule, Montaigne says that “the Mayor 
and Montaigne have always been two, with a very clear separation” 
(VS1012, F774). Montaigne here introduces something like a public will, 
or rule that is not merely private will; it is rule as will or power without 
the self. The rejection of the common good rests on the claim that rule by 
the standard of the common good is really and simply the imposition of 
a private will on other men. 
Montaigne’s refounding replaces force—the domination of the strong 
over the weak—with consent. “As I do not like to take a hand in legiti-
mate actions against people who resent them, so, to tell the truth, I am 
not scrupulous enough [je ne fas pas assez de conscience] to refrain from 
taking a hand in illegitimate actions against people who consent to them” 
(VS1063, F814). Consent, not superior wit, legitimizes rule. 
Montaigne’s refounding thus institutes a new kind of freedom. He 
praises the Theban general Epaminondas because he fought for “the ines-
timable good of restoring liberty to his country” (VS801, F609). This 
reference to “the inestimable good” is, I believe, the only instance in the 
Essays where Montaigne points to something like a highest or greatest 
good. The language that he uses is the language of restoration, of regain-
ing or returning to something that had been lost. He uses this language 
because he is going back to the origins of political association and replac-
ing them. The freedom that he institutes cannot be precisely the natural 
freedom of pre-civilized peoples who live under the “sweet freedom of 
nature’s first laws” (VS3, F2). But it is also not simply a return to the 
ancient understanding of freedom, for there are two notions of freedom 
that are thematic in the Essays: the freedom of self-determination of a 
political entity and the freedom of the individual. 
In his essay “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the 
Moderns,” Benjamin Constant maintains that the liberty of the ancients 
consisted “in exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the 
complete sovereignty.” This included deliberating in the public square, 
forming alliances with foreign governments, voting, judging, and so on. 
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“But if this was what the ancients called liberty, they admitted as compat-
ible with this collective freedom the complete subjection of the individual 
to the authority of the community.”6 Constant refers to this ancient lib-
erty as “political” liberty. Modern liberty, on the contrary, is “personal” 
liberty, expressed in terms of certain rights of the individual. Personal 
freedom is the rejection of the Aristotelian notion of the common good. 
In “Of Glory” Montaigne writes: “All the glory that I aspire to in my life 
is to have lived it tranquilly: tranquilly not according to Metrodorus, or 
Arcesilas, or Aristippus, but according to me. Since philosophy has not 
been able to find any way to tranquility which is good in common, let 
each one seek it in his particularity!” (VS622, F471). 
Montaigne’s “restoration” is the reconciliation of these two notions 
of liberty. He expresses the first, ancient notion of liberty in his hatred of 
domination itself and the second, modern notion in his “end” which is 
“domestic and private.” Bringing the domestic and private into the public 
means freeing the domestic and private from the domination of the politi-
cal, and thus inventing society as a free mode of human association. 
Reconciling these two kinds of freedom amounts to nothing less than a 
radically new understanding of rule itself. If rule is to be compatible with 
freedom, and if freedom is the condition of “neither master nor slave,” 
then rule must become representation. Constant says that the bringing 
together of these two kinds of freedom is a modern invention. Repre-
sentative government is a “discovery of the moderns”7 that allows the 
individual to participate in sovereignty by electing representatives and, at 
the same time, allows him the freedom to pursue his own personal goals, 
to seek the good in his particularity.
According to Francis Slade, “rule detached from its natural embodi-
ment is the core of modern political philosophy.”8 Thus, “the principle 
of ancient constitutions is the regime; that of modern, representation.”9 
Whereas “a regime is rule embodied in those who rule,”10 representa-
tion is “the separation of rule from human beings.”11 Representation is 
the separation of the man from the prince, for the representative is not a 
natural prince.
We see this notion of representation in Hobbes: “A person is he whose 
words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the 
words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are 
attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. When they are considered as his 
owne, then he is called a Naturall Person: And when they are considered 
as representing the words and actions of an other, then he is a Feigned or 
Artificiall person.” Rule is, then, representation of the will of every man: 
“A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, 
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or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every 
one of that Multitude in particular.”12 
Although Montaigne does not discuss the idea of representative gov-
ernment, his epistemological notion of representation provides the basis 
for this possibility. The mind represents not only what is and what is not 
but also “what we want.” Therefore, the will can be represented.13 Repre-
sentation is not the apprehension of form, of a universal essence. Rather, 
Montaigne represents “a particular, very ill-formed.” Representation is of 
particulars, particular and diverse wills. As Hobbes says, the consent of 
each is united in the words and actions of the one person who represents 
the multitude. 
Montaigne says that “mastery, of itself, breeds contempt of what we 
hold and rule” (VS634, F480). If natural inequality is not justification 
for mastery, then those who believe themselves superior must be brought 
into unity with the common herd which they naturally hold in contempt. 
Only the magnanimous act of the proud can make possible the resolution 
of the conflict between master and slaves. The proud must renounce the 
right to rule. This is an act of the will which looks irrational—like a mere 
whim or caprice—because it is uncalculated. And, because it is uncalcu-
lated, it is entirely free. Yet, the will is in accord with reason inflexible and 
impassive, because this public reason is the renunciation of self-interest 
and self-esteem.14 
We find in Montaigne, then, a kind of “moralization of pride” similar 
to what Oakeshott sees in Hobbes’s political philosophy. Hobbes relies 
on the fact that the greatest fear that most men experience is the fear of 
death. This fear drives them out of the state of nature and into the contract 
that is the commonwealth. But Hobbes recognizes that not all men can be 
ruled by the fear of death. The proud man would rather die than submit, 
would rather die than be forced to accept equality with the common men 
who do submit out of fear. In fact, according to Oakeshott, Hobbes actu-
ally needs such proud men because they are more likely to make the first 
gesture toward peace. They are the ones who must be counted on to risk 
their lives by laying down their arms while the others retain theirs. This 
gesture comes not from fear but from a certain kind of generosity that 
can belong only to the proud. The proud achieve through courage what 
others achieve through rational calculation inspired by fear. 
Oakeshott’s depiction of the generous man’s character is worth quot-
ing in full because it describes so precisely Montaigne’s character. The 
man whose pride has been moralized is “a man whose disposition is to 
overcome fear not by reason (that is, by seeking a secure condition of 
external human circumstances) but by his own courage; a man not at all 
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without imperfections and not deceived about himself, but who is proud 
enough to be spared the sorrow of his imperfections and the illusions of 
his achievements; not exactly a hero, too negligent for that, but perhaps 
with a touch of careless heroism about him; a man, in short, who (in 
Montaigne’s phrase) ‘knows how to belong to himself,’ and who, if for-
tune turned out so, would feel no shame in the epitaph: ‘Par delicatesse/ 
J’ai perdu ma vie.’ ”15 
Montaigne’s essay “Of the Disadvantage of Greatness” actually begins 
with a discussion of the advantage of greatness: “In general greatness has 
this evident advantage, that it can step down whenever it pleases, and that 
it almost has the choice of both conditions” (VS916, F699). Greatness 
“almost” has the choice of both conditions only because, when it steps 
down to the condition of lowliness, greatness still differs from lowliness 
in that its lowliness is freely chosen. To choose lowliness means the dis-
appearance of the great into the anonymity of the common. Illustrious, 
shining deeds are swallowed up in the darkness of privacy. The noble man 
who chooses this condition does not assert his superiority, does not claim 
what is his by right, but acts on an “inclination” of his judgment to disap-
pear into the anonymity of the common. 
In order to effect the condition of “neither master nor slave,” the insti-
tution of true freedom, the noble man must step down. Greatness must 
lower itself; pride must become generosity; and the desire to rule must 
become the gift of equality and freedom. “Giving belongs to rule and 
mastery” (VS1026, F785). In his Travel Journal, Montaigne records that 
in a house in Pisa he saw a representation of King Charles VIII on his 
knees before the Madonna who appears to be giving him counsel. “The 
inscription says that when the said king was supping in this house it 
came into his mind to give the Pisans their ancient freedom, whereby he 
surpassed the greatness of Alexander. . . . The words concerning that mat-
ter of the granting of freedom have been purposely disfigured and half 
effaced.”16 
The condition of “neither master nor slave” is the condition of “vol-
untary servitude,” to use the expression of Montaigne’s friend La Boétie. 
The old foundation of political association rests on the justification of 
the mastery of the naturally strong over the weak. In contrast, volun-
tary servitude is the transformation of the natural relationship of masters 
and slaves into the free, non-natural association of equals. Voluntary ser-
vitude does not assume the superiority or perfection of the master. On 
the contrary, it is voluntary because the master’s rule cannot be justified 
by his superiority. Montaigne says: “Let us make this concession to the 
political order: to suffer [princes] patiently if they are unworthy. . . . But, 
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our dealings over, it is not right to deny to justice and to our liberty the 
expression of our true feelings, and especially to deny good subjects the 
glory of having reverently and faithfully served a master whose imperfec-
tions were so well known to them” (VS16, F9).
So also, the motives for entering into the condition of voluntary ser-
vitude do not matter. In a passage that anticipates Hobbes, Montaigne 
writes of false and lax rules in philosophy: “Robbers have seized you; 
they have set you free again after extracting from you an oath to pay a 
certain sum. People are wrong to say that an honest man will be quit of 
his word without paying, once he is out of their hands. Nothing of the 
sort. What fear has once made me will, I am bound still to will when 
without fear. . . . Otherwise we shall come by degrees to overthrow all 
the rights that a third person obtains from our promises and oaths. As if 
force can be brought to bear on a brave man [Cicero]. In this alone does 
private interest have the right to excuse us for failing our promise, if we 
have promised something wicked and unjust in itself; for the rights of 
virtue must prevail over the rights of our obligation” (VS801, F608). For 
Montaigne, the promise as the expression of and the binding of the will is 
the social bond. “Since mutual understanding is brought about solely by 
way of the word, he who falsifies it betrays human society. It is the only 
instrument by means of which our wills and thoughts communicate, it is 
the interpreter of our soul. If it fails us, we have no more hold on each 
other, no more knowledge of each other. If it deceives us, it breaks up all 
our relations and dissolves all the bonds of our society” (VS666, F505). 
Lying is such a destructive vice because “we are men and hold together 
only by our word” (VS36, F23).
Although, as Oakeshott maintains, Hobbes must presume upon the 
generosity of the proud, he constructs his commonwealth on the founda-
tion of the fear of death that is characteristic of the weak. That is, the 
proud or spirited, who play such an important role in the state of nature, 
disappear from his commonwealth, apparently dismissed by the ninth law 
of nature. “If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to 
be acknowledged: or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men 
that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but 
upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for 
the ninth law of Nature, I put this, That every man acknowledge [every] 
other for his Equall by Nature. The breach of this Precept is Pride.”17
In Montaigne, however, the moralization of pride, which is presumed 
but not accounted for by Hobbes, is made explicit, for, unlike Hobbes, 
Montaigne wants to preserve the spiritedness of the proud in the form of 
resistance to mastery. Freedom is central for Montaigne in a way that it is 
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not for Hobbes. Montaigne wants to overcome mastery but, at the same 
time, preserve spiritedness. In other words, he wants to remove the desire 
for mastery from the proud without destroying the love of freedom. The 
moralization of pride is just this combination of the renunciation of the 
desire for mastery with the love of freedom. Being the first to lay down 
one’s arms looks like surrender and submission. The hero, however, does 
not care that he might look weak and cowardly. He knows that his will-
ingness to take the risk is his freedom, for he risks his life and is ready to 
lay down his life, not for the sake of his honor, but rather for the sake of 
a good greater than either life or honor. The good worthy of his risk is 
twofold: the freedom he exhibits in his choice to lower himself and the 
freedom he thereby wins for his fellow citizens.
How, then, does Montaigne effect his refounding? How does the phi-
losopher, who effaces himself and has no great deeds to tell, exercise 
power over the minds and hearts of men? 
Essaying: Producing the Marvelous
The invisible power of the Essays is exercised through the production of 
the marvelous. In his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund 
Burke reports on an observation made by Rousseau to Hume: “Mr. Hume 
told me that he had from Rousseau himself the secret of his principles of 
composition. That acute though eccentric observer had perceived, that 
to strike and interest the public, the marvelous must be produced; that 
the marvelous of the heathen mythology had long since lost its effect; 
that giants, magicians, fairies, and heroes of romance which succeeded, 
had exhausted the portion of credulity which belonged to their age; that 
now nothing was left to the writer but that species of the marvelous 
which might still be produced, and with as great effect as ever, though in 
another way; that is, the marvelous in life, in manners, in characters, and 
in extraordinary situations, giving rise to new and unlooked-for strokes 
in politics and morals.”18 
In Baconian terms, the essay is a new logic, a logic of discovery, which 
replaces the old logic of the syllogism. Through particulars and accidental 
similarities, rather than universals and essences, the new logic discovers 
or invents new particulars, new possibilities. In “Of the Disadvantage 
of Greatness” Montaigne’s thought moves from the advantage of great-
ness—the ability to step down and thus to have the choice of both 
conditions—to the disadvantage of greatness: “There is perhaps nothing 
more pleasant in association with men than the trials [essais] of strength 
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we have with one another, in rivalry of honor and worth, whether in 
exercises of the body or of the mind; and in these sovereigns have no 
real share” (VS918, F701). The prince can only essay himself if he steps 
down. There is a sense of essaying, then, that means trying oneself out 
against other men, and this conveys the sense of spiritedness, struggle, 
and striving to assert and display one’s superior strength. Essaying can 
only occur in a condition in which the master gives up his conventional 
and customary power in order to depend upon only his natural abili-
ties. The activity of essaying, then, combines “stepping down,” that is, 
renouncing mastery, and the spiritedness of trying out one’s strength in 
rivalry with other men. Montaigne invents this form and essays himself 
against princes, philosophers, historians, and poets. He emerges from his 
rivalry as an astonishing new possibility. 
By Diverse Means
The very first essay, “By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End,” will 
serve as my example of Montaigne’s activity of essaying as the produc-
tion of the marvelous and as a structure for presenting a more complete 
account of his project. I will first give a brief summary of this essay and 
then offer a thematic interpretation. 
Montaigne begins with the distinction between the common and the 
extraordinary: “The most common way of softening the hearts of those 
we have offended, when, vengeance in hand, they hold us at their mercy, 
is by submission to move them to commiseration and pity. However, 
audacity and steadfastness—entirely contrary means—have sometimes 
served to produce the same effect.” This observation is illustrated with 
three stories of avenging princes who were not moved to compassion by 
the submission of the common people but who were moved by esteem for 
the valiant defiance of a few. Immediately after the first stories of these 
three princes, Montaigne writes: “Either one of these two ways would 
easily move me. For I am marvelously weak in the direction of mercy and 
gentleness. As a matter of fact, I believe I should be more likely to surren-
der more naturally to compassion than to esteem. Yet to the Stoics, pity is 
a vicious passion; they want us to succor the afflicted, but not to unbend 
and sympathize with them” (VS8, F4).
On the basis of the examples of the three princes, a possible explana-
tion is offered of why some men are moved by compassion and others 
by esteem: “It might be said that to subdue your heart to commiseration 
is the act of easygoing indulgence and softness, which is why the weaker 
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natures, such as those of women, children, and the common herd, are the 
most subject to it; but that, having disdained tears and prayers, to surren-
der simply to reverence for the sacred image of virtue is the act of a strong 
and inflexible soul which holds in affection and honor a masculine and 
obstinate vigor” (VS8, F4). This first plausible explanation is given in the 
terms of the hierarchy of strong and weak, a hierarchy said to be accord-
ing to nature: virtue is associated with strength and identified with the 
divine (“the sacred image of virtue”). But this explanation does not hold 
up, for Montaigne brings in other examples to show that “in less gener-
ous souls, astonishment and admiration can engender a like effect” (VS8, 
F4). Two stories of “the people,” the common herd, illustrate the way 
in which an entire assembly and an entire army can be so astonished at 
the spectacle of extraordinary valor that it turns from its pursuit of ven-
geance to admiration and mercy. Epaminondas, for example, addresses 
the Theban assembly in a haughty and arrogant manner, refusing to ask 
for mercy, and the people are so astonished that they walk out without 
casting their ballots against him. In the second story, the tyrant Dionysius 
decides to make the captain Phyto an example of his extreme vengeance, 
but when Phyto is dragged through the town to be led to execution, he 
keeps calling out the honorable and glorious cause of his death, that he 
refused to surrender his country to the tyrant. The rank and file of the 
army are so astonished that they turn against the tyrant and are on the 
verge of mutiny. 
At this point in the essay, Montaigne makes his first assertion about 
the diversity—the marvelous diversity—of human beings: “Truly man is 
a marvelously vain, diverse, and undulating object. It is hard to found 
any constant and uniform judgment on him” (VS9, F5). The examples of 
Pompey and Sulla, in their very different responses to heroic self-sacrifice, 
illustrate this diversity of character. Pompey pardoned the entire city of 
the Mamertines on account of the valor and magnanimity of one citizen, 
Stheno, who took upon himself the fault of the people and asked to bear 
their punishment; Sulla, however, refused to pardon the city of Praeneste 
when his host asked to take on himself the punishment of the city. 
Now Montaigne turns to Alexander as his example of another prince 
who was not moved to mercy at the spectacle of valor. Alexander is 
“directly contrary” to the first three princes whom Montaigne has cited. 
Montaigne does say that Alexander was “the bravest of men and one 
very gracious to the vanquished” (VS9, F5), thus implying that these two 
instances of cruelty are unusual and out of character. He then goes on 
to tell two stories of Alexander’s cruelty: his encounter with and mon-
strous treatment of the Persian governor Betis after the siege of Gaza; 
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and the story of the desolation of Thebes in which 6,000 Theban soldiers 
were slaughtered and the old men, women, and children were taken as 
slaves.
“Neither Master nor Slave”: Princes and People
Montaigne’s first essay thus presents us with the fundamental situation of 
mastery and subjection in its most extreme form: the defeated are entirely 
at the mercy of the avenging conqueror. That, in fact, is the defining situ-
ation, the setting, of the Essays. “By diverse means we arrive at the same 
end” becomes “by diverse means we produce the same effect.” The most 
obvious sense of “the same effect” is the softening of the heart of the 
avenging conqueror, that is, the humanization of the prince. The effect 
that is being manifested in this first essay is the transformation of the 
master-slave relationship: rule as mastery is replaced with a new form of 
rule that transcends mastery and subjection and is, therefore, humanized. 
The first plausible explanation of the fact that the princes are moved to 
mercy by esteem but not by compassion is that strong natures can revere 
only “the sacred image of virtue,” whereas weak natures sympathize with 
those who are like themselves. Montaigne here goes beyond the appear-
ance of the first sense, the explanations offered by the tradition. This first 
explanation is based on the classical hierarchy of weak and strong, but 
it does not entirely hold up: the two stories of “the people,” the common 
herd, show that, in “less generous souls,” astonishment can have the same 
effect as esteem. 
The three stories of the princes and the two stories of the people have 
in common the element of surprise. The princes are bent on vengeance, 
relentlessly pursuing conquest and revenge, indifferent to the cries of 
women and children. Suddenly, they are brought up short by the spectacle 
of heroic action. A possibility is offered to the prince so suddenly that 
he has the chance of not acting according to habit. The man separates 
himself from his power. In these three cases, the prince goes beyond habit, 
recognizes the equality or even superiority of the defiant, his esteem soft-
ens his heart and, in the cases of two of these princes, mercy expands to 
the entire city. The stories of the people present a similar phenomenon. In 
both cases, the people are moved by astonishment at heroic virtue and are 
deterred from their course of revenge. The first words of the essay are “the 
most common”: submission is the most common way to soften the heart 
of the avenging prince. The last word of the essay is “slaves”: after the 
slaughter of 6,000 Theban soldiers, Alexander takes 30,000 Thebans—
old men, women, and children—as slaves. But the stories Montaigne tells 
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of the people display the desire to escape such slavery and gain freedom. 
The Thebans regained their freedom from Sparta under the leadership of 
Epaminondas. When he is charged with the crime of having held onto the 
position of leader beyond the legal limit, he reminds them of the fact that 
they are free on account of him, that it was he who led them to defeat 
the invincible Spartans. In the story of the rank and file of the army of 
Dionysius, we are shown the possibility of rebellion. At the same time 
that the crowd is astonished at the heroic virtue of Phyto, they reach the 
point of mutiny against the tyrant. This account challenges the view that 
the common herd is weak and submits on account of fear. Even though 
Dionysius is making an example of Phyto, using him to demonstrate the 
extreme to which his vengeance will take him, the crowd is ready to rebel. 
The people are not naturally slaves. 
How is it possible that an entire people, an entire assembly or army, 
can be astonished? How is this response communicated? In both the story 
of Phyto and the story of Epaminondas, the people are moved by words. 
Phyto not only acts with incredible fortitude while being whipped through 
the streets on his way to execution, he keeps calling out in a loud voice 
the reason for his condemnation: he resisted the tyrant. Epaminondas 
likewise reminds the Thebans in a proud and haughty manner of what he 
had done for them. Whereas the three princes are not moved by speech, 
the people are moved and are united by speech. The explanation that 
might be offered is that the people show their desire for freedom because 
they realize that there is strength in numbers, while individually they are 
weak and cowardly. But this reasoning neglects the fact that their reac-
tion is spontaneous, not calculated. Further, as we see in the last story of 
this essay, the Theban soldiers are in fact extremely brave as individuals. 
When the princes are taken by surprise, they are moved beyond mas-
tery by esteem, and that transcendence of mastery has the effect of mercy. 
Esteem is the way in which the “natural envy” of masters is overcome, for 
esteem is the recognition of the equality or even superiority of the defiant. 
When the people are taken by surprise, they are moved beyond subjection 
to both mercy and freedom: like the princes, they recognize something 
of themselves in the defiant. The similarity of the people to the princes is 
Montaigne’s rejection of the idea of natural mastery and natural slavery.
Stheno and the Anonymous Man: Representing the People
The contrasting stories of Pompey and Sulla are taken from Plutarch’s 
“Precepts of Statecraft,” in which Plutarch discusses the characteristics of 
the true statesman who “even though he had no part in the wrongdoing 
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of the people, [takes] dangers upon himself in their behalf. For this is 
noble; and besides being noble, one man’s excellence and wisdom by 
arousing admiration has often mitigated anger which has been aroused 
against the whole people and has dissipated the threatened terror and 
bitterness” (815e). When Pompey was going to punish the Mamertines 
for revolting, “Sthenno [sic] told him that he would be doing wrong if he 
should destroy many innocent men for the fault of one; for, he said, it was 
he himself who had caused the city to revolt by persuading his friends and 
compelling his enemies. This so affected Pompey that he let the city go 
unpunished and also treated Sthenno kindly.” But when Sulla was going 
to slaughter the citizens of Praeneste, his guest-friend, an unnamed man 
to whom he had a private duty, could not produce the same effect. Sulla 
offered to let this anonymous man go on account of his guest-friendship. 
But that noble man “declared that he would not be indebted for his life to 
the slayer of his fatherland, and then mingled with his fellow-citizens and 
was cut down with them” (815f–816a).19
Both Stheno and the anonymous man unite their cities in themselves 
by taking on the guilt of the entire city and by standing in the stead of 
all the citizens. It could be said that they represent the people before the 
conquering prince. In these stories we are presented with an instance in 
which the same means produces diverse effects. Pompey accepts the single 
individual as standing in for the entire city and his response is forgiveness, 
whereas Sulla does not accept the single individual as standing in for the 
city. The magnanimous gesture is a risk taken in desperate circumstances. 
Sulla would have spared his guest-friend, but that man disappears into 
the anonymity of the crowd in an act of unity with the people and volun-
tary dissolution of the self. 
The Power of Homer and the  
Weakness of Aristotle: Alexander and Betis
Betis was the governor of the city of Gaza at the time of Alexander’s 
invasion. He fought valiantly, but when the siege was near its end, was 
abandoned by his men and fought on alone although badly wounded. 
Alexander had also been wounded twice in the course of the battle. When 
Betis was finally captured, Alexander confronted him with threats of tor-
ment, but Betis remained silent: his look was “not only confident but 
insolent and haughty.” At that point, Montaigne says, Alexander turned 
his anger into rage. “He ordered Betis’ heels to be pierced through and 
had him thus dragged alive, torn, and dismembered, behind a cart” until 
dead (VS9, F5). 
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Montaigne’s source for this story is the History of Alexander by Quintus 
Curtius. When his recounting of this story is compared with this source, 
his invention becomes evident.20 He both omits crucial elements of Curti-
us’s account and changes one of the details of Betis’s death.21 Concerning 
the manner of Betis’s execution, Curtius claims that Alexander “boasted 
that in taking vengeance on an enemy he had imitated Achilles, from 
whom he derived his race.”22 Montaigne omits this entirely, a striking 
omission since he himself provides three possible motives for Alexander’s 
action, none of them involving the deliberate imitation of Achilles. The 
detail that Montaigne changes has to do with the way Betis was fastened 
to the chariot. Quintus Curtius says that “thongs were passed round his 
ankles” and “he was bound to the king’s chariot.”23 Montaigne says that 
Alexander “commanded that his heels be pierced.” This change of detail is 
important, because in Homer’s description of the way Achilles bound the 
body of Hector to his chariot, it is specified that Achilles pierced the feet 
of Hector (Iliad, bk.22, 468–70). By altering this detail from Curtius’s 
version, Montaigne shows quite clearly that he is thinking of Homer, of 
Achilles’s treatment of Hector’s body, and thus of Alexander’s boasting 
that he was imitating Achilles, just as Curtius reports. Thus, Montaigne’s 
omission concerning Alexander’s own statement of his motive is both 
deliberate and meant to be noticed.
Montaigne is silent concerning the role of Homer and Alexander’s desire 
for immortality through his family origins. Instead, he offers three other 
possible motives or “springs” for Alexander’s action: “Could it be that har-
dihood was so common to Alexander that, not marveling at it, he respected 
it the less? Or did he consider it so peculiarly his own that he could not bear 
to see it at this height in another without passionately envious spite? Or was 
the natural impetuosity of his anger incapable of brooking opposition?” 
These three possible motives display the contempt and envy that mas-
tery has for subjection. The first—that bravery was so common to him 
that he could not admire it—manifests the contempt that the ruler has 
for what he holds and rules. The second—that he could not stand to 
see bravery at such a height in another man—manifests the “natural 
envy” between masters and subjects, the envy that the master feels in the 
presence of an equal or superior. The third—the natural impetuosity of 
Alexander’s anger—is not assigned a possible cause by Montaigne, but 
Quintus Curtius attributes his anger to the fact that in the battle for Gaza, 
Alexander was wounded twice.24 Montaigne may, in fact, favor this third 
spring of action since he goes on to say: “In truth, if [his anger] could 
have been bridled, it is probable that it would have been in the capture 
and desolation of the city of Thebes” (VS9–10, F5). 
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Could it be that he, who was descended from the gods, suddenly, in 
being wounded, faced the possibility of his mortality and that this caused 
his uncharacteristic rage and cruelty? Montaigne does not mention this 
possibility. Could it be, then, that Alexander deliberately produced the 
spectacle of Betis’s punishment in order to display his divinity and his 
immortality, as Dionysius deliberately produced the spectacle of extreme 
vengeance? Indeed, Alexander goes beyond Achilles’s treatment of the 
body of Hector, for Betis is alive when he is fastened to the chariot. In 
“Cowardice, Mother of Cruelty” Montaigne says that anything beyond 
simple death in the executions of justice is “pure cruelty” (VS700, F530). 
Alexander’s anger turns to rage and cruelty because Betis will not sub-
mit. Betis was “alone, abandoned by his men,” wounded and covered 
with blood. He is silent before Alexander and will not beg for mercy. 
His look is insolent and haughty. It is clear that Alexander wants him to 
speak, to acknowledge his submission by words or gestures. Alexander 
calls out: “Has he bent a knee? Has any suppliant cry escaped him? I’ll 
conquer your muteness yet; and if I cannot wring a word from it, at least 
I’ll wring a groan.” Montaigne does not mention a possible cause for 
Betis’s silence: Quintus Curtius tells us that silence was one of the most 
important traits instilled into the Persian captains.25 Betis, then, was the 
subject of a despot and remains fiercely obedient to him even in the most 
dire circumstances when he is alone and cannot be protected and saved 
by his prince. Quintus Curtius describes Betis as “a man of exceptional 
loyalty to his king.”26 Indeed, he is not only loyal to his prince, but he 
also displays defiance, haughtiness, and insolence to Alexander who has 
him entirely in his power. He refuses to submit. Betis may be one of those 
men who, even though he is brought up under tyranny, has the desire for 
freedom.27 
Alexander’s encounter with Betis, as invented by Montaigne, displays 
two fundamental features of mastery: domination which of itself breeds 
contempt for what is dominated, and the natural envy between masters 
and subjects. It also, silently, points to the enchantment of the origins: 
Alexander is bound to Achilles, his divine and immortal ancestor, for he 
is held by the power of Homer. The divinity of Alexander, which silently 
marks his first appearance in the Essays, is mentioned explicitly in his last 
appearance at the very end of the last essay. “I find nothing so humble and 
so mortal in the life of Alexander as his fancies about his immortaliza-
tion” (VS1115, F856–57). 
Montaigne is entirely silent about the role of Homer in Alexander’s 
actions toward Betis. He is breaking the enchantment of Homer and thus 
breaking the power of Alexander’s belief in his divine origins. Montaigne 
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reduces Alexander’s action from participation in the divine (through his 
ancestor Achilles) to the infinite desire to be and to appear superior to 
and stronger than all other men. By replacing the divine with the human 
he shows that the desire to participate in the divine is the vain desire to be 
and to appear superior to all other men. 
Montaigne breaks the enchantment of Homer because he is replacing 
Homer. As Homer is the poet of Alexander—Alexander carried his Iliad 
everywhere in his drive to conquer the world—Montaigne is the poet of 
Epaminondas, who fought for the inestimable good of restoring freedom 
to his country. In his essay “Of the Most Outstanding Men” Montaigne 
discusses Homer, Alexander, and Epaminondas. Epaminondas is the most 
outstanding of all. 
Although Montaigne does not mention Aristotle in this first essay, 
Aristotle is nevertheless present as the teacher of Alexander. It would 
seem that the two stories of Alexander’s cruelty are intended to manifest, 
in particular, the failure of Aristotle’s teachings to moderate the infinite 
desires and passions of Alexander and, in general, the ineffectiveness of 
Aristotle’s restraints on the power of the natural master. For Aristotle, 
philosophy, not rule, is man’s participation in the divine. Philosophy, then, 
ought to have a moderating effect on the prince’s aspirations to divinity. 
But the power of Homer is greater: Montaigne is the poet of Epaminon-
das, but he is also replacing the impotent Aristotle with his own invisible 
power to moderate the prince. 
Separating the Man from the Prince:  
Epaminondas and Thebes
Epaminondas, who, as we have already seen, figures prominently in the 
Essays, was the commander who led the Thebans to victory over the 
Spartans and freed Thebes from the domination of Sparta at the battle of 
Leuctra in 371 BC. Plutarch’s life of Epaminondas has not survived and 
even though Cicero refers to him as “the first man of Greece,” very little 
remains of the writings about him.28 
Given the sparseness of the ancient sources available to us, Victor Davis 
Hanson, in The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, 
How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny, provides an unusually 
detailed portrait. Epaminondas was a Pythagorean, a philosopher, and 
“may have been the best educated man of action in the ancient world.”29 
Two features of the character of Epaminondas stand out in Hanson’s 
portrait. First, “the entire Epaminondan laudatory tradition is rooted in 
contemporary observations of his zeal . . . to free the unfree.”30 He felt 
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great repugnance for Spartan helotage, and his goal was to liberate both 
serfs and free men from the autocracy of Sparta.31 His disdain for tyrants 
caused him to fight in order to give democracy to his fellow Boeotians, 
autonomy to the cities of the Peleponnese, and freedom to the helots of 
Messenia.32 
Second, Hanson notes, the character of Epaminondas was “selfless.”33 
The liberation of Thebes, of the cities of the Peloponnese, and of the helots 
of Messenia was accomplished “all without gratuitous killing, personal 
lucre for himself, or political exploitation by his Boeotians.”34 According 
to Plutarch, Epaminondas never executed any person of a captured city, 
nor ever sold any Greek captive into slavery.35 Remarkably, in spite of his 
great military victories, Epaminondas was himself indifferent to domina-
tion. He fought to bring freedom, not to conquer and rule.36 
In Montaigne’s first essay, Epaminondas appears before the Theban 
assembly on trial for having kept his command of the troops for four 
months longer than the people had directed. Cornelius Nepos explains 
that Epaminondas did this because he was convinced that the new com-
manders appointed by the people were inexperienced and would bring 
about the destruction of the army: “Epaminondas did all of this under 
the shadow of the Theban law which punished with death all who kept 
their command longer than the prescribed period. Since he recognized 
that this law was enacted to preserve the state, and since he did not want 
the same law to ruin the state,” he held onto the command, violating 
the letter of the law.37 Montaigne presents him as defiant in his speech 
before the assembly. Epaminondas reminds the people of the fact that 
under his leadership, they had been set free from the yoke of Spartan 
domination, and they are so astonished that they cannot proceed against 
him. He is the only prince profiled in the first essay who speaks to the 
people.
The last story Montaigne includes in “By Diverse Means” also concerns 
Thebes: here, he recounts Alexander’s destruction of the city. Alexander 
has all of the soldiers slaughtered and then takes the rest of the inhabitants 
as slaves. The 6,000 Theban soldiers are described by Montaigne as “lost 
and without any further means of common defense.” It is clear from his 
account of the battle that the soldiers were dispersed, silent, alone, each 
on his own, seeking out the enemy. Not one of them attempted to flee and 
not one asked for mercy. What we see here is the same Theban army that, 
under the leadership of Epaminondas, had defeated the Spartans thirty 
years earlier.38 The essay ends, then, with the display of the valor of the 
individual, anonymous Theban soldiers. As David Quint says: “In this 
case, valor really has become ‘common,’ since it is displayed in the entire 
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adult male population of the doomed city. These are, ironically, the same 
Thebans who . . . had shown themselves capable of reverencing—and 
sparing—their valorous fellow citizen Epaminondas.”39 
The individuals who make up the “rank and file,” the common herd, 
display as much valor as any of the noblemen of the first stories, even as 
much as Alexander himself. However, without Epaminondas, they are 
defeated, and their country is enslaved. Without Epaminondas, they are 
not united. Montaigne concludes his portrait of Epaminondas in “Of the 
Most Outstanding Men” with the observation that “the prosperity of his 
country died, as it was born, with him” (VS757, F574).
That the freedom and prosperity of Thebes depended entirely on the 
character and ability of Epaminondas is a fact noted by the ancient his-
torians as well. As Epaminondas lay dying, he ordered the Thebans to 
make peace because they had no one left to lead them.40 Cornelius Nepos 
concludes his life of Epaminondas with a “comment about his character 
and life, a comment no one can dispute. Before Epaminondas was born 
and after he died Thebes was the satellite of a foreign power. But while 
he directed the state, Thebes was the leader of the most powerful city in 
Greece. From this fact anyone can see that Epaminondas as an individual 
was mightier than the whole state.”41 
What had happened to Thebes in the thirty years between the death 
of Epaminondas and its destruction by Alexander? In the Discourses on 
Livy, Machiavelli tells us that “after the death of Epaminondas, Philip of 
Macedon was made captain of their troops by the Thebans; and after his 
victory he took their liberty from them.”42 In other words, the Thebans 
submitted themselves to a master—to Alexander’s father—when they no 
longer had Epaminondas to unite them. 
Montaigne’s portrait of Epaminondas is consistent with the ancient 
sources, but he also “probes the inside” and invents the “springs of action” 
in his interpretation of the histories. Epaminondas, Montaigne says, was 
a great and fearless warrior. He has not nearly as much glory as Alexan-
der or Caesar, but “of resolution and valor, not that which is sharpened 
by ambition, but that which wisdom and reason may implant in a well-
ordered soul, he had all that can be imagined. As for proof of this virtue 
of his, he has given as much, in my opinion, as Alexander himself and as 
Caesar.” In spite of the fact that Epaminondas has not nearly as much 
glory as Alexander or Caesar, Montaigne regards him as a more outstand-
ing man than either. What is it, then, that makes the Theban commander 
superior in Montaigne’s eyes? The resolution and valor of Epaminondas 
are not, according to Montaigne’s judgment, due to ambition, the vice 
that ruined Caesar. The resolution and valor of Epaminondas are due to 
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wisdom and reason: his was a “well-ordered” soul. His soul is ordered to 
freedom, not to mastery. 
The resolution and valor, the “virtue,” of Epaminondas is equal to 
that of Alexander and Caesar, but his character (mœurs) and conscience 
far surpassed all those who have ever undertaken to manage affairs. 
“For in this respect, which must be principally considered, which alone 
truly marks what we are, and which I weigh alone against all the others 
together, he yields to no philosopher, not even to Socrates.” The character 
and conscience of Epaminondas are marked especially by goodness and 
innocence. Innocence is, in him, “a key quality, sovereign, constant, uni-
form, incorruptible,” whereas in Alexander it appears as “subordinate, 
uncertain, streaky, soft, and accidental.” 
Montaigne gives several examples of the “exceeding goodness” of Epa-
minondas. Epominondas said that the sweetest contentment he had in all 
his life was the pleasure he gave his mother and father by his victory over 
the Spartans at Leuctra. “It says a lot that he preferred their pleasure to 
his own.” Here Montaigne is pointing to the primacy that Epaminondas 
accords to his private duty to his parents. Also, Epaminondas “did not 
think it was permissible, even to recover the freedom of his country, to 
kill a man without full knowledge of the case. . . . He also held that in 
battle a man should avoid encountering a friend who was on the opposite 
side, and spare him.” He showed humanity even toward enemy forces. 
(VS756–57, F571–74). Montaigne invents the innocence of Epaminon-
das. That is, he interprets his actions in a way that distinguishes between 
his virtue and his innocence or goodness. 
The goodness and innocence of Epaminondas, which make him supe-
rior to Alexander, are seen most clearly in his refusal to put aside his 
“private duty” even at the risk of failing in his greatest enterprises: “To 
what a height did he raise consideration for his private duty, he who never 
killed a man he had vanquished, who even for the inestimable good of 
restoring liberty to his country scrupled to kill a tyrant or his accomplices 
without due form of justice, and who judged anyone a wicked man, how-
ever good a citizen he was, who among his enemies and in battle did not 
spare his friend and his host. . . . Terrible with blood and iron, he goes 
breaking and shattering a nation invincible against anyone but himself, 
and turns aside in the middle of such a melee on meeting his host and his 
friend. Truly that man was in command of war itself, who made it endure 
the curb of benignity at the point of its greatest heat, all inflamed as it was 
and foaming with frenzy and slaughter. It is a miracle to be able to mingle 
some semblance of justice with such actions; but it belongs only to the 
strength of Epaminondas to be able to mingle with them the sweetness 
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and ease of the gentlest ways, and pure innocence” (VS801–2, F608–9). 
The goodness and innocence of Epaminondas are manifested in the fact 
that he did not seek his own good in power. He preferred his private duty 
to the pursuit of glory. His strength is exercised in declining mastery.43 
In this choice to decline mastery, Epaminondas separated the man from 
the prince. Therefore, he was able to combine the ferocity of the prince 
in battle with the gentleness of the man. Montaigne’s emphasis on Epa-
minondas’s preference for his private duty is his way of humanizing the 
prince: Epaminondas submits his ferocity to the social. “There is a soul 
of rich composition. To the roughest and most violent of human actions 
he wedded goodness and humanity, indeed the most delicate that can be 
found in the school of philosophy” (VS801–2, F608–9). 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli provides his own account of Epami-
nondas’s virtue in turning the Theban peasants into a fierce army and 
of the reason for the decline of Thebes after the death of Epaminondas: 
“After the Thebans Pelopidas and Epaminondas had freed Thebes and 
had brought it out of the servitude of the Spartan empire, though they 
found themselves in a city used to serving and in the midst of effeminate 
peoples, they did not hesitate—so much was their virtue—to put them 
under arms, and to go with them to meet the Spartan armies in the field, 
and to conquer them.”44 In Machiavelli’s terms, the “matter” was corrupt, 
for the city was accustomed to servitude, and the people were effemi-
nate, probably because of the idleness of the oligarchs. Therefore, Thebes 
could not maintain itself as a republic without the virtue of Epaminon-
das: “Where the matter is not corrupt, tumults and other scandals do not 
hurt; where it is corrupt, well-ordered laws do not help unless indeed they 
have been put in motion by one individual who with an extreme force 
ensures their observance so that the matter becomes good. I do not know 
whether this has ever occurred or whether it is possible.” A corrupt city 
can only rise through the virtue of one man, but “as soon as such a one is 
dead, it returns to its early habit, as occurred in Thebes, which could hold 
the forms of a republic and its empire through the virtue of Epaminon-
das while he lived, but returned to its first disorders when he was dead.” 
This is because the virtuous man cannot live long enough to transform 
a city from bad to good. His city “is ruined, unless indeed he makes it to 
be reborn with many dangers and much blood. For such corruption and 
slight aptitude for free life arise from an inequality that is in that city; and 
if one wishes to make it equal, it is necessary to use the greatest extraor-
dinary means, which few know how or wish to use.”45 
The extraordinary means to which Machiavelli refers is the elimina-
tion of the idle and rich oligarchs. “Those are called gentlemen who live 
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idly in abundance from the returns of their possessions without having 
any care either for cultivation or for other necessary trouble in living. 
Such as these are pernicious in every republic and in every province . . . in 
these provinces no republic or political way of life has ever emerged for 
such kinds of men are altogether hostile to every civilization.” Machia-
velli draws this conclusion: “that he who wishes to make a republic where 
there are very many gentlemen cannot do it unless he first eliminates all of 
them.”46 Given the gentleness of Epaminondas, and especially his mani-
fest unwillingness to kill or do any harm to his fellow Thebans, it can 
be inferred that he would have refused to use the extraordinary means 
necessary to make the city’s citizens equal. Epaminondas could not “learn 
to be able not to be good.”
Montaigne concludes his portrait of Epaminondas in “Of the Useful 
and the Honorable” with the claim that Epaminondas is a “great precep-
tor” who teaches us that some things are illicit even against an enemy 
and that the common interest ought not to demand all things of all men 
against the private interest. “If it is greatness of heart and the effect of 
a rare and singular virtue to despise friendship, private obligations, our 
word, and kinship, for the common good [le bien commun] and obedi-
ence to the magistrate, truly it is enough to excuse us from this that it is 
a greatness that cannot lodge in the greatness of Epaminondas’s heart” 
(VS802, F609–10).Montaigne wants to strip the pretext of reason from 
the actions of wicked men: “Let us take away from wicked, bloody, and 
treacherous natures this pretext of reason. Let us abandon this mon-
strous and deranged justice and stick to more human imitations” (VS802, 
F609–10). 
Montaigne’s praise of Epaminondas as the great preceptor who teaches 
us that the common good cannot require all things of all men has the 
most fundamental significance, for it presents the notion of “the com-
mon good”—the defining principle of classical and medieval political 
philosophy—as a pretext for cruelty. Appeals to the common good for 
justification of mastery, then, are in bad faith. Perhaps that is why the 
very first words of “To the Reader” are: “This book was written in good 
faith, reader,” for they warn us that his end is merely domestic and private 
(VS3, F2).47 
The separation of the man from the prince makes the prince inhuman, 
but in the example of Epaminondas, who never abandons his private duty, 
we are offered a “more human” imitation of rule. Montaigne’s account of 
Epaminondas insists that, even for the sake of the inestimable good, and 
even in the midst of battle, Epaminondas would not put aside his private 
duty. His judgment as a man remains above his power as a prince: he does 
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not see himself as a prince by nature, but accidentally. The priority of the 
domestic and private is the humanization of the prince and sets limits on 
the power of the prince. 
Making Epaminondas Permanent 
In those instances in which he prefers his private duty to glorious action, 
the goodness and innocence of Epaminondas appear to be at odds with 
his ferocity as the warrior who fights for “the inestimable good” of the 
freedom of his country. Consistency requires that this conflict be allowed 
to stand, for the innocence of Epaminondas is the very spring that pushes 
him to fight for the inestimable good of the freedom of his country. His 
innocence means that he does not want to dominate. Here we see the 
deep level at which the freedom of the individual and the freedom of one’s 
country—Constant’s “personal liberty” and “political liberty”—can come 
into conflict. Montaigne judges Epaminondas to be the most outstanding 
man, for the innocence of his conscience is unsurpassed. Montaigne must 
leave the conscience of the man uncorrupted in order to restore humanity 
to the prince. 
The role of private duty in the humanization of the prince gives added 
significance to the stories of Pompey and Sulla in “By Diverse Means We 
Arrive at the Same End.” Both are confronted with a friend who takes 
upon himself the guilt of an entire people. The “end” in this essay is to 
soften the heart of the avenging conqueror. In the case of Pompey, his 
forgiveness extends to the entire city. In the case of Sulla, his heart is not 
softened by his private duty.
In spite of Alexander’s extreme cruelty toward Betis and his extreme 
vengeance in the destruction of Thebes, Montaigne includes Alexander 
among the three most outstanding men. The nature of Alexander was 
“excellently formed for goodness; and it was said of him, ingeniously, 
that he had his virtues from nature, his vices from fortune.” He judges 
the character of Alexander to be almost above reproach for he weighs 
his outstanding virtues against certain individual actions which do merit 
criticism. “But it is impossible to conduct such great movements accord-
ing to the rules of justice; such men require to be judged in gross, by the 
master end of their actions.” Here he mentions the desolation of The-
bes, the murder of Menander, and several other vicious actions that are 
“rather hard to excuse.” He does not mention Alexander’s cruelty toward 
Betis, perhaps implying that it is in fact entirely inexcusable. Alexander’s 
“master-end” is glory. By using this expression, Montaigne points to 
Alexander’s relationship to his teacher, Aristotle. 
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Two aspects of Montaigne’s judgment of Alexander qualify the Mace-
donian commander to rank among men second only to Epaminondas. 
First, whereas the prosperity of Thebes ended with the death of Epami-
nondas, the conquests of Alexander remained under the control of even 
“ordinary captains” after the death of Alexander. Alexander “caused so 
many royal lines to spring from his soldiers, leaving the world divided 
after his death among four successors, ordinary captains of the army, 
whose descendants remained for so long in control of those great posses-
sions” (VS754, F571). Second, Montaigne prefers Alexander to Caesar, 
whom he had also considered for this place among the most outstanding 
men. Caesar had many qualities equal to and even greater than Alexan-
der’s. But, although Caesar’s ambition was more moderate in itself than 
Alexander’s, “it is so unfortunate in having for its abominable object the 
ruin of his country” (VS755, F572). Montaigne’s ultimate judgment of 
Caesar is that “this single vice . . . ruined in him the finest and richest 
nature that ever was, and has made his memory abominable to all good 
men, because he willed to seek his glory in the ruin of his country and the 
subversion of the most powerful and flourishing republic that the world 
will ever see” (VS733, F554). 
These two aspects reveal what weighs so heavily in Montaigne’s 
judgments of princes: the stability and the freedom of one’s country. In 
Montaigne’s judgment, the innocence of Epaminondas surpasses the vir-
tue of Alexander. “I know no form or fortune of man that I regard with 
so much honor and love” (VS756, F573). Epaminondas is the better man 
but nevertheless he did not succeed in establishing the foundations for a 
permanent free society. The Theban general lacked ambition, which, for 
Montaigne, is a great vice. The valor of Epaminondas is “not sharpened 
by ambition,” whereas the ambition of Alexander is unlimited. But the 
comparison of Alexander and Caesar allows us to see that even ambition 
is excusable if it does not have for its object the ruin of one’s country 
and the destruction of its freedom, and if it does result in the perma-
nence of one’s foundations. Montaigne’s own refounding, then, might 
be seen as surpassing both Epaminondas and Alexander by combining 
the innocence of Epaminondas—his indifference to mastery—with the 
permanence of Alexander’s rule. Thus, Montaigne surpasses and replaces 
both the power of Homer and the weakness of Aristotle. 
Montaigne: The Magnanimous Gesture 
Montaigne appears in this first essay between the princes and the phi-
losophers. “Either one of these two ways [submission and defiance] 
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would easily win me, for I am marvelously weak in the direction of mercy 
and gentleness.” Like the first three princes, he is moved by esteem, but, 
unlike them, he is also moved by compassion. “Yet to the Stoics pity is a 
vicious passion; they want us to succor the afflicted, but not to unbend 
and sympathize with them” (VS8, F4). Like the Stoics, he is merciful, but 
unlike them, he feels the passion of pity. Esteem unites him to the great, 
compassion unites him to the weak: he would always be merciful to all 
men. Unlike the princes who are surprised into mercy, Montaigne, like 
the Stoics, is consistently merciful. Surprise has been replaced by a settled 
inclination of judgment: both esteem and compassion would easily move 
him because he is already and always inclined to mercy and gentleness. 
Montaigne’s mercy is beyond esteem and compassion, which are hierar-
chical dispositions.
Thus, Montaigne stands between the Stoics and the princes, neither of 
whom will bend with compassion. This is the submission of reason inflex-
ible and impassive to sympathy, to the good. It is an irrational act for it is 
not the subjection of passion to reason, but rather the subjection of rea-
son to passion. “Natural compassion,” he says, has “infinite power” over 
him (VS1100, F844). Natural compassion has become in him a settled 
inclination of judgment, thus going beyond the natural. Reason inflexible 
and impassive cannot move without the will. This is why the Essays are 
not arguments: arguments do not move us. The generous gesture is the 
marvelous, and the marvelous is what moves men.
The opposite of esteem is not compassion but rather contempt. In the 
natural condition, displayed in the first three princes, esteem and con-
tempt belong together in the same man: those who feel esteem do so 
toward those who are like themselves. Therefore, they at the same time 
feel contempt for those who are weak. Montaigne, however, shows no 
contempt for anyone, neither princes nor people. Through his esteem and 
compassion, he unites princes and people within himself. Since he does 
not judge others in relation to himself, his position with respect to the 
strong and the weak is not a position within the natural hierarchy. His 
esteem and compassion are instead due to his judgment, from which his 
own private will has been removed. 
The overcoming of natural mastery is thus the transcendence of nature. 
The first plausible explanation for the fact that the first three princes are 
moved by esteem but not by compassion is based on nature: the princes 
are naturally strong and therefore can revere only “the sacred image of 
virtue” whereas the common people are weak; they are naturally slaves 
and therefore respond more readily to compassion. Montaigne, however, 
goes against that prejudice by showing that, when they are given a voice, 
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the common people do recognize the loftiness of heroic virtue. In fact, 
they are moved to rebel against the tyrant for they are not simply moved 
by fear.
Montaigne here appears before us for the first time in terms of possibil-
ity: if I were the prince, I would be easily moved. Thus, he is the private 
man who deliberately emerges into the public as the prince and thereby 
transcends his origins as a private man. Montaigne is bringing the com-
mon man into the public, making him visible and giving him a voice. He 
unites the princes and the people in an act of forgiveness, and his marvel-
ous weakness in the direction of mercy is the promise that his forgiveness 
is not an isolated act of caprice but rather demonstrates his constant will 
to forgive. Forgiveness is the act of refounding because it is the only way, 
apart from violence and force, to settle the natural contention between 
masters and subjects. Forgiveness is the only way to make a new begin-
ning, to replace the origins. “Reason inflexible and impassive” requires 
the magnanimous gesture of forgiveness. Forgiveness allows us to erase 
the past and to start over again on a different footing. The promise makes 
the act of forgiveness permanent so that it is not simply a random and 
fleeting act. Surprise, which takes both princes and the people out of 
themselves, becomes a settled inclination of the will. In The Human Con-
dition, Hannah Arendt discusses forgiveness and promise-keeping within 
the context of her account of human action. “The possible redemption 
from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to undo what 
one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he 
was doing—is the faculty of forgiving. The remedy for unpredictability, 
for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to 
make and keep promises. The two faculties belong together in so far as 
one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, whose ‘sins’ 
hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation; and the other, 
binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncer-
tainty, which is the future by definition, islands of security without which 
not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in 
the relations between men.”48 Forgiveness makes it possible to refound, 
for refounding, in Montaigne’s sense of restoring, conveys the sense of 
reversing the order of time.
Forgiving is a kind of action that, because it is spontaneous, reveals 
the character of action in an especially clear way, that is, as a beginning, 
not as actualization. Arendt says that “the act of forgiving can never be 
predicted; it is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus 
retains, though being a reaction, something of the original character of 
action.”49 Montaigne takes that spontaneous act, which in the first essay 
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is always associated with surprise, and makes it permanent. Refounding 
means making forgiveness permanent, the firm ground for the possibility 
of action that is free. The promise is the representation of the will, and 
Montaigne’s marvelous weakness “in the direction” of mercy is the con-
stant inclination of his will to forgiveness.
Forgiveness as the foundation of society is necessary precisely on 
account of the presupposition of both human imperfection and human 
freedom. Indeed, the nature of freedom makes imperfection inevitable 
and, in a certain sense, acceptable. The freedom of particularity, to be a 
particular very ill-formed, is freedom from the perfection of form and final 
cause. Therefore, the unity through forgiveness that Montaigne effects 
between strong and weak is not the unity of the common good: forgive-
ness as the necessary condition for free society means that the unity of 
men in society is a unity of individuals who do not share a common 
form. 
Montaigne says that one of the principal consolations that he has for 
his deficient memory is that he does not even remember injuries received 
(VS35, F23). Forgiveness—the constant will to forgiveness—is necessary 
because human freedom is such that men “trespass” against each other 
every day. “Trespassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the very 
nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a 
web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it 
possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they 
have done unknowingly. Only through this constant mutual release from 
what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness 
to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a 
power as that to begin something new.”50 
The introduction of forgiveness and promise-keeping as the new foun-
dations of society brings with it a radical transformation of morality. 
Arendt argues that this new moral code is very different from the standards 
of domination and mastery of oneself and others. “Since these faculties 
correspond so closely to the human condition of plurality, their role in 
politics establishes a diametrically different set of guiding principles from 
the ‘moral’ standards inherent in the Platonic notion of rule,” that is, 
domination of the self. 51 Montaigne’s reformation of mores involves pre-
cisely this transformation of virtue from self-mastery and self-perfection 
to the virtues required for free society. The character necessary for forgive-
ness is the character necessary for unity in the absence of common form. 
If Machiavelli is correct—that Thebes could not remain a republic after 
the death of Epaminondas because Epaminondas would not or could not 
institute equality—then making Epaminondas permanent would have to 
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involve the institution of equality. The Machiavellian reformation that 
Epaminondas could not or would not effect—the institution of equal-
ity by doing away with the idle and rich oligarchs—Montaigne seeks to 
effect by means of a radical transformation of mores. 
By his silence about the role of Homer in the story of Alexander and 
Betis, Montaigne is silent about Alexander’s desire for immortality, a 
desire that Alexander pursues by imitating his ancestor Achilles through 
whom he believed he was divine. Montaigne is silent about Homer 
because he himself replaces Homer and thus the notion of the divine and 
of heroic virtue that has its origins in Homer. The substitution of forgive-
ness for mastery points to the divinity of Christ. The silent presence that 
overshadows this first essay is the image of Christ before Pilate. 
As Arendt says, “the discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the realm 
of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.”52 Forgiveness is “the exact 
opposite of vengeance,” and “the freedom contained in Jesus’ teaching 
of forgiveness is the freedom from vengeance.”53 It is Jesus who teaches 
that the power to forgive is not only divine but also human. “Forgive us 
our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.” Indeed, Jesus 
performs miracles to prove that he has the power to forgive. When the 
scribes accuse Jesus of blasphemy for telling the paralytic that his sins 
are forgiven, he says: “Now, which of these is easier: to say ‘Your sins are 
forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Get up and walk’? But to prove to you that the Son 
of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins—he said to the paralytic—
get up, and pick up your bed and go home” (Matthew 9:5–7). Arendt 
says, “It is his insistence on the ‘power to forgive,’ even more than his 
performance of miracles, that shocks the people.”54 Montaigne produces 
his effect through the production of the marvelous. The marvelous is the 
miracle of forgiveness. 
“By Diverse Means” displays the fundamental philosophical movement 
of Montaigne’s thought, the movement that begins in the most familiar 
and ends in astonishment at the most familiar. The essay begins with 
submission as the most common way to soften the heart of the aveng-
ing conqueror and ends with the submission of 30,000 common people 
to enslavement. What has happened in the development of this essay to 
cause our astonishment at submission? 
Submission, which at first appears to be weakness and therefore wor-
thy of contempt, is now seen in its “proper light.” Montaigne’s “marvelous 
weakness” is the surrender of his arms in the midst of violence and the 
submission of himself to the risk of death. Montaigne’s generous gesture 
reveals the new possibility of the combination of the renunciation of mas-
tery and the love of freedom, which is the effect he seeks to produce. The 
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risk of his life in laying down his arms is both his freedom from fear of 
death and also his invention of a new form of society. This new society is 
freed from the power of the political and instead subjects the political to 
itself. Natural mastery is overcome, and the inestimable good is brought 
into being by this gesture that overcomes nature itself. Thus, while the 
most obvious effect produced “by diverse means” is the softening of the 
heart of the conquering prince, that is, the humanization of the prince, the 
deeper sense is Montaigne’s own conquest of the temporal realm in his 
refounding and reordering of human life.
Limiting Violence
It must be acknowledged that the rejection of the common good as the 
standard of rule is dangerous for it seems to be the rejection of any moral 
foundation and of any restraint upon the power of the prince. Montaigne 
seeks to replace that foundation and to impose restraints through the sep-
aration of the man from the prince and through the invention of society 
as the limitation on the power of government. In another striking reversal 
of Aristotle, politics becomes the realm of necessity while the pre-political 
(society) becomes the realm of freedom.55 
Only reason inflexible and impassive can settle the conflict between 
masters and slaves. The ascent to reason inflexible and impassive there-
fore requires the transcendence of experience, because experience cannot 
show us the possibility of a world without masters and slaves. It is a pos-
sibility that must be invented and brought into being by the philosophical 
act. But reason inflexible and impassive is inhuman. Reason must submit 
to experience. That is, we must take men as we find them with all of their 
passions and interests. Reason must submit to the imperfect.
To put it differently, if the standard of the common good is really the 
pretext for the prince’s unlimited exercise of power in the attainment of 
that end, if it is really the pretext for his vicious actions, then the perfec-
tion of the common good must be abandoned as the goal of political life. 
Therefore, the new standard for the exercise of power must be the limita-
tion of evil, rather than the pursuit of a good in common. Since consent 
is the basis for the legitimacy of rule, the limitation of evil is, for the most 
part, the limitation of force and violence.
In her reflections on liberty and the necessity of force, Simone Weil 
concludes that the formula of “the least evil” is the only one applicable in 
the political realm, provided it is applied with “the coldest lucidity.” The 
struggle between those who command and those who obey is inevitable 
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and even desirable, but it can only be suppressed by constraint. Therefore, 
the limitation of violence is the best that can be done by those who love 
liberty.56
In describing his role in the civil wars of his day and his loyalty to the 
Catholic side, Montaigne expresses his abhorrence of violence and force: 
“I do not know how to involve myself so deeply and so entirely. When 
my will gives me over to one party, it is not with so violent an obligation 
that my understanding is infected by it. . . . People adore everything that 
is on their side; as for me, I do not even excuse most of the things that 
I see on mine” (VS1012, F774). And in “Of Vain Subtleties,” he distin-
guishes himself from those who are “extreme, injudicious, and unjust in 
the conduct of our cause, and stain it with infinite reproaches of violence” 
(VS313, F227). 
Because the power of the prince is unmeasured and because the limi-
tation of power depends upon the conscience of the prince, Montaigne 
recognizes the difficulty of judging the prince’s actions. The conscience of 
the prince must be given the benefit of the doubt, and his actions must be 
excused or forgiven whenever possible. There is no one who would not be 
worse than the king if he were as continually spoiled by flatterers as the 
king is (VS1077–78, F825). “The toughest and most difficult occupation 
in the world, in my opinion, is to play the part of king worthily. I excuse 
more of their faults than people commonly do, in consideration of the 
dreadful weight of their burden, which dazes me. It is difficult for a power 
so immoderate to observe moderation” (VS917, F700). 
Based on this understanding of the prince’s predicament, Montaigne 
draws a distinction between vicious actions or effects and vicious means. 
“The weakness of our condition often pushes us to the necessity of using 
evil means to a good end. Lycurgus, the most perfect and virtuous law-
maker that ever was, hit upon this very unjust method of teaching his 
people temperance: to make the Helots, who were their slaves, forcibly 
drunk, so that the Spartans, seeing them thus lost and buried in wine, 
should hold the excess of this vice in horror” (VS684, F518). Even the 
most perfect and virtuous lawgiver judges that he must use force to pro-
duce his effect.
Montaigne recognizes the limitations that necessity places on the rul-
er’s action: “The virtue assigned to the affairs of the world is a virtue with 
many bends, angles, and elbows, so as to join and adapt itself to human 
weakness; mixed and artificial, not straight, clean, constant, or purely 
innocent. . . ‘Let him who would be pure from courts retire’ [Lucan].” 
Montaigne says that he once tried to use in public dealings the pure and 
innocent opinions and rules that he uses in private matters, but, he says, 
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“I found them inept and dangerous” when applied to political matters 
(VS991, F758).
The imperfection of our condition is such that vices are actually neces-
sary and useful in the public domain. “Whoever would remove the seeds 
of these qualities from man would destroy the fundamental conditions of 
our life.” In every government there are necessary offices that are abject 
and vicious. Vices actually have a role in holding society together. “If they 
become excusable, inasmuch as we need them and the common neces-
sity effaces their true quality, we still must let this part be played by the 
more vigorous and less fearful citizens, who sacrifice their honor and 
their conscience, as those ancients sacrificed their life, for the good of 
their country. We who are weaker, let us take parts that are both easier 
and less hazardous. The public welfare requires that a man betray and lie 
and massacre; let us resign this commission to more obedient and suppler 
people” (VS791, F600). 
Individuals may escape the necessity of vice, but the prince cannot 
excuse himself from public affairs. “The prince, when some urgent cir-
cumstance or sudden and unexpected accident of state necessity makes 
him deviate from his word and his faith or otherwise forces him from 
his ordinary duty, should attribute this necessity to a blow from the 
divine rod. Vice it is not, for he has abandoned his own reason to a more 
universal and powerful reason; but it is certainly misfortune. So that to 
someone who asked me ‘What remedy?’ I replied: ‘No remedy. If he was 
really racked between these two extremes . . . it had to be done. But if 
he did it without regret, if it did not grieve him to do it, it is a sign 
that his conscience is in a bad way.’ ” Montaigne will not call this “vice,” 
because the prince has abandoned his own reason to a more universal 
and powerful reason. This is the difference between excusing the prince 
and giving him the pretext for wicked, self-interested, vicious actions. 
The prince whose conscience is troubled does not act in his own interest, 
according to his private reason, but on account of a more universal, pub-
lic reason, that is, reason that becomes public through the elimination of 
self-interest.
Montaigne wants the conscience of the prince to be preserved in its 
purity even though his actions cannot be called honorable. The judgment 
of the prince should be above his own power. In other words, Montaigne 
wants the prince always to preserve the conscience of the man, judging 
the actions that he must perform as prince from a perspective outside of 
his position of power. “If there should be a prince with so tender a con-
science that no cure seemed to him worth so onerous a remedy, I would 
not esteem him the less. He could not ruin himself more excusably or 
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becomingly. . . . What is less possible for him to do than what he cannot 
do except at the expense of his faith and his honor, things which perhaps 
should be dearer to him than his own safety, yes, and even than the safety 
of his people?” (VS799, F607). 
The conscience of the prince, then, should set the limits on his immea-
surable power. He should be racked between his two choices: “We offer 
a good bargain to a man of conscience when we propose to him some 
difficulty as a counterpoise to vice. But when we shut him up between 
two vices, we put him to a rough choice” (VS846, F642–43). The use of 
vicious means such as breaking one’s word should be the prince’s last 
resort. “These are dangerous examples, rare and sickly exceptions to our 
natural rules. We must yield to them, but with great moderation and cir-
cumspection. No private utility is worthy of our doing this violence to 
our conscience; the public utility yes, when it is very apparent and very 
important” (VS800, F607). 
The rejection of the common good on the grounds that it can serve as 
justification for vicious actions implies that the prince must not pursue 
his own private interests in public affairs. But the more difficult cases 
are those in which private duty (as distinguished from private interest) 
conflicts with public duty. The example of Timoleon brings this conflict 
into sharp relief. Timoleon killed the tyrant, but the tyrant was his own 
brother. He freed the Corinthians from slavery, and Montaigne says that 
“his end is excusable if any could be.” Yet his conscience was troubled 
that “it had been necessary to purchase the public advantage at such a 
price in honorable conduct” (VS800, F607–8). There is no rule that can 
determine what is best in each case. This must be left to the judgment 
of the individual. The separation of the man from the prince allows the 
prince to bow to necessity while, at the same time, allowing his con-
science as a man to limit the violence he must do.
Montaigne’s Bold Stroke and Noble Risk
This brings us to the question of Montaigne’s own effects and the manner 
in which they are produced. Montaigne’s warnings against innovation are 
based on the risk of the greater harm and even destruction that usually 
results from attempts to change the foundations of the political struc-
ture. But “nothing noble is done without risk” (VS129, F94). Montaigne’s 
refounding carries the greatest risk because it entails the overturning of 
the most fundamental moral basis of society: the standard of the common 
good and thus of classical virtue. 
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Montaigne’s refounding is a bold and risky enterprise and his “new and 
unlooked-for strokes in politics and morals” require extraordinary means. 
As soon as he moves from his thoughts to the production of effects, as 
soon as he acts, it becomes impossible to avoid vicious means. These trou-
ble his conscience, so he confesses them and makes them public. In these 
actions, we can trace the reformation of conscience that he is seeking to 
effect. I will consider four instances in which Montaigne confesses to the 
use of vicious means and the role that each plays in his refounding. Each 
of these instances of Montaigne’s use of vicious means shows us something 
about the way he seeks to limit evil. In each case, he is willing to sacrifice a 
traditional or conventional virtue in order to produce his own effect.
First, in “By Diverse Means” Montaigne replaces the enchantment 
of Homer with his own production of the marvelous. The very notion 
of replacing one enchantment with another involves him in a kind of 
deception that troubles his conscience. In “Of the Power of Imagination” 
he tells the story of how he helped his friend on his friend’s wedding 
night. His friend was fearful that the bride’s former suitor had placed 
an enchantment on him that would cause him to be impotent. Belief in 
enchantments was widespread at the time, but Montaigne himself does 
not believe in such invisible powers. Nevertheless, he gives his friend a 
gold piece engraved with celestial figures sewn to a ribbon and tells him 
to put this ribbon on around his waist if he experiences any problems. 
The counter-enchantment works, and his friend’s impotence is over-
come. Montaigne introduces this as a story of how a “counterbattery of 
enchantments” was able to save someone from impotence. In conclusion, 
he says: “It was a sudden and curious whim that led me to such an action 
[effect], which was alien to my nature. I am an enemy of subtle and dis-
simulated acts and hate trickery in myself, not only for sport but also for 
someone’s profit. If the action is not vicious, the road to it is” (VS101, 
F71). This sudden and curious whim is a “caprice” (VS103, F74). Mon-
taigne’s caprice is therefore an enchantment to take away the original 
enchantment of the invisible power of one man over another. 
Second, in “By Diverse Means” Montaigne says that he would be moved 
by either esteem or compassion, but that compassion is more natural to 
him than esteem. He is the only prince who is moved by compassion for 
the people. Montaigne’s compassion is extreme. He is not merely moved by 
compassion, but compassion also has “infinite power” over him (VS1100, 
F844) and makes him appear weak. According to the Stoics, compassion 
is a form of weakness and is therefore a vicious means to mercy.
Third, in “Of Diversion,” Montaigne says that, in one actual case, in 
order to lead a young prince away from vengeance, “I did not tell him 
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that we must turn our cheek to the man who has just struck the other one, 
for charity’s sake, nor did I represent to him the tragic results that poetry 
attributes to this passion. I let the passion alone and applied myself to 
making him relish the beauty of a contrary image, the honor, favor, and 
good will he would acquire by clemency and kindness. I diverted him to 
ambition” (VS835, F634). Montaigne does regard ambition as a great 
vice, but it is a lesser vice than vengeance and the cruelty that accompanies 
revenge. He attempts to prevent the evil and the violence of vengeance by 
the lesser evil of ambition. He does what is possible, given the character 
of the prince, to direct the prince to forgiveness.
Fourth, in “On Some Verses of Virgil” he discusses the erotic and the 
sexual in a way that he admits goes beyond the limits of propriety. Then 
he clarifies the purpose of his open speaking: “God grant that this exces-
sive license of mine may encourage our men to attain freedom, rising 
above these cowardly and hypocritical virtues born of our imperfections; 
that at the expense of my immoderation I may draw them on to the point 
of reason!” (VS845, F642). Immoderation is a vicious means but it is 
necessary in order to rise above cowardice and hypocrisy and to attain 
freedom.
The practice of making the private public goes beyond the sexual and 
extends to the Essays as a whole. Montaigne frankly and openly dis-
cusses a diversity of private matters in public, a practice that violates the 
very deep-seated prohibition against bringing the private into the public. 
Montaigne insists repeatedly that his project is the revelation of himself; 
it is, therefore, a new, strange, and even bizarre enterprise. Custom, how-
ever, has made speaking of oneself a vice because it assumes that speaking 
of oneself will always entail boasting, a vice opposed to the virtue of 
truth. But Montaigne finds more harm than good in this supposed cure 
for pride. “The supreme remedy to cure it is to do just the opposite of 
what those people prescribe who, by prohibiting talking about oneself, 
even more strongly prohibit thinking about oneself. The pride lies in the 
thought; the tongue can have only a very slight share in it” (VS379, F274). 
At the deepest level, then, he directs the Essays against the vice of pride, 
the remedy for which is another vice: speaking of oneself. This is the most 
fundamental sense in which he exploits vicious means, using one vice to 
limit another, worse vice, and it describes Montaigne’s project as a whole.
Throughout Montaigne’s discussions of the inescapability of evil and 
vicious means, the terms that are used most frequently are terms of con-
fessing, compensating, limiting, and excusing. “If my heart is not great 
enough, it is compensatingly open, and it orders me boldly to publish its 
weakness” (VS917, F700). In his frank admission that his immoderate 
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speech about the erotic is scandalous, he says: “I do not commend it, any 
more than I do any forms that are contrary to accepted practice; but I 
excuse it, and by particular and general circumstances I make the accusa-
tion lighter” (VS889, F678). Public confession, in particular, compensates 
and limits: “The worst of my actions and conditions does not seem to me 
so ugly as the cowardice of not daring to avow it. Everyone is discreet 
in confession; people should be so in action. Boldness in sinning is some-
what compensated and limited by boldness in confessing” (VS845, F642). 
Open speech about oneself, the confession of one’s imperfections and 
weakness, preserves purity of judgment: it makes it possible to keep one’s 
judgment uncorrupted without justifying one’s own actions. That is why 
Montaigne says that the judgment of the prince must be above his power 
and also that the prince must know how to communicate himself like any 
other man. Open judgment allows the man of conscience to participate 
in politics. As an advisor to princes, Montaigne always communicates his 
frank judgment to the prince, without fear and without self-interest. The 
role of the philosopher as advisor is to keep the judgment of the prince 
above the prince’s power, that is, to separate the man from the prince. 
Thus, the philosopher will humanize the prince.
Public confession also assumes that forgiveness is the necessary condi-
tion for the kind of society in which open speaking and the expression 
of judgment are essential. By boldly publishing his own weakness, Mon-
taigne makes that first, generous gesture that might possibly bring that 
kind of society into existence. This is his bold stroke and his noble risk.
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Chapter Six

The Primacy of the Private and the 
Origins of a Free Society
Society is a new, modern form of association. As Francis Slade dem-
onstrates, the distinction of having first invented society belongs to 
Machiavelli. Machiavelli “generates the distinction between State and 
Civil Society. The term itself, civil principality, is Machiavelli’s invention.”1 
According to Slade, “civil society is society from which what is political 
has been removed. . . . Depoliticized society and decontextualized rule are 
the great innovations effected by modern political philosophy.”2 This is 
precisely what we see in Montaigne, that is, the separation of the man 
from the prince and the separation of the social from the political. 
While Machiavelli is the first modern philosopher to invent society, 
Montaigne is the first to give a full account of this new form of associa-
tion and to actually bring it into existence through the publication of the 
Essays. The social is the domestic and private brought into the public. 
The separation of the man from the prince is the separation of society 
from politics, that is, it is the freedom of the social. Montaigne identifies 
the “social bond” as the free communication of our thoughts and wills. 
This is the bond that unites while at the same time allowing each human 
being to seek the good in his particularity.
The Emergence of the Private into the Public
Montaigne reorders the public and the private: his end is domestic and 
private. In “Of Repentance” he writes: “I set forth a humble and inglori-
ous life; that does not matter. You can tie up all moral philosophy with 
a common and private life just as well as with a life of richer stuff. Each 
man bears the entire form of the human condition” (VS805, F611). A 
life of richer stuff is the life of politics. Whereas for Aristotle, human 
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nature finds its ultimate fulfillment in the political community through 
the practice of moral virtue, Montaigne sees nothing superior in the pub-
lic role of the prince. The traditional notion of human nature has been 
replaced by “the human condition,” and in this condition each man is 
complete. The human condition is a private condition, and human perfec-
tion is now located in the private realm. “It is an absolute perfection and 
God-like to know how to enjoy our own being rightly.” The sentences 
that follow tell us something about what our own being is. “We seek 
other conditions because we do not understand the use of our own, and 
go outside ourselves because we do not know what it is like inside. Yet 
there is no use our mounting on stilts, for on stilts we must still walk on 
our own legs. And on the loftiest throne in the world we are still sitting 
on our own rump” (VS115–16, F857). The prince is merely and essen-
tially a private man, like every other man. As the Essays begin with his 
domestic and private end, so they end with the prince now become a 
private man.
Thus, “human condition” reduces all human beings to a private status, 
erasing the hierarchical distinctions implicit in the perfection of form, 
the perfection that is final cause. Each man bears the entire form of the 
human condition, not on account of a common end but on account of the 
“springs of action,” that is, on account of beginnings that are not ends. 
“The souls of emperors and cobblers are cast in the same mold. . . . they 
are led to and fro in their movements by the same springs [ressors] as we 
are in ours” (VS476, F350). The will of the cobbler is equal to the will of 
the emperor. Equality is equality of the will. 
Montaigne identifies three aspects under which a man might be judged: 
the way he appears in public, the way he is in the interior of his soul, and 
the way he behaves in the private, domestic setting. Any man can put on 
a good face in public, “but to be disciplined within, in his own bosom, 
where all is permissible, where all is concealed—that’s the point. The next 
step to that is to be so in our own house, in our ordinary actions, for 
which we need render an account to no one, where nothing is studied 
or artificial” (VS808, F613). In “To the Reader” he presents the same 
three possibilities. Had he intended to seek the favor of “the world,” he 
would have appeared in a studied posture. Had he been born in those 
nations that are said to still live under “the sweet freedom of nature’s first 
laws,” he would have shown himself wholly naked. Instead, since his end 
is domestic and private, he wants to be seen in his simple and “natural” 
form, without striving. The domestic and private, then, is still “natural.” 
The private realm is where we act without being seen by others, where we 
are what we truly are. This is “our own being.” 
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Montaigne wants to produce his effects on the hidden springs of 
action, to reform the will. When he studies the histories, therefore, he 
is more interested in the private actions and lives of the great: “Every 
movement reveals us. That same mind of Caesar’s which shows itself in 
ordering and directing the battle of Pharsalia, shows itself also in arrang-
ing idle and amorous affairs” (VS302, F219). Montaigne would rather 
know the conversation that Brutus had with his friends in his tent than 
the speech Brutus made to his army; he would rather expose what Brutus 
was doing in his study and his chamber than what he did in the pub-
lic square and the Senate. That is why biographies are so interesting to 
him: they focus more on “what comes from within than on what happens 
without” (VS415–16, F302–3). “It takes a keen and select judgment to 
perceive the order in these humble, private actions” (VS809, F614). Judg-
ing the men of his day, he finds that “the real condemnation” is that even 
their private lives are corrupted (VS811, F615–16).
Montaigne shines the light of publicity on the private and thereby 
brings it into the public. To make it appear is to make it public. The 
private can now emerge into the public view without shame, and this 
emergence radically changes the public realm.
Judgment Restored
How, then, does Montaigne bring about this reordering of public and 
private and this radical reformation of the public sphere? In “Of Custom” 
he tells us that, at one time, he had found himself in the position of having 
to justify an authoritative customary observance. He wanted to establish 
this custom, not simply by the force of the laws and examples, but by 
tracing it back to its origin. But in doing so, he discovered that its “foun-
dation” was “so weak” that he, who was supposed to justify it to others, 
instead became “almost disgusted” by this practice (VS116–17, F84). 
Where, then, does he stand with respect to the authority, the founda-
tional status, of custom? When the mask of custom is torn off, it exposes 
an authority based on nothing but time and usage; and when Montaigne 
subsequently measures custom by the standard of truth and reason, his 
judgment is “all upset” but “nevertheless restored to a much surer status” 
(VS117, F84–85). How can his judgment be “restored” once he has seen 
the weak origin of custom?
The examples he uses to show what happens to him in his attempt to 
rid himself of the prejudice of custom illustrate the strangeness and even 
barbarity of French laws: they illustrate the way that judgment is upset 
The Primacy of the Private 137
when one refers custom to truth and reason. What could be more strange, 
he asks, than to see a people governed by laws it does not understand, 
that is, laws written and published in Latin, which therefore require 
paid interpreters? It is “monstrous” that reason, law, and justice must 
be bought and sold. What could be more barbarous than the simultane-
ous existence of two codes of conduct: the code of arms, which binds 
the nobility by the standard of honor, and the civil code, which forbids 
the avenging of insults? “There are two sets of laws, those of honor and 
those of justice, in many matters quite opposed. The former condemn as 
rigorously a man’s enduring being given the lie as the latter condemn his 
avenging it.” He asks, “what could be more barbarous” than the condi-
tion in which a man is degraded from honor and nobility if he endures an 
insult without avenging himself and incurs capital punishment if he does 
avenge himself? (VS117–18, F85) 
Immediately after the discussion of these strange and barbarous cus-
toms, he turns to consider more “indifferent things,” such as clothing. 
Just as there are monstrous laws, so also there are monstrous fashions 
in clothing, monstrous because they do not serve the needs and comfort 
of the body “on which depend their original grace and fitness.” It is pos-
sible, then, that someone would “want to restore them to their true end” 
(VS118, F85). By turning to indifferent things, Montaigne suggests that in 
a similar way custom and the laws might also be restored to their true end. 
Further, within the discussion of strange and monstrous laws, there are 
suggestions of other possibilities. With respect to the burdens imposed 
by the Latin laws, which bind the people in all of their domestic affairs 
and which must be interpreted by paid lawyers, Montaigne mentions 
the “ingenious opinion” of Isocrates who advised the king “to make the 
trades and negotiations of his subjects free, gratuitous, and lucrative, and 
their disputes and quarrels onerous.” Montaigne also points to a time in 
their own history when the French were not governed under Latin laws: 
“I am grateful to fortune that, so our historians say, it was a Gascon gen-
tleman, and from my part of the country, who first opposed Charlemagne 
when he wanted to give us Latin and imperial laws.” By specifying that 
this unnamed man was from his part of the country, Montaigne associ-
ates himself with this Gascon gentleman who opposed Charlemagne’s 
innovation.3 In addition to the burdens forced on private life by the Latin 
laws, the result of their imposition is the barbarous but lawful custom 
of having to purchase justice and being denied justice if one cannot pay. 
Thus, Montaigne says, to the three “ancient” estates of Church, Nobility, 
and People, a fourth has been added, the estate of lawyers that has sover-
eign authority over life and property. Once again, Montaigne is recalling 
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a time before the emergence of this fourth estate, the time of the three 
ancient estates. 
In Montaigne’s Politics: Authority and Governance in the Essais, 
Biancamaria Fontana describes the legal situation to which Montaigne 
refers: “An unfortunate combination of Roman law and feudal custom 
had produced in France an aberrant result, a judicial monstrosity, which 
subsequent interventions on the part of the crown had only succeeded in 
making more incoherent and unmanageable. . . . France had far too many 
laws. . . . Moreover, many of these laws were obsolete or redundant, some 
contradicted one another, and all were expressed in a characteristically 
cryptic jargon.” French law “was distinguished by its remarkable obscu-
rity: people were governed by codes that were not even written in their 
own language, and that they could neither read nor understand with-
out the costly assistance of specialists.” This resulted in what Montaigne 
calls the barbarous custom of having to pay for justice. Fontana says that 
“Montaigne was strongly opposed to the venality that characterized the 
French judicial system. To begin with, he disapproved of the fact that 
magistrates generally expected to be remunerated for their services by 
the parties involved in trials: payments ranged from simple fees, in them-
selves rather modest, to far more substantial benefits, such as pensions, 
appointments, or gratuities.”4 In 1584, Montaigne drafted comments on 
a project of judicial reform intended for Henry of Navarre in which he 
expressed “his belief that there should be ‘one single justice,’ and that 
consequently legal services should be free of charge and equally accessible 
to all, regardless of wealth and social position.”5 
Fontana’s description explains the situation of the nobility that Mon-
taigne finds monstrous as well as the existence of a fourth estate, which 
was so oppressive to the poor. “In France the magistracy represented a 
powerful caste, a ‘Fourth Estate’; yet in practice only the lowest ranks of 
the population were subjected to their authority and to the prescriptions 
of the law. The nobility followed a code of honor of its own, which often 
clashed with ordinary legislation and was deemed superior to it; among 
the members of the Third Estate, the rich could pay to secure a favorable 
treatment from judges and tribunals, so that only the poor were exposed 
to the full rigor of the law.”6
Montaigne says that “our French laws, by their irregularity and lack 
of form, rather lend a hand to the disorder and corruption that is seen 
in their administration and execution. Their commands are so confused 
and inconsistent that they are some excuse for both disobedience and 
faulty interpretation, administration, and observance” (VS1072, F821). 
As Fontana shows, Montaigne was involved in contemporary efforts to 
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reform the French judicial system; but his reform also goes much deeper. 
By pointing back to an ancient condition, a time before the imposition 
of burdensome Latin laws, Montaigne is suggesting change that is really 
a “restoration” of a condition within the history of the French people, 
a possibility that he discovers within that history. Through introducing 
the “ingenious opinion” of Isocrates, he points to the desirability of free-
ing the private sphere from the control of the laws as much as possible: 
the trade and negotiations of the people should be free, gratuitous, and 
lucrative.7 His restoration is not precisely a return to the past but the 
introduction of a new freedom.
The discussion of the barbarous situation of the nobility also points to 
a reform that is fundamental. In showing the contradictions between the 
laws of honor and the laws of justice, Montaigne refers to the dishonor 
incurred by enduring insult, specifically the insult of “being given the lie,” 
that is, to be accused of lying. Montaigne devotes an entire essay to this 
subject, “Du démentir,” or “Of Giving the Lie.” He begins by describing 
his own project in writing the Essays, how he has taken himself as the 
subject of his book. So the question arises of how we can believe that a 
man would actually tell the truth about himself. At this point, the discus-
sion turns to the custom concerning the gravity of the insult of being 
given the lie: why do the French regard this as the extreme of insult? 
“Our nation,” he says, “has long been reproached for this vice” of lying. 
Salvianus of Massilia, who lived at the time of the Emperor Valentinian, 
says that “to the French lying and perjury are not a vice but a manner of 
speaking.” Montaigne goes further: “If a man wanted to go this testimony 
one better, he could say that [lying] is now a virtue to them. Men form 
and fashion themselves for it as for an honorable practice; for dissimula-
tion is among the most notable qualities of this century” (VS666, F505).
Given the French penchant for lying and also the honorable status 
of lying, Montaigne wonders “what could be the source of that custom, 
which we observe so religiously, of feeling more bitterly offended when 
reproached with this vice, which is so common among us, than with any 
other; and that it should be the worst insult that can be given us in words, 
to reproach us with lying.” One possible cause is that it is natural to 
defend oneself most for the defects of which we are most guilty. Per-
haps we try to unburden ourselves of guilt by becoming resentful of the 
accusation. We condemn it in appearance although we have it in fact. 
Once again, he makes the association between lying and cowardice: the 
reproach of lying is the accusation of cowardice and lack of courage. 
Indeed, there is no more obvious cowardice than to deny our own word 
and to deny what we know. 
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It is here that Montaigne sets out his understanding of the social bond 
and thus lays the new foundation of human association. Our word, he 
says, is the only instrument we have to communicate our thoughts and 
wills. “If it fails us, we have no more hold on each other, no more knowl-
edge of each other. If it deceives us, it breaks up all our relations and 
dissolves all the bonds of society” (VS666–67, F505). In “Of Liars” he 
says, “Lying is an accursed vice. We are men, and hold together only by 
our word” (VS36, F23). 
Montaigne concludes “Of Giving the Lie” with the observation that, 
among the ancient Greeks and Romans, giving the lie was not considered 
so great an insult and did not result in violence and revenge. This indiffer-
ence of the ancients looks “novel and strange” to us. So he wonders how 
it came to pass that giving the lie has become the extreme insult: “As for 
the varied etiquette of giving the lie, and our laws of honor in that matter, 
and the changes they have undergone, I shall put off to another time tell-
ing what I know about that, and shall meanwhile learn, if I can, at what 
time the custom began of weighing and measuring words so exactly, and 
attaching our honor to them” (VS667, F506). In fact, he does not discuss 
this explicitly again in the Essays. 
Montaigne’s refounding consists in his discovery, his invention, of 
truth as the foundation of society. He does this by taking the custom 
concerning giving the lie and directing it to its true end. This entails the 
reformation of the nobility through a transformed notion of honor and 
courage. That is why he so strongly associates lying with cowardice. He 
turns the desire for honor, expressed in revenge for the insult of giving the 
lie, into the notion of honor as keeping one’s word, telling the truth, and 
communicating one’s thoughts and will. 
While the philosophers either hide under the authority of custom 
or reject custom entirely on account of the weakness of its origins, 
Montaigne discovers or invents the possibilities already present in the tra-
dition. There are two senses of the possible that must be addressed with 
respect to Montaigne’s invention. The first is the sense of the possible as 
that which is “realistic,” what can reasonably be expected to be accom-
plished. This meaning amounts to a rejection of the notion of perfection 
as unrealizable in practice and therefore involves a concomitant lowering 
of expectations based on the idea that to aim at perfection is futile and 
dangerous. Perfection, the attainment of the highest and the best state of 
affairs, is really impossible. It is this notion of the possible that seems to 
be Machiavelli’s point in chapter 15 of The Prince: we must, he argues, 
turn to the “effectual truth” and away from the imagination of repub-
lics that have never actually existed. What has never actually existed is 
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impossible. That Montaigne interprets Machiavelli in that way is sug-
gested by his claim that Machiavelli’s arguments are based on experience: 
since the imagined best has never actually occurred, it is not possible. 
The second sense of the possible is that of what has never been seen 
before. According to this sense, the possible is distinguished both from the 
probable and from the actual. The fact that something has never existed in 
the past does not mean that it cannot ever exist, that it is impossible in prin-
ciple. This is the openness to the possible that Montaigne has in mind when 
he says that his end is to tell not what has happened but what can happen.
Montaigne says that we must take men as we find them, already bound 
and formed to certain customs (VS957, F730). This attitude toward the 
givenness of the human condition is what makes the difference between 
change and overthrowing everything, between refounding and destroy-
ing. Both senses of the possible, then, are present here: the rejection of the 
hierarchical notion of perfection implied in his “taking men as we find 
them,” and the introduction of a foundation of association that had never 
been seen before.
Michael Oakeshott describes this discovery of possibilities as the pur-
suit of “intimations.” The amendment of traditional modes of behavior 
and of existing social arrangements is accomplished not by a process of 
making them conform to an ideology but “by exploring and pursuing 
what is intimated” in these traditional modes.8 This is what preserves 
the continuity of a tradition: “authority is diffused between past, pres-
ent and future; between the old, and new and what is to come.”9 This 
view of change and reform gives some assurance that “our mistakes of 
understanding will be less frequent and less disastrous.”10 Reform as the 
pursuit of intimations is in accord with Montaigne’s criticism of reform 
undertaken by means of new opinions. That is why he can be disgusted 
with innovation and, at the same time, be the initiator of innovation. 
Montaigne’s reform is reform through old opinions: his refounding is also 
a restoring. As Biancamaria Fontana puts it, recovery must come “from 
the hidden resources of French society itself, from the community’s poten-
tial for self-regeneration.”11
The Three Ancient Estates and the Origin of Society 
The Reform of the Nobility: Pride and Shame
In The Quality of Mercy, David Quint argues that the Essays can be 
read as an extended commentary on “By Diverse Means We Arrive at 
the Same End,” for this first essay reveals “Montaigne’s shifting attitude 
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toward a model of heroic selfhood.”12 The Essays are directed to his noble 
contemporaries, especially at the vice of cruelty which is so deeply associ-
ated with valor in combat. An ethical reform of his class is at the heart 
of his political project: “To be truly noble . . . is to forswear cruelty.”13 
Quint argues persuasively that “by making clemency a form, indeed 
the supreme expression, of true valor, Montaigne here reveals the logic 
behind an argument that the Essais make elsewhere to substitute clem-
ency for valor as the distinguishing sign of aristocratic identity.”14 Indeed, 
“the choice of pardon over revenge is the moral and political touchstone 
of the Essais.”15 In his chapter entitled “An Ethics of Yielding,” Quint 
describes Montaigne’s moral teaching as “an ethics of submission” that 
shows the nobility how to yield while retaining honor and integrity.16 
This is “an honorable kind of submission that is the result of free indi-
vidual choice.”17
As Hannah Arendt argues, the public sphere is radically changed by 
the emergence of the private into the public. Montaigne offers the pos-
sibility of the reform of the nobility through a new understanding of 
honor as the generous gesture of submitting their private selves to public 
scrutiny; thus, the nobility holds in itself the possibility of transforming 
the political through honorable submission. At the expense of his own 
immoderation, he wants to draw “our men” to freedom and reason. He 
is attempting to bring into being the character that is “neither master nor 
slave,” the character that is necessary for the origin and the preservation 
of a free society. The nobility, who are born to rule, must learn to hate 
mastery. But spiritedness must not be crushed: it must be separated from 
the desire for domination. In other words, the noble man must be edu-
cated to hate both mastery and slavery.
For the proud, spirited man, shame has to do with the way he appears 
in public, before other men. Hence, the laws of honor that require him 
to risk his life rather than suffer the humiliation of enduring an insult. 
Shame is one of the few things that Montaigne says is unique to man. 
For the nobility, pride in one’s family is pride in one’s noble origins. The 
noble man sees himself as suited to rule by nature on account of his supe-
rior origins. Montaigne’s open speaking about the sexual is intended to 
emphasize the point that all men share the same origins. It is in order 
“to make us all equal” that nature has made us this way (VS877, F668–
69). Early in the Essays, Montaigne tells us that he is very susceptible to 
shame concerning the members and acts that custom orders us to cover 
up: “I, who am so bold-mouthed, am nevertheless by complexion affected 
by this shame” (VS18–19, F11). His speech, however, is excessively free 
with respect to the erotic and sexual. In “On Some Verses of Virgil” he 
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discusses the erotic in a way that he admits goes beyond the limits of pro-
priety. Then the purpose of his open speaking becomes clear: he intends 
his excessive license to encourage the nobility to attain freedom, by rising 
above the cowardly and hypocritical virtues born of their human imper-
fections; he writes as though he had no shame so that he might lead 
them on to the point of reason even at the expense of his immoderation 
(VS845, F642). Here he is addressing “our men,” the nobility who are 
driven by the shame that belongs to spiritedness. Thus, his license in dis-
cussing the sexual is intended to effect a transformed sense of shame and 
of honor. By going against the instinctual shame associated with sex as 
the private and hidden, Montaigne is weakening the power of the shame 
associated with the private, overcoming one of the most deeply ingrained 
of all customs, or perhaps even of nature itself. He directs his license to 
the encouragement of freedom, the freedom of self-revelation. 
Montaigne also intends his open speech about the sexual and about 
himself to bring words and deeds into harmony. We are not ashamed to 
do shameful things but we scruple to speak about them. “The words that 
men fear most are those that uncover them. We must tuck up this stupid 
rag that covers our conduct. They send their conscience to the brothel and 
keep their countenance in good order” (VS846, F643). Bringing words 
and deeds closer together, therefore, has the effect of limiting evil. Con-
fession to some extent limits and compensates for sin. “Whoever would 
oblige himself to tell all, would oblige himself not to do anything about 
which we are constrained to keep silent” (VS845, F642).
Custom has made speaking about oneself a vice, but Montaigne sees 
this prohibition as one of those hypocritical and cowardly virtues that 
are obstacles to freedom. The vice of speaking about oneself is actually 
the cure for the greater vice of pride (VS379, F274). Self-revelation both 
overcomes pride and compensates for pride because it is a new way of 
showing oneself in public. 
Dissimulation, on the other hand, or hiding oneself under a mask, tes-
tifies to cowardice and baseness of heart: “In that way our men train 
for perfidy; being accustomed to speak false words, they have no scru-
ples about breaking their word. A generous heart should not belie its 
thoughts; it wants to reveal itself even to its inmost depths. There every-
thing is good, or at least everything is human” (VS647, F491). 
The new character of the noble man that Montaigne seeks to bring 
about combines the renunciation of mastery with spiritedness and 
courage; this is a character that is neither master nor slave. Therefore, 
Epaminondas is the new, “more human,” figure of the prince. He was able 
to combine the ferocity of the prince in battle with the gentleness of the 
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man. His was “a soul of rich composition,” for he brought goodness and 
humanity to the roughest and most violent of human actions. Montaigne 
points to the possibility that the character of Epaminondas was not natu-
ral and could therefore be produced by education: “That heart, so great, 
full and obstinate against pain, death, and poverty—was it nature or art 
that had made it tender to the point of such an extreme gentleness and 
goodness in disposition?” (VS801–2, F608–9). It is possible, then, that the 
disposition of a man, the temperament that he is born with, his “nature,” 
can actually be changed by art. Epaminondas achieved “the perfect refor-
mation of mores” (VS1109, F851).18
“Of the Education of Children” is addressed to the widowed mother 
of a young nobleman. Montaigne advises her on how she should choose 
a tutor for her son and what the tutor should seek to effect. Above all, 
Montaigne says, the tutor must make it possible for the boy to form his 
judgment, which is a work that is “all his own.” With respect to the boy’s 
future role as a member of the prince’s court, Montaigne writes: “If his 
tutor is of my disposition, he will form his will to be a very loyal, very 
affectionate, and very courageous servant of his prince; but he will cool in 
him any desire to attach himself to that prince otherwise than by a sense 
of public duty. Besides several other disadvantages which impair our free-
dom by these private obligations, the judgment of a man who is hired and 
bought is either less whole and less free, or tainted with imprudence and 
ingratitude. A courtier can have neither the right nor the will to speak 
and think otherwise than favorably of a master who among so many 
thousands of other subjects has chosen him to train and raise up with his 
own hand. This favor and advantage corrupt his freedom, not without 
some reason, and dazzle him” (VS155, F114). Therefore, the nobleman 
must resist the seduction of the court and maintain his freedom and inde-
pendence at home: “In truth, our laws are free enough, and the weight of 
sovereignty scarcely touches a French nobleman twice in his life. The real 
and essential subjection is only for those among us who go seeking it and 
who like to gain honors and riches by his service; for anyone who wants 
to ensconce himself by his hearth, and who can manage his house without 
quarrels and lawsuits, is as free as the Doge of Venice: ‘Slavery holds but 
few; many hold fast to slavery’ [Seneca]” (F195, VS266). Slavery, then, 
is seeking one’s own private good in the public realm. Freedom, in con-
trast, means a contentment with the domestic and private and a resultant 
detachment from any personal gain from political power or rule.
The reform that Montaigne wants to effect occurs, then, at the deep-
est level of action; it is a reform of the beginnings, the springs of action. 
“Those who in my time have tried to correct the world’s mores by new 
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opinions, reform the superficial vices; the essential ones they leave as they 
were.” These “external, arbitrary reforms” cost little and bring public 
acclaim, leaving “the other natural, consubstantial, and internal vices” 
unaffected (VS811, F615). He criticizes those who concern themselves 
with the correction of trivial faults and “the vices of appearance” rather 
than the vices of reality. “Oh what an easy and applauded route those 
superficial men take, compared with ours!” (VS888, F677). Montaigne is 
not attempting to reform through new opinions. Rather he is attempting 
to reform judgment itself, and the reform of judgment entails a reordering 
of the will toward overcoming the desire for mastery. 
Montaigne’s project, then, is nothing less than a transformation of the 
moral life. The pride of the nobleman must no longer find its object in 
domination. Therefore, shame must be redirected, and honor understood, 
in a new way. 
Reordering Virtues and Vices
“The Romans took the general term ‘virtue’ from their word for ‘strength.’ 
The proper, the only, the essential form of nobility in France is the military 
profession. It is probable that the first virtue that manifested itself among 
men and gave some advantage over others was this one, by which the 
strongest and most courageous made themselves masters of the weaker 
and acquired particular rank and reputation; whence it has retained this 
linguistic honor and dignity. Or else that these nations, being very war-
like, gave the prize and the worthiest title to the one virtue which was 
most familiar to them” (VS384, F277). As he frequently does, Montaigne 
goes beyond the most common and familiar form of virtue, strength in 
war. He intends his new lesson to replace that familiar foundation of 
human strength with the foundation of goodness or innocence, a founda-
tion that in the natural hierarchy appears weak.
This new foundation, however, gives rise to an entirely new rank-
ing of the traditional virtues and vices. “Confusion about the order and 
measurement of sins is dangerous. . . . Even our teachers often rank sins 
badly, in my opinion” (VS340, F244–45). Montaigne’s goodness leads 
him to the judgment that cruelty is the extreme of viciousness: “Among 
other vices, I cruelly hate cruelty, both by nature and by judgment, as 
the extreme of all vices” (VS429, F313). His hatred of cruelty verges on 
extreme “softness” and is therefore easily mistaken for weakness. Cruelty 
is the vice that would be most closely associated with the ferocity neces-
sary for courage in war and with the willingness to fight for the freedom 
of one’s country. Thus, the spirited would be most inclined to this vice.
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Cruelty is, of course, regarded as a vice in the classical-Christian tradi-
tion, but it is not regarded as the extreme. By establishing cruelty as the 
worst of the vices, Montaigne changes the meaning of vice itself. Rather 
than ranking the virtues and vices according to the classical standard 
of self-perfection, he ranks them according to the requirements of the 
social. This reordering, announced in “Of Drunkenness,” leads him to 
conclude: “I find [drunkenness] a loose and stupid vice, but less malicious 
and harmful than the others, which almost all clash more directly with 
society in general” (VS342, F247). The drunkard’s lack of self-control 
does not threaten the social so deeply as the cruelty of a spirited ruler.
Together with cruelty, Montaigne ranks ambition as one of the worst 
vices. The valor of Epaminondas is “not sharpened by ambition”: his was 
a “well-ordered soul” (VS756, F572–73). Montaigne himself had been 
tempted toward this vice, even seeing opportunities for satisfying ambi-
tion in the Reformation (VS320, F232). But he holds firm against these 
temptations (VS992, F759). As mayor of Bordeaux, he avoided all inno-
vation that might have given him a glorious reputation but would at the 
same time have been harmful to the city (e.g., VS1021, F781). As we have 
seen, his most severe condemnation of ambition is reserved for his judg-
ment of Caesar, because Caesar sought his glory in the ruin of his country 
and the subversion of the republic. However, ambition is still a lesser vice 
than revenge and cruelty. In fact, it is Caesar who shows that the vice of 
ambition is not necessarily accompanied by cruelty: Montaigne admires 
Caesar for his great clemency and sees in him many rare seeds of virtue 
(VS430, F314 and VS731, F552). 
Ambition ranks so high on the list of vices because it entails the pursuit 
of glory and the desire to rule. The desire to rule, then, is not the legiti-
mate and just assertion of one’s superiority but rather the vice of wanting 
to assert one’s right to mastery. Montaigne takes the honor out of ambi-
tion. He diverts the ambitious man to a different image of honor: “Since 
we will not do so out of conscience, at least out of ambition let us reject 
ambition. Let us disdain this base and beggarly hunger for renown and 
honor which makes us grovel for it before all sorts of people . . . abjectly 
and at no matter how vile a price” (VS1023, F783). Ambition is to seek 
one’s own good in politics and is therefore a form of dependence upon 
one’s master for one’s own good. In this, it is servile and shameful.
Montaigne’s treatment of ambition also brings out the way in which 
he understands and deals with the passions. In “Of Diversion,” he tells 
how he led a young prince away from the passion of vengeance: “I let the 
passion alone” (VS835, F634). He does not try to persuade the prince 
to directly confront the passion of vengeance. Rather, Montaigne diverts 
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him to ambition because ambition is a lesser vice than vengeance. Thus, 
the role of the passions is different for Montaigne than it is for Aristotle: 
Montaigne uses one passion to counter another more harmful one. He 
avoids the struggle between reason and passion, thereby minimizing the 
role of mastery in the practice of virtue. Further, he diverts the prince 
by means of an image of the honor and goodwill to be gained by mercy 
and kindness, thus affecting the prince’s judgment of the true meaning 
of honor and leading him away from the customary view that honor is 
primarily a matter of avenging insults. 
After cruelty and ambition, the vice that Montaigne hates most is lying. 
Truth is the “first and fundamental part of virtue” (VS647, F491). Indeed, 
“the first stage in the corruption of morals is the banishment of truth” 
(VS666, F505). Again, we see the connection of his ranking of vice and 
virtue with the social, for truth is the foundation of society. That is, truth 
is the first and fundamental part of virtue because it is the social bond. 
Referring to the practices of the nobles at court (and apparently also 
to Machiavelli), Montaigne writes: “As for this new virtue of hypocrisy 
and dissimulation, which is so highly honored at present, I mortally hate 
it: and of all vices, I know none that testifies to so much cowardice and 
baseness of heart” (VS647, F491). Through his openness he wants to 
encourage the nobility to attain freedom by rising above cowardice and 
hypocrisy (VS845, F642). It requires courage to speak of oneself (VS664, 
F503), while “not to speak roundly of oneself shows some lack of heart” 
(VS942, F920). It is craven and servile to disguise and hide ourselves, 
and not to dare to show ourselves as we are. That is how “our men” 
train themselves for breaking their word. A “generous heart” does not 
belie its thoughts but rather wants to reveal itself entirely (VS647, F491). 
Montaigne is redirecting the virtue of courage to truthfulness rather than 
valor.19 
But what action could initiate this reform of the nobility? What could 
make it possible for men of honor to lay down their arms and seek 
the conditions of society? Pride is transformed into generosity by open 
speech. Montaigne says: “My essential form is suited to communication 
and revelation. I am all in the open and in full view, born for society and 
friendship” (VS823, F625). 
The Essays show us both a new notion of honor and a new notion of 
strength. Alexander and Caesar are not relaxing their souls, but “tough-
ening” them by submitting their violent tasks to the practice of everyday 
life (VS1108, F850). Strength is not a matter of mastery over others but of 
“stepping down” and essaying oneself against other men using only what 
is all one’s own in the freedom of social life.20
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The emergence of the private into the public must entail an overcom-
ing of the primitive instinct of shame that causes us to hide and cover up 
the private. Looked at in this way, the entire project of the Essays is the 
overcoming of shame. Montaigne uncovers himself, revealing the most 
private aspects of his life. This is the act of generosity that lies at the ori-
gin of society. Montaigne has made the first generous gesture.
The People
Like Hobbes, Montaigne insists on the legitimacy of fear as the motive for 
giving one’s word. Whereas the noble man acts not out of fear but only 
out of a certain kind of pride, the common people are presumed to be reli-
ably motivated by the fear of death. One of the most persistent themes of 
the Essays, however, is the way in which the common people, the weak, 
are accidentally similar to the strong. For example, in “By Diverse Means 
We Arrive at the Same End,” the common people are moved to mercy 
through astonishment: astonishment produces the same effect in them as 
esteem produces in the princes. The story of the rank and file of Diony-
sius’s army shows that the display of heroic virtue can elicit the response 
of rebellion against the tyrant. Astonishment brings out into the open 
what is hidden, what is present without our knowing that it is present, 
the hatred of mastery and the desire for freedom in the common people.
Furthermore, there are several stories in the Essays that illustrate the 
possibility of eliciting the trust of the common people: the confidence 
and trust of the great call forth trust in the many. That is what happens 
in the two stories that Montaigne tells in “Of Physiognomy.” During the 
civil wars, a group of men arrived at his house, clearly with the inten-
tion of taking him and his house by surprise. It was Montaigne’s practice 
always to keep his house open and undefended. The openness and trust 
that he demonstrated on this occasion caused the leader of the invaders 
to simply abandon his plan. Later, he often told Montaigne that his face 
and his frankness had disarmed the invaders. On another occasion, Mon-
taigne was captured by a group of 15 or 20 armed men who demanded a 
large ransom. Montaigne refused to promise any ransom, and his captors 
began disputing over his life. Suddenly, a change came over them. Their 
leader returned to him all of his belongings and let him go free. One of 
these men took off his mask, told Montaigne his name, and explained 
to him that he owed his deliverance to his face and to the freedom and 
firmness of his speech. Montaigne tells these stories in order to illustrate 
his claim that his openness and trust often call forth a like trust (VS1060, 
F811–12). A similar incident occurs when there are rumors that some of 
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the men on his side in the civil war are planning mutiny at a review of 
the troops. The other officers advise caution and scaling back the planned 
ceremonies, but Montaigne advises that they go out among the troops, 
heads held high, encouraging them to display their arms. This strategy 
succeeded because trust elicited trust (VS131, F96).
In “Of Various Outcomes of the Same Plan” Montaigne tells the story 
of a military governor of a great city who, in order to quell an incipi-
ent riot, went out into the mob and was brutally killed. Fontana cites 
this story as evidence of the importance of trust in Montaigne’s political 
philosophy: “The current view—Montaigne explained—was that he was 
killed because he took a foolish risk; yet this was not quite true: his real 
mistake was not the choice of confronting the people in person, but the 
attitude he adopted in doing so, first surrounding himself with armed 
soldiers—showing his mistrust and his will to intimidate—then revealing 
his fear and his anxiety to win over the angry crowd. What was required 
instead to confront ‘the frenzied populace’ was an attitude of ‘gracious 
severity . . . security and confidence,’ which alone might have gained their 
respect.”21 Fontana notes the element of surprise—the surprise that can 
take us out of our accustomed modes of action—in this and other stories: 
“What interested [Montaigne] . . . was the precise nature of the feeling 
that led human beings, sometimes impulsively, to replace an instinctive 
response of fear and distrust with one of acceptance and cooperation. 
Thus his concern shifted from the conventional definition of an ideal 
moral posture to that decisive interaction between real people that so 
often determined the twists and turns of historical events. In the Essais 
this positive response to another human agent was identified as fidelité, 
confiance, and fiance (in English: fidelity, confidence, and trust) and grad-
ually came to occupy a prominent place in Montaigne’s analysis.”22 
“Of Various Outcomes of the Same Plan” begins with stories of princes 
who dealt with conspiracies by forgiveness, clemency, and trust rather 
than by revenge and suspicion. Montaigne’s conclusion is that “those who 
preach to princes such an attentive distrust, under the guise of preaching 
them security, preach them their ruin and their shame. Nothing noble is 
done without risk” (VS129, F94). The strong assurance required for the 
show of trust “cannot be displayed truly entire and natural except by 
those who do not take fright at the imagination of death” (VS130, F95).23
Witness to his own strong assurance, Montaigne confidently places 
himself among “the dregs of the people” (VS1040, F795). He is unafraid 
to proclaim himself “only a man of the lowest form” (VS988, F755). Like 
the simple Christians, he sticks to the old ways, and in order to be like 
the peasants, he pulls back from learning as far as possible to the seat of 
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ignorance. That is, he identifies himself with the people; he “steps down” 
by choice. The characteristic of Montaigne that comes through most 
forcefully on account of this moralization of pride is compassion. The 
first words that he says about himself in the first essay—“I am marvel-
ously weak in the direction of mercy and gentleness. . . . I believe I should 
be likely to surrender more naturally to compassion than to esteem” 
(VS8, F4)—find an echo in the very last essay where he says that compas-
sion has “infinite power” over him. Here he recalls the fact that his father 
had sent the infant Montaigne to the poorest village in his neighborhood 
to be nursed and had asked the lowliest villagers to hold his son over 
the baptismal font in order to attach and oblige the child to them. “His 
plan,” Montaigne says, “succeeded not at all badly. I give myself willingly 
to the little people, whether because there is more glory in it, or through 
natural compassion, which has infinite power over me” (VS1100, F844). 
As is usual for him, he presents possibilities without concerning himself 
to identify one, true cause of his character: glory, natural compassion, and 
the grace of baptism are indistinguishable in him. 
Montaigne acknowledges the need for the conventional distinctions 
made among men, distinctions of honor that are so coveted among the 
French nobility. But, he says, “I should be more at home in a country 
where these orders of precedence were either regulated or despised” 
(VS980, F749). With respect to the distinction between master and 
servant, he says: “It is inhuman and unjust to make so much of this acci-
dental privilege of fortune. And the governments which admit the least 
disparity between servants and masters seem to me the most equitable” 
(VS821, F623). 
In his Travel Journal, Montaigne writes: “Free nations do not have the 
same distinction between people’s ranks as do the others; and even those 
of the lowest class have something lordly in their manner.”24 The elimi-
nation of such distinctions of rank, then, brings out the nobility of the 
common people. He also comments on the lost liberty of certain Italian 
cities and of the traces of the desire for freedom that he saw in their peo-
ple. Of Pistoia he writes: “This poor town compensates for its lost liberty 
by a vain image of its ancient constitution.” The citizens elect ceremonial 
functionaries who have no real power. Montaigne says: “I felt pity to see 
them feed on this monkey business; and meanwhile the grand duke has 
increased the taxes by ten times over what they formerly were.”25 He 
recounts that during his visit to Florence, the grand duke had opened 
the palace to the country people, who filled the place with dancing. “To 
these people I believe this is a kind of symbol of their lost liberty, which 
is refreshed at this main festival of the city.”26 
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The greatest act of generosity to the people and trust in the people is 
the restoration of their freedom. In “Of Presumption” Montaigne says 
that every man presumes that his judgment is as good as anyone else’s, 
that the simple productions of the understanding are within his power. 
That is why Montaigne’s recommendation of himself is “vulgar, common, 
and popular” (VS656, F498). Founding on the lowly means founding 
on the presumption of the many. As a philosopher, he stands back and 
acknowledges the authority of the presumption of the common people. 
If you accept the presumption of every man, then you allow him to judge 
for himself. That is freedom, and that is how his refounding takes men 
as they are.
The Church
The role of the Church in Montaigne’s invention of society was discussed 
at greater length in chapter 2. The spiritual power of the Church provides 
the basis for the social bond. In the custom of honor concerning “giving 
the lie,” Montaigne invents a new intimation: truth as the social bond. He 
expresses the desire to find out what caused the shift from ancient notions 
of duty (which made little of accusations of dishonesty) to the central 
place that this insult to one’s honor occupies in his own day. But he never 
explicitly returns to the search for the origin of that shift. I suggest that 
its origin is the foundational status of truth in the Christian religion. The 
ancient philosophers taught that religion is merely a human contrivance 
to bind society together; in contrast, Montaigne holds that “our sovereign 
creator” has “freed our belief” and “based it on the eternal foundation of 
his holy word” (VS579, F437). Christianity holds that its truth is acces-
sible to all men, to the most simple peasant woman as to the most learned 
theologian. 
In his Montaigne and Religious Freedom: The Dawn of Pluralism, 
Malcolm Smith argues that Montaigne’s opposition to the Reformation 
and his views on religious toleration were similar, if not identical, to those 
of his friend Etienne de La Boétie and that the essay “It Is Folly to Mea-
sure the True and False by Our Own Capacity” (where Montaigne asserts 
the authority of the Church) was first written as an “introduction” to La 
Boétie’s “Memorandum on Pacifying the Troubles.”27 La Boétie rejects 
persecution on the principle of freedom of conscience, but he also believes 
that tolerance will lead to a divided state. He rejects toleration on both 
political and theological grounds, arguing that “truth is one.”28
Smith interprets Montaigne’s remarks concerning the Church as a 
public and immutable institution to imply that society could not survive 
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the very dangerous introduction of a variant form of Christianity.29 The 
liturgy, Montaigne holds, is essentially public.30 Smith argues that Mon-
taigne rejects the idea of national religions31 and may have been involved 
in attempts to reconvert Henry of Navarre to Catholicism.32 Montaigne 
worried that, under the Reformers, the liberties of Catholics would be in 
jeopardy.33 
But Montaigne also opposes the execution of heretics, a position that 
was very unusual in his day.34 In the end, he bows to necessity and accepts 
the limits imposed by what is possible.35 “Of Freedom of Conscience” 
concludes with reflections on the emperor Julian and their relevance for 
the situation in France. The emperor Julian used “to kindle the trouble of 
civil dissension, that same recipe of freedom of conscience that our kings 
have just been employing to extinguish it.” On the one hand, it could be 
said that to give factions their freedom is to foster division. On the other 
hand, it could be said that civil unrest softens and relaxes the factions by 
taking away rarity, novelty, and difficulty. “And yet I prefer to think, for 
the reputation of our kings’ piety, that having been unable to do what 
they would, they have pretended to will what they could” (VS671, F509).
Montaigne denounces the use of force and violence in religion.36 In 
the “Apology for Sebond,” especially in his reply to the first objection, 
Montaigne is highly critical of the conduct of those who call themselves 
Christians on both sides of the civil wars of his day. They use religion as 
a pretext for giving vent to their vicious passions, their ambition, hatred, 
and avarice. So also, in “Of Coaches” he describes the extreme cruelty of 
the Spanish conquerors toward the people of the New World and insists 
that cruelty and violence are means entirely contrary to the spread of 
Christian faith. Faith, he says, is not spread by conquest of territory but 
by “possession of men” (VS913, F697). Through his use of the spiritual 
power of the Church, Montaigne takes that possession and makes all men 
his own.




The Character of the Free Individual
Because society is the association of individuals that is free from the con-
trol of government, it therefore serves to limit the power of government. 
In the Essays, Montaigne reveals the new character of the free individual 
that is necessary for the existence of a free society. This is not to say that 
every member of society must or can exhibit this character, but without 
the presence of a sufficient number of such individuals, society cannot 
remain free. This character has already been described in previous chap-
ters as “the self-ordered soul” that is also sociable; as the combination in 
one man of the renunciation of mastery and the love of freedom; and as 
the man who is neither master nor slave. 
Individuality and the Human Condition
Michael Oakeshott locates Montaigne within the tradition of what he 
calls the politics of skepticism. “Montaigne,” Oakeshott says, “has no 
illusions about human power.”1 He describes the changes that were tak-
ing place at the very origins of modernity: “During the late fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, governments all over Europe were, in varying 
degrees, acquiring a power to control the activities and destinies of their 
subjects such as their predecessors had never enjoyed.” Now “the tireless, 
inquisitive, roving hand of government was beginning to be able to reach 
everywhere, accustoming the subject to the notion that nothing should 
be beyond its grasp.” According to Oakeshott, “the most significant of 
all these changes was . . . the gradual disappearance of the intermediate 
authorities which had formerly stood between a then weak central gov-
ernment and the subjects, leaving them naked before a power which in its 
magnitude was becoming comparable to a force of nature.”2 
Not coincidentally, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw “the 
emergence of the human individual in his modern idiom.”3 According 
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to Oakeshott, the medieval condition of life was such that “relation-
ships and allegiances normally sprang from status and rarely extricated 
themselves from the analogy of kinship. For the most part anonymity 
prevailed; individual human character was rarely observed because it was 
not there to be observed. What differentiated one man from another was 
insignificant when compared with what was enjoyed in common as mem-
bers of a group of some sort.”4 The individual “became unmistakable 
when the habit appeared of engaging in activities identified as ‘private’: 
indeed, the appearance of ‘privacy’ in human conduct is the obverse of 
the desuetude of the communal arrangements from which modern indi-
viduality sprang.”5
Oakeshott regards the emergence of this disposition to be an individual 
as “the pre-eminent event in modern European history.”6 Unsurprisingly, 
Montaigne is one of the exemplars of this disposition. “The disposition to 
regard a high degree of individuality in conduct and in belief as the condi-
tion proper to mankind and as the main ingredient of human ‘happiness’ 
had become one of the significant dispositions of modern European char-
acter. What Petrarch did for one century, Montaigne did for another.”7
In The Invention of Autonomy, J. B. Schneewind argues that Mon-
taigne was the first modern philosopher to attempt to articulate “a 
morality of self-governance.”8 Schneewind claims that this morality of 
self-governance is grounded in what he regards as Montaigne’s moral 
skepticism: Montaigne’s “moral skepticism was the starting point of 
modern moral philosophy.”9 The evidence that Schneewind finds for this 
moral skepticism includes Montaigne’s rejection of universal natural laws 
and his acknowledgment of the variety of customs and beliefs among 
different cultures. He concludes that, like the classical Pyrrhonists, Mon-
taigne’s morality involves his adjustment of his beliefs to the demands of 
daily practice. 
I would argue, however, that Montaigne’s understanding of the free-
dom of the individual is not to be identified with the radical autonomy 
of contemporary notions of liberalism or postmodernism. True, Mon-
taigne’s character is that of the “self-ordered” individual, but he abhors 
vices and makes categorical moral judgments, for example, that cruelty 
is the extreme of all vice. Further, although Montaigne does often speak 
in terms of deferring to custom as the ancient skeptics did, he is also 
engaged in a project of reform, as we see in his reordering of the virtues 
and vices, and this reform implies a moral standard. In other words, there 
is a substantive good, the good of free association itself, that is at stake in 
Montaigne’s reformation of the moral life. Thus, there are distinct virtues 
that the individual must cultivate if the substantive good of society is to 
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be enjoyed. At the same time, there are also virtues that he must practice 
if society is to remain an association of free individuals. 
What is at issue in the idea of the free individual can be expressed in 
terms of Constant’s two kinds of freedom: political and personal. Mon-
taigne clearly hates tyranny and wholeheartedly admires the ancients who 
willingly sacrificed their lives for the freedom of their country. On the other 
hand, he loves his own freedom and prefers private life to public occupa-
tions. These two freedoms are, at first glance, incompatible. The second 
seems to refer to a private life that turns people away from any common 
concerns and makes them indifferent to political freedom. If I can pursue 
my own economic goals in freedom, then what do I care whether I do so 
under a tyrannical or a democratic regime? The first seems to require a 
disregard for one’s personal, private satisfaction for the good of the whole 
society. The compatibility of these two kinds of freedom is much more 
than a merely practical problem, for that compatibility implies a radical 
change both in the meaning of citizenship and in the set of virtues that are 
necessary for both personal goodness and life with other men. The recon-
ciliation of personal with societal freedom requires a new character, one 
that is both necessary for the existence of a free society and suited for life 
in a free society. It is not enough to espouse the principles of liberalism, or 
even to place institutional limits on the power of the state and erect safe-
guards for the freedom of individuals. Only a certain kind of character, 
the formation of which depends on a reformation of human nature itself 
on the deepest level, makes freedom possible. Individuality is not simply 
given with “particularity” but must also be achieved: the individual is the 
self-ordered soul. Montaigne is unique among modern philosophers in 
presenting us with such a character.10 
Montaigne’s Marvelous Weakness 
The Essays bring to light a new notion of strength, very different from the 
moral strength of ancient philosophy. Recall that Caesar and Alexander 
actually “toughen” their souls by submitting their violent occupations 
to the practice of everyday life; in the tradition, their strength would be 
shown in their freedom from and transcendence of the needs of everyday 
life. When Montaigne says that his end is domestic and private, he implies 
that the domestic and private is a lower or weaker goal than public ser-
vice or his own glory: “my powers [forces] are inadequate for such a 
purpose.” Although Montaigne is a self-ordered soul, strong in himself, 
he often describes himself as weak. He must use the vocabulary of weak 
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and strong in order to capture what is new in his character. Weakness, 
therefore, is the way he expresses the fact that he acts “without striving,” 
without any internal moral struggle. Weakness is the absence of mastery 
within the soul. 
Montaigne comes into the public in order to reveal himself, but he 
reveals himself not as a powerful conqueror or great mind, but rather 
as weak. In doing so, he emerges into the public without pride. He is the 
possible prince without pride and without mastery. The first thing that 
Montaigne says about himself in the first essay is: “I am marvelously 
weak.” His marvelous weakness is “in the direction of mercy and gentle-
ness,” and this, according to the standard of weak and strong, makes 
him resemble the common people who are moved by compassion because 
they are weak. 
How can his weakness be marvelous? Weakness looks like a failure to 
attain the end or perfection of the human form. According to the Aristo-
telian hierarchy of the moral order, weakness ranks just above vice. Hints 
of this hierarchy, and Montaigne’s assessment of it, come out especially 
in “Of Cruelty.” Montaigne begins with the opinion that “virtue is some-
thing other and more noble than the inclinations toward goodness that 
are born in us” (VS422, F306). Virtue is “more noble” because it involves 
struggle and the difficulty of mastering the passions and appetites. The 
difficult and rare is more noble or higher than the ease of inclination. 
But Montaigne is brought up short by the images of Socrates and Cato: 
he cannot imagine any difficulty or struggle in their practice of virtue 
and, therefore, struggle and mastery cannot be essential to virtue. The 
two-place hierarchy of virtue and goodness has been superseded by the 
three-place hierarchy of perfect habitual virtue, ordinary virtue (virtue 
as moral strength), and the goodness or innocence that belongs to those 
who simply happen to be born with a good temperament and a distaste 
for vice (VS425–26, F310). 
Montaigne locates himself at the lowest place in this three-place hier-
archy: he is very far from that first and most perfect degree of excellence 
in which virtue becomes a habit, and he has given little evidence of the 
second degree of virtue or moral strength. Had he been born with a more 
unruly temperament, things would have gone pitifully with him, for he 
has not experienced much firmness in his soul to withstand passions: “I do 
not know how to foster quarrels and conflict within me” (VS427, F311). 
Comparing himself to Socrates and to Stilpo (both of whom are said to 
have corrected their natural inclinations to vice through discipline and 
study), Montaigne says that he, on the contrary, has whatever good is in 
him simply by the chance of his birth (VS427, F311). Montaigne does not 
158 The Invention of Society
or cannot imitate the loftiness of heroic virtue, and he does not strive for 
the perfection of virtue that would require the rule of reason in the soul. 
There seems to be no distance between what he is and what he should be. 
By locating himself below the category of moral strength, Montaigne 
ranks himself in what looks like Aristotle’s category of moral weakness. 
He calls attention to this by pointing out that the condition of goodness 
or innocence is “so close to imperfection and weakness” that it is difficult 
to distinguish them. Even the names “goodness” and “innocence” suggest 
a certain contempt (VS426, F310). Ordinary language lends itself to rank 
difficulty and mastery higher than goodness and innocence. 
Montaigne’s own goodness and innocence might be confused with 
moral weakness because in “Of Cruelty” he presents his goodness as 
“extreme softness.” Since he attributes his goodness to his natural dis-
position, not to reason, it would be plausible to assume that extreme 
softness must be accompanied by cowardice.11 So, an individual may have 
a natural inclination to one or another virtue, but not to all the virtues, 
because a natural disposition that inclines to one virtue also inclines to 
the contrary of another virtue. Therefore, a man who is naturally inclined 
to courage will also be naturally inclined to cruelty. Consistency of action 
requires the direction of the inclinations by reason to a single end. Looked 
at from the perspective of the tradition, Montaigne’s goodness is just an 
impossible combination of natural inclinations. 
But the picture of Montaigne’s character that emerges in the Essays 
is not one of cowardice. On the contrary, he is not afraid of death. The 
gesture of laying down his arms is the risk of his life. In “Cowardice, 
Mother of Cruelty,” he shows clearly that he hates cowardice and asso-
ciates it with the character of the tyrant. His own openness, frankness, 
and honesty in dealing with the princes with whom he negotiates require 
courage, as he himself says. In “Of Physiognomy,” the stories he relates 
about when he was captured and held for ransom and the threatened 
invasion of his house by enemy troops reveal a man whose openness is 
courageous. He hates especially the practice of dissimulation, because it 
originates in cowardice (VS647, F491).
Montaigne uses the traditional language of weakness and imperfection 
but displays a moral possibility that cannot be captured by the traditional 
moral categories. Goodness and innocence are “so close” to weakness 
and imperfection that even their names are “almost” terms of contempt. 
Montaigne has gone outside the ancient hierarchy to a position that, from 
the perspective of that hierarchy, looks like weakness. In fact, however, 
he is not holding himself accountable to that hierarchy but rather to an 
entirely new moral vision.
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The distinction between classical virtue and Montaigne’s notion of 
goodness can be seen in his description of Cato the Younger, one of 
his two exemplars of perfect virtue. Those who attribute Cato’s death 
to ambition and the desire for glory are, he says, fools (VS231, F171). 
Rather, Cato acted for the nobility and beauty of the act itself and took 
great pleasure in it. Montaigne says: “I go so far in that belief that I begin 
to doubt whether he would have wanted to be deprived of the occasion 
for so fine an exploit. And if his goodness [la bonté], which made him 
embrace the public advantage [les commoditez publiques] more than his 
own, did not hold me in check, I should easily fall into this opinion, that 
he was grateful to fortune for having put his virtue to so beautiful a test 
and for having favored that brigand [Caesar] in treading underfoot the 
ancient liberty of his country” (VS424, F309). Montaigne here associates 
virtue with personal perfection, whereas he associates goodness with the 
public advantage, that is, the freedom of the country. 
In “By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End” Montaigne pres-
ents himself as similar to the weak in that he is compassionate and easily 
moved. But he is also similar both to the strong princes on account of 
his capacity for esteem and to the Stoic philosophers on account of 
his consistency. His compassion is not due to fear for himself. He dis-
plays a character that includes both weak and strong but that is also 
not reducible to weak and strong. That is, his character transcends those 
traditional categories, for his character is not due to Aristotelian virtue 
but to his judgment. In terms of the traditional categories, his character 
is an impossible combination of compassion and courage for which the 
name is generosity. The emergence of goodness and innocence from their 
hiddenness into the public effects a new kind of virtue, a virtue without 
pride and mastery. 
The Ease of Virtue
In “Of the Education of Children” Montaigne says that he has little to 
offer in the way of advice concerning this most difficult topic apart from 
“this new lesson,” the ease of virtue (VS162, F120). The young man’s 
tutor “will teach him this new lesson, that the value and the height of 
true virtue lies in the ease, utility, and pleasure of its practice, which is 
so far from being difficult that children can master it as well as men, the 
simple as well as the subtle. Virtue’s tool is moderation [le reglement], not 
strength. Socrates, her prime favorite, deliberately gives up his strength, 
to slip into the naturalness and ease of her gait” (VS162, F120, emphasis 
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added). Self-regulation, then, is not the same as self-mastery. Socrates 
deliberately gives up his strength so that his virtue is like the virtue of the 
simple; he does not, in other words, seek the virtue of the noble or the 
warrior. In this, Socrates demonstrates, for Montaigne, that the ease of 
virtue means there is no superior virtue of the nobility. Hence, “you can 
tie up all moral philosophy with a common and private life just as well as 
with a life of richer stuff” (VS805, F611). 
The fact that Montaigne takes up his “new lesson” in this particular 
essay shows that the ease of virtue has to do with judgment, not with the 
rule of reason over the passions: the single goal of education, he says, is 
the formation of judgment. Socrates deliberately gives up his strength in 
order to slip into the ease of virtue: he judges the thing itself, brings it 
down, subjects it to himself, and makes it his own.
Why does Montaigne reject the classical idea of virtue as reason’s mas-
tery of the passions? As we saw in the discussion of “By Diverse Means 
we Arrive at the Same End,” Aristotle’s moral teaching proved to be inef-
fective for his pupil, Alexander the Great, at least with respect to the 
control of his anger and desire for revenge. Quintus Curtius reports that 
Alexander went into a “frenzy,”12 and Montaigne tells us that Alexander’s 
anger turned to rage in the confrontation with Betis so that Alexander 
treats his captive with extreme cruelty. This, I believe, is an instance of 
what Montaigne calls “the ravishment of reason.” 
In “Of Cruelty” Montaigne wanders into a “digression” immediately 
after his assertion that cruelty is the extreme of all vices. “Those who 
have to combat sensual pleasure like to use this argument to show that it 
is wholly vicious and unreasonable: that when it is at its greatest pitch it 
masters us to such an extent that reason can have no access. And they cite 
the experience of it that we feel in intercourse with women, . . . where it 
seems to them that the pleasure transports us so far beyond ourselves that 
our reason could not possibly then perform its function, being all crip-
pled and ravished away in pleasure” (VS429–30, F313).13 Montaigne, of 
course, does not simply accept this common judgment, for his own expe-
rience shows otherwise: “I know that it is possible to master the onset of 
this pleasure.” It is possible to “cast our soul back to other thoughts at 
this very instant.” In fact, his own experience leads him to say: “I do not 
take it for a miracle . . . or for an extremely difficult thing, to spend entire 
nights with every opportunity and in all freedom, with a long-desired 
mistress, keeping the faith one has pledged to her, to be content with 
kisses and simple contacts” (VS430, F313). 
With respect to the ravishment of reason, Montaigne says: “I think the 
example of the chase would be more appropriate. Even as there is less 
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pleasure in it, so there is more transport and surprise, whereby our reason, 
stunned, loses the leisure to prepare and brace itself against it, when after 
a long quest the beast starts up suddenly and appears in a place where per-
haps we were least expecting it. This shock, and the ardor of the hue and 
cry, strike us so that it would be hard for those who love this sort of hunt 
to withdraw their thought elsewhere at that point” (VS430, F313–14). 
Montaigne himself does not love the hunt. “Natures that are bloodthirsty 
toward animals give proof of a natural propensity toward cruelty” (VS433, 
F316). Indeed, he cannot even bear to hear the scream of the hare in the 
teeth of his dogs. “The chase is a violent pleasure” (VS429, F313). 
The civil wars of Montaigne’s day have seen incredible examples of 
cruelty, unsurpassed even by those recorded in the ancient histories: “We 
experience this,” he says, “every day. But that has not reconciled me to 
it at all. I could hardly be convinced, until I saw it, that there were souls 
so monstrous that they would commit murder for the mere pleasure of 
it . . . for the sole purpose of enjoying the pleasing spectacle of the piti-
ful gestures and movements, the lamentable groans and cries, of a man 
dying in anguish. For that is the uttermost point that cruelty can attain” 
(VS432, F315–16). 
Reason is therefore unreliable and ineffective in ruling the passions 
because reason can be ravished away. Montaigne says that, while Plato 
fears pleasure and pain because they nail the soul to the body, he him-
self fears extreme pleasure and pain because they separate the soul from 
the body. Reason becomes “detached,” and thus cruel and violent. In the 
example of the chase, reason is ravished away in the contemplation of 
the spectacle. The extreme of cruelty is the contemplative pleasure of the 
spectacle of the pain and despair of another human being who is entirely 
in our power. The ravishment of reason as it contemplates the suffer-
ing of another human being shows that this ecstatic beholding separates 
the soul from the body, dissociates us from our common humanity, and 
brings about the loss of all sympathy. 
Montaigne would not have believed such extreme cruelty possible if he 
had not seen it with his own eyes, if he had not experienced it. It is expe-
rience, not reason, that instructs him in this. Although he has seen many 
examples of cruelty, he has not become accustomed to it: it always hor-
rifies him. “I cruelly hate cruelty, both by nature and by judgment, as the 
extreme of all vices” (VS429, F313). That he cruelly hates cruelty shows 
that he has made it his own, not through the experience of being cruel, 
but through his judgment, which subjects reason to the good. Montaigne 
substitutes “a settled inclination of judgment” for the rule of reason in 
the soul.
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In the examples of both his encounter with his mistress and the chase, 
Montaigne refers to “turning our thoughts elsewhere” or “back” at the 
instant of pleasure. He does not specify where thought is or should be 
directed. Turning one’s thoughts elsewhere would seem to mean turning 
one’s thoughts to the good. Reason, then, is not ravished away to the 
good; it is ravished away in the pleasure of mastery. In the encounter 
with his mistress, he mentions that he keeps faith with her: he keeps the 
promise he has made to her. He will not use force and violence to impose 
his will on her. The chase, he says, is more difficult: one’s reason is rav-
ished away by surprise, and the individual is caught up in the crowd. 
One “loses the leisure” to turn one’s thoughts elsewhere. The chase is the 
mastery of the animal, not of another human being. But that is precisely, 
according to the tradition, what reason is supposed to do: master the ani-
mal within us. The example of the chase shows that the attempt to master 
the animal within us—that is, to master our passions—by force of reason 
lends itself to the ravishment of reason and the acceptability of cruelty, 
force, and violence.14 
Montaigne does not separate the moral from the contemplative. 
Notice, the language that he uses to talk about the chase is associated 
with philosophy: surprise, leisure, the pleasure of the spectacle. Cruelty 
is a contemplative vice. Montaigne’s reordering of the vices reflects his 
conviction that those which are more bodily are in fact less deadly than 
“the passions that are all in the soul” (VS729, F551). These more danger-
ous vices conflict more with society. Montaigne gives us two descriptions 
of the practice of his easy virtue: “unlearning evil” and “training the 
disposition.” In “Of Cruelty” he explains his own natural goodness (as 
distinguished from virtue as struggle) in terms of Antisthenes’s under-
standing of the best apprenticeship for virtue: “To unlearn evil” (VS428, 
F311). Throughout the Essays, he presents his own weak way of com-
ing to terms with the accidents of life and with the occasions that force 
us to confront evil. In “Of Husbanding Your Will” he explains that his 
way involves avoiding such occasions whenever possible. Some philoso-
phers have taken another way: they have not feared to seek out trials and 
test their powers of endurance in wrestling with misfortunes. But, Mon-
taigne says, “Let us not tackle these examples; we would not come up to 
them. . . . For our common souls there is too much effort and harshness in 
that. . . . We little men must flee the storm from farther away; we must try 
to avoid feeling it, not try to endure it” (VS1015, F777). Later in the same 
essay, he writes: “Passions are as easy for me to avoid as they are hard 
for me to moderate. . . . He who cannot attain that noble impassibility of 
the Stoics, let him take refuge in the bosom of this plebeian stupidity of 
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mine. What those men did by virtue, I train myself to do by disposition” 
(VS1019–20, F780). 
Although training the disposition sounds much like the habituation 
to virtue described by Aristotle, Montaigne is here in fact distinguishing 
between the two: his reform deliberately adopts a disposition of “plebian 
stupidity” rather than struggling to master his passions in the manner of 
the strong. However, there are instances when he does speak in terms of a 
kind of mastery, for example, in his encounter with his mistress and also in 
his description of his temptations to ambition (VS992, F759). Yet he does 
not fit into Aristotle’s categories of moral strength and moral weakness 
(NE. 7. 2–10, 1145b8–1152a35). For example, even though he presents 
himself as weak, he tells us in “Of Repentance” that he does not experi-
ence remorse as the morally weak man does. His description of mastery in 
the examples mentioned above seems to include no experience of struggle. 
Thus, training the disposition and attaining a settled inclination of judg-
ment points to a standard of moral virtue that is different from Aristotle’s. 
“Unlearning evil” and “training the disposition” both show that natu-
ralness can be deliberately acquired. So, for example, he asks whether 
the gentleness of Epaminondas’s disposition is the result of nature or art. 
The disposition, for Montaigne, is the temperament one is born with; it is 
given by nature. Montaigne’s reform is so difficult and so deep because it 
is the reform of nature itself. He makes his disposition natural: he reorigi-
nates his disposition. (This is precisely what was discussed in chapter 3 
concerning the way he judges natural inclinations, choosing the natural 
inclinations to which his judgment conforms.) 
If virtue is not the mastery of the passions, how then does Montaigne 
propose to deal with the passions? Passions, he says, are easy for him to 
avoid. “Those who say that they have got the better of their vindictive 
passion or of some other kind of painful passion often tell the truth as 
things are, but not as they were. They speak to us when the causes of 
their error have been fostered and developed by themselves. But go back 
further, call these causes back to their beginning; there you will take them 
unprovided. Do they expect their fault to be lesser for being older, and 
the sequel of an unjust beginning to be just?” (VS1016, F777). Since the 
beginnings of all things are weak, he confronts the passions in their weak 
beginnings rather than test himself against them when they have reached 
their height. “If each man watched closely the effects and circumstances 
of the passions that dominate him, as I have done with the ones I have 
fallen prey to, he would see them coming and would check their impetu-
osity and course a bit. They do not always leap at our throats at a single 
bound; there are threats and degrees” (VS 1074, F822–23). Stopping the 
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passion in its beginnings makes it possible to avoid the struggle between 
reason and passion.15 Unlike the Stoics, Montaigne does feel the passions. 
His attitude toward them is not a matter of mastering them by the force 
of reason but of choosing the passions that he allows himself to feel and 
those that he wants to avoid. 
Most of Montaigne’s examples of passions to be avoided have to do 
with the violent passions associated with revenge. In fact, the first example 
of virtue as struggle and mastery in “Of Cruelty” concerns the overcom-
ing of the desire for revenge. Comparing goodness to the more noble 
virtue, he writes: “He who through a natural mildness and easygoingness 
should despise injuries received would do a very fine and praiseworthy 
thing; but he who, outraged and stung to the quick by an injury, should 
arm himself with the arms of reason against this furious appetite for 
vengeance, and after a great conflict should finally master it, would with-
out doubt do much more.” The former should be called “good” and the 
latter “virtuous” (VS422, F307). This “natural” mildness and easygoing-
ness—the good—can actually be deliberately acquired through training 
the disposition, that is, through deliberately giving up one’s strength and 
becoming “marvelously weak.” 
Montaigne’s new lesson, the ease of virtue, therefore amounts to a 
new understanding of what virtue is, a new ordering of the virtues and 
vices, and a transformation of classical virtue. The new foundation for 
the virtues is goodness rather than strength and truth rather than rea-
son. Montaigne’s new character—the self-ordered soul that is sociable, 
the combination of the renunciation of mastery and the love of freedom, 
the man who is neither master nor slave—is expressed in terms of the two 
virtues of generosity and integrity. 
Generosity 
In the sixteenth century, “generosity” referred to the virtue of the nobility 
and bore the connotations of valor and magnanimity belonging to that 
class. Generosity, then, was associated with “good birth”: the word itself 
comes from the Latin genus, meaning “family.” Montaigne uses the term 
that way in “By Diverse Means We Arrive at the Same End” when he says 
that, in the “less generous souls” of the people, astonishment can have 
the same effect that esteem has in the souls of the nobility. However, in 
accordance with his reformation of the nobility, the meaning of generos-
ity is transformed and becomes a possibility for all men, because natural 
origins are not determinative. 
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The man who emerges from obscurity wants to be seen, to reveal him-
self, in his individuality and his superiority. He emerges in his pride and 
wants to be master. But Montaigne astonishes us. He removes the desire 
for mastery from his self-revelation. Instead, the desire that seizes him to 
reveal himself in public is generosity; and the Essays are that uncalculated 
gesture of generosity. Generosity is produced out of himself. 
Montaigne says: “If my heart is not great enough, it is compensat-
ingly open, and it orders me boldly to publish its weakness” (VS917, 
F700). Aristotelian magnanimity is greatness of soul (NE. 4.3, 1123a35–
1125a35). Openness compensates for greatness: classical magnanimity 
has become generosity. “A generous heart should not belie its thoughts; it 
wants to reveal itself even to its inmost depths. There everything is good, 
or at least everything is human” (VS647, F491).16 Generosity is the more 
human possibility. Montaigne’s natural goodness becomes the virtue of 
generosity through judgment. 
Descartes’s treatment of generosity in the Passions of the Soul can help 
us to understand the distinction between magnanimity and generosity. 
“There is, it seems, no virtue so dependent on good birth as the virtue 
[generosity] which causes us to esteem ourselves in accordance with our 
true value, and it is easy to believe that the souls which God puts into our 
bodies are not all equally noble and strong (which is why, following the 
vernacular, I have called this virtue ‘generosity’ rather than ‘magnanim-
ity’, a term used in the Schools, where this virtue is not well known). It 
is certain, however, that a good upbringing is a great help in correcting 
defects of birth.” Descartes calls this virtue generosity rather than magna-
nimity because our souls are not all equally noble and strong by birth or 
by nature. He thereby suggests that anyone, whether naturally weak or 
strong, can acquire this virtue. Anyone can change his natural disposition 
by correcting the defects of his birth. But how can this change be brought 
about? “Moreover, if we occupy ourselves frequently in considering the 
nature of free will and the many advantages which proceed from a firm 
resolution to make good use of it—while also considering, on the other 
hand, the many vain and useless cares which trouble ambitious people—
we may arouse the passion of generosity in ourselves and then acquire the 
virtue. Since this virtue is, as it were, the key to all the other virtues and a 
general remedy for every disorder of the passions, it seems to me that this 
consideration deserves serious attention.”17 In his discussion of “how gen-
erosity may be acquired,” Descartes writes: “It should be noted that what 
we commonly call ‘virtues’ are habits in the soul which dispose it to have 
certain thoughts: though different from the thoughts, these habits can 
produce them and in turn can be produced by them.” Habits can produce 
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thoughts, and thoughts can produce habits. The virtues are thus “pro-
duced” in the soul by its thoughts. This is a very different account of how 
the virtues are acquired from Aristotle’s account, which involves mastery 
and moderation of the passions and which depends upon the practice of 
performing virtuous actions by striving for perfection as the end. 
Here, it seems, we have a picture of Montaigne’s “weak way.” We can 
acquire the virtue by arousing the passion in ourselves. We can “unlearn” 
the defects of birth and train the disposition by thinking about the nature 
of free will. Generosity has to do with judgment: classical, Aristotelian 
magnanimity becomes generosity on account of the generous man’s judg-
ment of and relation to the weak and the strong. Descartes’s description 
of generosity fits well with Montaigne’s practice of judgment. True gener-
osity consists in the knowledge that nothing belongs to us but the freedom 
of the will and in the resolution to undertake and carry out whatever we 
judge to be best.18 
Generosity, then, causes us to esteem ourselves in accordance with our 
true value but it also has to do with our judgment of others. The opposite 
of esteem is contempt, and Montaigne has contempt for no one precisely 
because generosity prevents us from having such contempt: “Those who 
possess this knowledge and this feeling about themselves readily come to 
believe that any other person can have the same knowledge and feeling 
about himself, because this involves nothing which depends on someone 
else. That is why such people never have contempt for anyone. Although 
they often see others do wrong in ways that show up their weakness, 
they are nevertheless more inclined to excuse than to blame them and to 
regard such wrong-doing as due rather to lack of knowledge than to lack 
of a virtuous will. . . . They suppose [a virtuous will] also to be present, 
or at least capable of being present, in every other person.”19 Montaigne 
has esteem for the strong and compassion, not contempt, for the weak. 
He has contempt and hatred for no man, but only for vice. Again, in Des-
cartes’s words: “we have contempt solely for vices.”20 
Magnanimity implies hierarchy, whereas generosity’s openness sug-
gests a disposition toward equality. The most explicit act of generosity 
is self-revelation, specifically the revelation of one’s thoughts, not one’s 
deeds. Unlike Aristotle’s magnanimous man, Montaigne talks about him-
self but has no great deeds to tell.21 Whereas Aristotle’s magnanimous 
man is justifiably proud, Montaigne’s self-revelation is the cure for pride. 
Generosity is thus the moralization of the desire for glory.
Generosity assumes and accepts the imperfection of our condition. As 
Oakeshott says of the generous man, he is “not at all without imperfec-
tions and is not deceived about himself” but is also proud enough to be 
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spared the sorrow of his imperfections and the illusion of his achieve-
ments. This is a new kind of pride and a new kind of humility. Generosity 
assumes the need for forgiveness, for judging the actions of others in the 
most favorable light. It is not the worthiness or perfection of others that 
rationally justifies the good man’s generosity, but rather the realization 
that no other human being is either higher or lower than himself. 
This relationship of the generous man to imperfection begins to make 
sense of the fact that the same man is also “careless” or nonchalant. 
Oakeshott’s generous man is “negligent . . . but perhaps with a touch of 
careless heroism about him.” This description captures the freedom of 
generosity. To be wholly good is to be so “without law, without reason, 
without example.” Nothing is calculated. The generous man seeks noth-
ing for himself in his actions. Goodness, then, is a spontaneity of the will. 
In the case of Oakeshott’s carelessly heroic man, generosity manifests 
itself in action that is free, for he does not act out of any need or lack of 
the good. This changes the meaning of human agency: it is not acting for 
an end, but producing out of itself. 
Integrity
In his discussion of “the best city” Aristotle writes: “one ought not even 
consider that a citizen belongs to himself, but rather that all belong to the 
city; for each individual is a part of the city” (Pol. 8.1, 1337a27). Mon-
taigne, on the other hand, says that “the greatest thing in the world is to 
know how to belong to oneself” (VS242, F178). 
Knowing how to belong to oneself is what might be called “integ-
rity,” the character that is necessary for freedom of judgment. Integrity 
is about the free choice of possibilities rather than the direction of all of 
one’s actions to a single end. Yet it is nevertheless a kind of consistency. 
Montaigne’s consistency cannot be captured in the rules of any school of 
philosophy: it is a “natural movement . . . a picture of liberty and license 
so constant and inflexible” (VS795, F603). There is no notion of perfec-
tion, no common good, that can guide his choices. 
Since the common good can serve as the pretext for the actions of 
wicked men, integrity is the virtue that is most necessary for a kind of 
association not defined by the common good: integrity, unlike the com-
mon good, is often about what one refuses to do.22 It is the character that 
is proper to life in a free society. In Enjoyment: The Moral Significance 
of Styles of Life, John Kekes spells out the connection between integrity 
and independent judgment.23 Integrity is a way of life “that reflects one’s 
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individuality.”24 It is the virtue of the “self-ordered soul” whose character 
is such that he can be left free in his judgments. 
When Oakeshott portrays the character of the man whose pride has 
been “moralized” and who is willing to risk everything in the gesture 
of laying down his arms, he describes him as a man of careless heroism 
“who (in Montaigne’s phrase) ‘knows how to belong to himself,’ and 
who, if fortune turned out so, would feel no shame in the epitaph: ‘Par 
delicatesse/ J’ai perdu ma vie.’ ”25 If generosity is the transformation of 
Montaigne’s natural goodness into virtue, integrity is the transformation 
of his natural innocence into virtue. In The Morality of Pluralism, Kekes 
distinguishes between pre-reflective and reflective innocence. Both are 
characterized by simplicity, spontaneity, and the absence of calculation.26 
Reflective innocence involves the realization that we may fail.27 Thus, the 
careless heroism of the man who knows how to belong to himself is a 
carelessness about the success of his actions. He is without striving. 
Belonging to oneself, or integrity, has the sense of wholeness and 
completeness. But this is a very different kind of completeness from the 
perfection of classical moral virtue. The good, for Montaigne, is not an 
end but a possession or property of the individual. He has made the good 
itself his own through judgment. He is what he ought to be. That is why 
he presents himself as nonchalant and “without striving.” He does not 
need to look outside himself for the good. Therefore, the wholeness and 
completeness of the man of integrity is his independence from the city: 
he is not completed and perfected in relation to the common good but by 
his own judgment. 
Limited and Conditional Allegiance: 
Separating the Man from the Citizen
The wholeness and completeness of the man of integrity, his indepen-
dence from a common good, means that his allegiance to his country is 
not absolute but conditional and limited. For Aristotle, the domestic and 
private is incomplete and imperfect for it finds its perfection only in the 
political. Montaigne’s end, however, is domestic and private. All of moral 
philosophy can be expressed in terms of a humble, private, and common 
life. Montaigne says: “Political philosophy may condemn, for all I care, 
the meanness and sterility of my occupation. . . . I am of the opinion that 
the most honorable occupation is to serve the public and to be useful to 
many. . . . For my part, I stay out of it; partly out of conscience, . . . partly 
out of laziness” (VS952, F727). That he stays out of politics on account 
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of his conscience shows that he does not regard the political realm as the 
place for the exercise of moral excellence but rather as a threat to his 
innocence. 
It is true, of course, that Montaigne did participate in political life: he 
served two terms as mayor of Bordeaux and acted as negotiator between 
the Catholic and Protestant princes during the civil wars. His accounts of 
this public service are given in terms of the principle that the judgment 
of the man must always be above his power as a ruler. That is, he always 
keeps the private man separate from the public role. Hence, the private 
retains its primacy.28
Montaigne contrasts his weakness with the strength of those like Cato 
whose country “possessed and commanded their entire will” (F777, 
VS1015). He counsels this weak way with respect to the performance of 
those vicious actions that are necessary for the survival of one’s country. 
If such actions become “excusable” because of necessity, “we still must 
let this part be played by the more vigorous and less fearful citizens, who 
sacrifice their honor and their conscience, as those ancients sacrificed 
their life, for the good [salut] of their country” (VS791, F600; see also 
VS1015, F777). Montaigne’s will, honor, and conscience, then, are not 
entirely bound to his country. 
In “Of Husbanding Your Will” he gives an account of his service as 
mayor of Bordeaux, an office that he assumed only with reluctance, but 
which he must have fulfilled with great diligence since he was elected to 
a second term. Montaigne believes that he was elected because of the 
high regard in which his father was held for his service as mayor. Mon-
taigne’s father seems to have identified the theological virtue of charity 
with public service. But the son regards public service as a temptation to 
the vice of ambition and as a threat to his freedom: “By the little I have 
essayed myself in that profession, I am just that much disgusted with it. I 
sometimes feel rising in my soul the fumes of certain temptations toward 
ambition, but I stiffen and hold firm against them. . . . Freedom and lazi-
ness, which are my ruling qualities, are qualities diametrically opposite to 
that trade” (VS992, F759). Montaigne’s weak way, then, is presented as 
a break with the classical tradition in which one’s entire will belonged to 
one’s country because the common good is the good of each. 
Montaigne does not seek his own good in politics, for it is the realm 
of mastery and slavery and not of the common good. His freedom is the 
condition of being “neither master nor slave.” In order to be a master, 
one must be willing to be a slave, because both involve seeking one’s 
own good in rule. As Socrates points out in his portrait of the tyrant 
in the Republic, the tyrant cannot tolerate any man who is not servile. 
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Montaigne describes his non-servile attitude with respect to “the great, 
toward whom lack of submission is the ultimate offense, and who are 
rough on any righteousness that is aware of itself and does not feel itself 
to be abject, humble, and suppliant. I have often bumped myself on that 
pillar” (VS1045, F799). The man who seeks his good in politics “must 
live not so much according to himself as according to others, not accord-
ing to what he proposes to himself but according to what others propose 
to him” (VS991, F758). According to Kekes, Montaigne “acknowledged 
the need to participate in public life, but set a limit beyond which he 
would not go. This formed his remarkably independent manner.”29 Mon-
taigne’s attitude toward politics is one of “detachment” and the absence 
of “enthusiasm.”30
He is loyal to the ancient laws and to the side of the king and the 
Church in the civil wars, willing to risk his life and all his possessions, 
but Montaigne’s allegiance to France is not absolute. “He who desires the 
good of his country as I do, without getting ulcers and growing thin over 
it, will be displeased, but not stunned, to see it threatened either with ruin 
or with conditions of survival no less ruinous” (VS1016, F777–78). He 
places his own freedom above his attachment to his country: “I am so 
sick for freedom, that if anyone should forbid me access to some corner 
of the Indies, I should live distinctly less comfortably. . . . If [the laws] that 
I serve threatened even the tip of my finger, I should instantly go and find 
others, wherever it might be” (VS1072, F820–21). 
Montaigne’s service as advisor to princes is not due to any private 
duty, or to anything that he owes to the prince or seeks to obtain from 
the prince. Therefore, he can describe his service as free: “I love a private 
life because it is by my own choice that I love it, not because of unfit-
ness for public life, which is perhaps just as well suited to my nature. 
I serve my prince more gaily because I do so by the free choice of my 
judgment and my reason, without personal obligation, and because I am 
not thrown back on his service and constrained to it by being unaccept-
able and unwelcome to every other party” (VS988, F756). His will is free 
because he does not seek his own interest. “Moreover, I am not pressed 
by any passion either of hate or of love toward the great, nor is my will 
bound by personal injury or obligation. I look upon our kings simply 
with a legitimate and civic affection, which is neither moved nor removed 
by private interest” (VS792, F601). 
In his account of his role as negotiator between princes, Montaigne 
says that he frankly tells the prince the limits of what he will do in his 
service. He will not lie, dissimulate, or betray any man. “This whole pro-
cedure of mine is just a bit dissonant from our ways. . . . Innocence itself 
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could neither negotiate among us without dissimulation nor bargain 
without lying. And so public occupations are by no means my quarry; 
what my profession requires, I perform in the most private manner that I 
can” (VS795, F603). 
Montaigne’s service to the prince is also limited by the demands of his 
conscience. There are princes, he says, “who do not accept men halfway 
and scorn limited and conditional services. There is no remedy. I frankly 
tell them my limits. For a slave I must be only to reason, and even that I 
can scarcely manage. And they too are wrong to demand of a free man 
the same subjection and obligation to their service as they demand of a 
man whom they have made and bought, or whose fortune is particularly 
and expressly attached to theirs” (VS794, F603). He would not, he says, 
betray a private person for the prince (VS792, F600). He does “not want 
to be considered either so affectionate or so loyal a servant as to be found 
fit to betray anyone” (VS794, F603). Nor will he knowingly lie for the 
prince, so that if he is to serve as an instrument of deceit, “at least let it 
be with a clear conscience” (VS794, F603). The actions of those who 
betray and lie for the king are not only low, but “also prostitute [their] 
conscience” (VS799, F606).
Epaminondas held that a man cannot be a good man, however good 
a citizen he may be, if he does not spare his friend when confronted in 
battle. Integrity separates the man from the citizen. As the separation of 
the man from the prince is the separation of the man from mastery, so the 
separation of the man from the citizen is the separation of the man from 
servitude. In his account of the limits of what he will do for the prince, 
Montaigne places his private duty, his duty to private individuals, above 
his obligations to the prince. Generosity and integrity have something of 
the appearance of the irrational, the whimsical, or the capricious: they 
are uncalculating and careless of consequences. Oakeshott refers to the 
“negligence” and the “careless heroism” of the generous man. Generosity 
and integrity have this quality because they are the virtues of an imperfect 
human being in an imperfect world. 
Thus, Montaigne lives in the world as it is given to him. Nietzsche takes 
note of this and says of Montaigne: “If my task were to make myself at 
home on this earth, it is to him that I would cleave.”31 In “Of Husbanding 
Your Will” Montaigne writes: “We must live in the world and make the 
most of it such as we find it” (VS1012, F774). He has no philosophical or 
religious contempt for this world. Of his negligence about his own affairs 
he writes: “This is not a philosophical scorn for transitory and mundane 
things; my taste is not so refined, and I value them at least at their worth” 
(VS953, F728). He is both attached to this world, valuing it for what it is 
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worth, and detached from it because it is not all that there is: “Never did 
a man prepare to leave the world more utterly and completely, nor detach 
himself from it more universally, than I propose to do” (VS88–89, F61). 
What does it mean to judge the world as it is and to value transitory and 
mundane things for what they are worth? For Montaigne it means living 
in the attitude of nonchalance.32 The attitude of nonchalance is the joyful 
acceptance of imperfection. The judgment that this world is not ultimate 
makes possible his carelessness about his own life: “I want a man to act, 
and to prolong the functions of life as long as he can; and I want death 
to find me planting my cabbages, but careless [nonchalant] of death, and 
still more of my unfinished [imparfait] garden” (VS89, F62). Noncha-
lance is therefore indistinguishable from hope.
Society as the Limit on the Power of the Prince
Friendship
Montaigne is one of the very few modern philosophers for whom friend-
ship is a fundamental philosophical concern. Generosity and integrity 
coincide for him in the perfection of friendship. Although his essay on 
friendship refers to many classical tropes, Montaigne says that his unique 
friendship with La Boétie surpasses all of the ancient categories of friend-
ship (VS184, F136). The discourses that antiquity has left on this subject 
seem weak to him when compared with his sentiments, and the facts 
“surpass even the precepts of philosophy” (VS192, F143). Their friend-
ship is a “mystery” (VS189, F140) and a “miracle” (VS191, F142).
Montaigne’s friendship with La Boétie surpasses the classical catego-
ries of friendship and the precepts of philosophy because it is due to the 
will: “Our free will has no product more properly its own than affection 
and friendship” (VS185, F137). Their friendship is the “complete fusion 
of [their] wills” (VS190, F141). Thus, “the springs of action” are “per-
fectly clean and true” (VS192, F142). The will produces friendship. In his 
Divine and Poetic Freedom, Ullrich Langer notices a strange impression 
that is conveyed in “Of Friendship.” Montaigne, he says, sets out a con-
ventional, classical view of friendship in describing his relationship with 
La Boétie. But then something else enters the picture: rather than depict 
their relationship as voluntary, Montaigne “removes any motivation.”33 
Langer’s observation here gives us an especially vivid example of the ease 
of Montaigne’s action. It is “without striving” even when it is the most 
perfect act of the will. There is no calculation, no deliberation, no reason 
that can be given for their union: “If you press me to tell why I loved him, 
The Character of the Free Individual 173
I feel that this cannot be expressed, except by answering: Because it was 
he, because it was I” (VS188, F139).34 Choice is not deliberation but judg-
ment. Deliberation is directed to an end, in particular, to a naturally given 
end. Judgment is the free production of the will, and friendship shows 
that a man has the complete disposition of his will. 
The spontaneous self-communication of friendship is the most perfect 
act of freedom. Friendship is “the perfection of society” (VS184, F136), 
and there is in it no element of mastery. But since this complete fusion 
of wills cannot be duplicated (VS191, F141), society can only ever be an 
imperfect form of friendship. Montaigne refers to “the acquaintanceships 
and familiarities formed by some chance or convenience, by means of 
which our souls are bound to each other” (VS188, F139). He also recog-
nizes the demands of private obligation such as those between father and 
son. These too are kinds of friendship although they are less free: “the 
more they are friendships which law and natural obligation impose on us, 
the less of our choice and free will there is in them” (VS185, F137). If nat-
ural obligation is less free than perfect friendship, then perfect friendship 
is an expression of a kind of freedom that actually transcends the natural. 
In “Of Friendship” many of the friendships of antiquity are presented 
as examples of opposition to tyranny. Tyrants have no friends and cannot 
tolerate the friendships of their subjects because they are always suspi-
cious of conspiracies. Describing the friendship of Caius Blossius and 
Tiberius Gracchus, who were condemned for conspiracy by the Roman 
consuls, Montaigne says that “they were friends more than citizens, 
friends [to each other] more than friends or enemies of their country” 
(VS189, F140). 
In On Voluntary Servitude, Etienne de La Boétie defends friendship 
against the tyrant’s suspicions: “Indeed, it is certain that the tyrant is 
never loved, nor does he love. Friendship is a sacred word; it is a holy 
thing. It never occurs except between honorable people, and it arises only 
from mutual esteem. It maintains itself not so much by means of good 
turns as by a good life. What renders a friend assured of the other is 
the knowledge of his integrity. The guarantees he has from him are his 
good nature, faith, and constancy. There cannot be friendship where there 
is cruelty, where there is disloyalty, where there is injustice. Among the 
wicked when they assemble, there is a plot, not companionship. They do 
not provide for one another, but fear one another. They are not friends 
but accomplices. Yet even if it were not impossible to befriend a tyrant, 
it would still be hard to find in a tyrant a reliable love, because being 
above all [other people], and not having any peer, he is already beyond 
the bounds of friendship, which has its true foundation in equality.”35 
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It is important to note that perfect friendship is not a relationship of 
dependence: it is not based on need but is entirely free. “In this noble 
relationship, services and benefits, on which other friendships feed, do 
not even deserve to be taken into account; the reason for this is the com-
plete fusion of our wills . . . the union of such friends, being truly perfect, 
makes them lose the sense of such duties, and hate and banish from 
between them these words of separation and distinction: benefit, obliga-
tion, gratitude, request, thanks, and the like. Everything actually being in 
common between them—wills, thoughts, judgments, goods, wives, chil-
dren, honor, and life. . . . they can neither lend nor give anything to each 
other” (VS190, F140–41).
Montaigne surpasses “all modern examples” in his independence from 
others. “Those who know me, both above and below me, know whether 
they have ever seen a man less demanding of others. If I surpass all mod-
ern examples in this respect, it is no great wonder, for so many parts 
of my character contribute to it,” especially “my very favorite qualities, 
idleness and freedom” (VS969, F740–41). With respect to indebtedness 
to others, he says: “I see no one freer and less indebted than I am up to 
this point. . . . There is no one who is more absolutely clear of any others: 
the gifts of princes are to me unknown [adapted from Virgil].” He tries to 
have “no express need of anyone” (VS968, F739–40). He has conceived 
“a mortal hatred of being obliged either to another or by another than 
myself” (VS969, F741). 
The idea of the common good in the tradition means that the members 
of the political association are dependent on each other for the good, 
because the good is such that it can only be attained in common. The 
good of all is the good of each. Thus, Montaigne’s generosity and integ-
rity are very different from Aristotelian virtue, because virtue is bound 
to the idea of the common good. If integrity means the possession of the 
good as a property, if it means completeness, then the man of integrity 
is not dependent on his city or country for his completeness. Montaigne 
does not seek his good in the dependent relationships of politics. His will 
belongs to him, not to his country. The common good is replaced by the 
inestimable good of freedom.
Education and Freedom
In “On the Education of Children” Montaigne says that “the greatest and 
most important difficulty in human knowledge” is the question of the 
upbringing and education of children (VS149, F109). The entire purpose 
of education is the formation of the judgment of the pupil, especially 
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through the study of history and philosophy. Like his own upbringing, 
the education he proposes would teach the pupil to be “wholly incapable 
of submitting to force and violence” (VS176, F131).
C. S. Lewis takes Montaigne as his example of “the freeborn mind”: 
“In adult life it is the man who needs, and asks, nothing of government 
who can criticize its acts and snap his fingers at its ideology. Read Mon-
taigne; that’s the voice of a man with his legs under his own table, eating 
the mutton and turnips raised on his own land. Who will talk like that 
when the State is everyone’s schoolmaster and employer?”36 Lewis is 
most concerned with the role of economic independence in providing an 
education not controlled by the state. Such an education is essential for 
freedom as well as for the knowledge that men must have of each other if 
they are to become and remain free. This is brought out forcefully in La 
Boétie’s Voluntary Servitude where he discusses the importance of books 
and learning for men who, in spite of subjection, have the desire for free-
dom: “Always there live among them some who are better born than the 
others, who feel the weight of the yoke and who cannot refrain from 
shaking it off, people who never tame themselves into subjection. . . . 
It is truly these individuals who, having a clear understanding and a 
sharp mind, do not content themselves like the vulgar populace with 
looking at what is at their feet, but look both backward and forward, 
and moreover recall past events so as to judge about those of times to 
come, and in order to measure the present ones. They are those who, hav-
ing their own heads well made, have also polished them through study 
and knowledge. Those, if ever liberty were entirely lost and wholly gone 
from the world, imagining it and feeling it in their minds, and still savor-
ing it, would never find servitude to their taste, no matter how well it 
might be dressed up. The Great Turk having become well aware of this, 
that books and learning more than anything else give men the sense and 
understanding to know one another and to hate tyranny, I understand 
that he does not have in his lands any learned people, nor does he ask 
for them.”37 The education that Montaigne recommends for the noble-
man includes the study of history so that the young man might form his 
independent judgment. The histories teach us to know men and recog-
nize each in his individuality. Men who love freedom must be able to 
recognize each other. La Boétie describes the difficulties of this mutual 
recognition under conditions of tyranny: “But commonly, the good zeal 
and love of those who have preserved the devotion to freedom in spite of 
the times, no matter how large a number there may be of them, remain 
without effect because they do not recognize one another. The liberty 
of action and of speech, and almost of thought, is completely taken 
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away from them under the tyrant. They live completely alone in their 
imaginings.”38 
Montaigne’s account of his first meeting with La Boétie seems to be 
a description of just such mutual recognition: “We sought each other 
before we met because of the reports we heard of each other, which had 
more effect on our affection than such reports would reasonably have; I 
think it was by some ordinance of heaven. We embraced each other by 
our names. And at our first meeting, which by chance came at a great 
feast and gathering in the city, we found ourselves so taken with each 
other, so well acquainted, so bound together, that from that time on noth-
ing was so close to us as each other. He wrote an excellent Latin satire, 
which is published, in which he excuses and explains the precipitancy of 
our mutual understanding, so promptly grown to its perfection” (VS188, 
F139). 
Freedom of Speech
La Boétie says that the mutual recognition of freedom-loving men is made 
almost impossible under the tyrant because the tyrant prohibits freedom 
of speech. One of the most important aspects of Montaigne’s character is 
the freedom of his speech. His manner of conducting himself in his role 
as negotiator between princes is one of openness and frankness, a practice 
that is very different from the dissimulation that is typical of such deal-
ings. He speaks the truth without regard to the consequences, either to 
himself or to the matter in question. He will not bend the truth in order 
to accomplish any goal. His liberty and license are constant and inflexible 
because “the way of truth is one and simple” (VS795, F603).Truth is the 
social bond that is possible for free particulars. Free speech is the way 
in which diverse minds can be bound to each other in truth. There is no 
common essence to bind men together, and so society is brought about 
only through self-communication. The only way we can know each other 
is not through knowledge of a universal nature but through our words 
in which we communicate our thoughts and wills, that is, our judgments. 
A character of a certain kind is required for the practice of freedom of 
speech, and Montaigne’s character comes through especially clearly in his 
description of himself with respect to this practice. “I do not at all hate 
opinions contrary to mine. I am so far from being vexed to see discord 
between my judgments and others’, and from making myself incompat-
ible with the society of men because they are of a different sentiment 
and party from mine, that on the contrary, since variety is the most gen-
eral fashion that nature has followed, and more in minds than bodies, 
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inasmuch as minds are of a substance suppler and susceptible of more 
forms, I find it much rarer to see our humors and designs agree. And there 
were never in the world two opinions alike, any more than two hairs or 
grains. Their most universal quality is diversity” (VS785–86, F597–98). 
In “Of the Art of Discussion” he elaborates on the attitudes that free 
speech requires. “I enter into discussion and argument with great freedom 
and ease, inasmuch as opinion finds in me a bad soil to penetrate and take 
deep roots in. No propositions astonish me, no belief offends me, what-
ever contrast it offers with my own” (VS923, F704). He is not offended 
nor does he respond with anger: “So contradictions of opinions neither 
offend nor affect me; they merely arouse and exercise me. . . . When 
someone opposes me, he arouses my attention, not my anger” (VS924, 
F705). Montaigne associates the inability to converse in this manner with 
a tyrannical disposition: “It is always a tyrannical ill humor to be unable 
to endure a way of thinking different from your own” (VS928, F709). 
In fact, in what may be the only instance in the Essays where he refers 
to himself as perfect, he says with respect to bantering and joking: “I am 
perfect in forbearance, for I endure retaliation, not only sharp but even 
indiscreet, without being disturbed” (VS938, F717).39
Montaigne removes self-esteem from discussion, thus removing the 
honor associated with winning an argument. His extreme tolerance for 
opinions different from his own is a necessary condition for a free society. 
Freedom of speech makes it possible for freedom-loving men to recognize 
each other and also provides one of the principal means of opposition to 
tyranny. 
The Universal Church
In chapter 2 I argued that the Church is the basis for Montaigne’s notion 
of society. The Church is the universal society that stands as an indepen-
dent association which claims authority over the minds and hearts of 
men. While it is true that this authority can and did come into conflict 
with the authority of the state, causing civil unrest, it is also true that 
without such an independent authority, one of the principal limits on the 
coercive power of the state is lacking.
Like Socrates, Montaigne considers the whole world his city. “Not 
because Socrates said it, but because it is really my feeling, and perhaps 
excessively so, I consider all men my compatriots, and embrace a Pole as 
I do a Frenchman, setting this national bond after the universal and com-
mon one” (VS973, F743). But unlike Socrates, he is not entirely bound to 
his country: “What Socrates did near the end of his life, in considering a 
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sentence of exile against him worse than a sentence of death, I shall never, 
I think, be so broken nor so strictly attached to my own country as to 
do. . . . That was a very fastidious attitude for a man who considered the 
world his city” (VS973, F743–44). Generosity is such that society cannot 
stop at the borders of one’s country.
The conscience of Montaigne is different from the conscience of 
Socrates with respect to the degree of attachment that one owes to one’s 
country. Socrates never left Athens, as he says in his Apology. He was con-
tent to remain always among his fellow citizens for he cared about them, 
if not exclusively, then at least much more than he concerned himself for 
the citizens of any other city. Montaigne, however, sets the national bond 
after the universal and common bond. This universal bond is grounded 
in the universal Church in which national origins do not matter. In Rous-
seau’s description, Montaigne is the great cosmopolitan soul: “natural 
pity . . . no longer dwells in any but a few great cosmopolitan souls, who 
surmount the imaginary barriers that separate peoples and who, follow-
ing the example of the sovereign Being who created them, include the 
whole human race in their benevolence.”40 Montaigne’s invention of soci-
ety, the philosophical act, effects the good of all mankind. 




The Invisibility of Philosophy and 
the Light of the Good
Montaigne’s philosophical project, I have argued, is nothing less than the 
invention of society, a new mode of association of free individuals. Yet, 
how can he produce such an astonishing effect when he himself warns 
us that he is nothing more than an accidental philosopher? Montaigne’s 
transformation of philosophy and his invention of society are the same 
act: his epistemology and his political philosophy originate in the same 
act. The unity of the Essays is the oneness of this single act. 
It must be admitted that the Essays of Michel de Montaigne do not look 
like philosophy: there are no first principles, no arguments, no conclu-
sions, no evident philosophical teaching. True, there are hundreds of 
quotations from the ancients, but Montaigne’s “own” philosophy, his 
own philosophical teaching, is nowhere to be seen. On the other hand, 
Michel de Montaigne himself is always visible: the Essays, as he often 
tells us, are all about him and only about him.
Yet Montaigne does describe himself as a philosopher, although only 
once, in the Essays. In fact, he is astonished to discover that he is “a new 
figure: an unpremeditated and accidental philosopher” (VS546, F409). 
Even in this passage—especially in this passage—where he describes him-
self as a new figure of the philosopher, his own philosophy is invisible. 
He simply uses the fragments of ancient philosophy to express what he 
is: a common, private man who claims no great learning or great deeds 
but who emerges into the public wearing only the fig leaf of ancient phi-
losophy. Unpremeditated and accidental philosophy looks like nothing 
more than the articulation of the most familiar, the expression of pre-
philosophical presumption. 
Montaigne’s thought moves from the familiar, the knowledge of famil-
iarity, and then back to the familiar, in astonishment at the familiar. The 
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difference between his beginning and his end is simply the act of bringing 
the private into the public, bringing the familiar to light. In one sense 
this act is hidden: philosophy itself is invisible. Yet, in another sense, it 
is most public: the truth of the familiar is made visible. Philosophy is 
unpremeditated and accidental: the spontaneity of the familiar, the truth 
of what was already always there, is brought to light, accidentally, in the 
fragments of ancient philosophy. 
The action of the Essays, then, might be described as bringing the 
private out into the public. Montaigne—a common, private, and weak 
man—presumes to bring out into public view everything that the phi-
losophers and the great despise. By bringing the private out into the 
public, into visibility, he overcomes the shame of the private. Through 
this simple act of reordering, Montaigne transforms the human world by 
bringing into existence a new form of human association. In the telling of 
his thoughts and mores in public, philosophy becomes social. Montaigne 
subordinates philosophy to the everyday and thus invents society. This 
act of the subordination of philosophy to the everyday is the free act, the 
generous gesture, of the philosopher. 
But what happens to philosophy itself when it descends, so to speak, 
into the everyday, the pre-philosophical? It seems to disappear. In becom-
ing merely unpremeditated and accidental, philosophy has reimmersed 
itself in the pre-philosophical and now looks just like presumption, the 
pre-philosophical condition from which anything that can call itself 
“philosophy” must surely have to escape. What could be more unphi-
losophical than contentment with the pre-philosophical, with what is 
simply “one’s own”? Unpremeditated and accidental philosophy does not 
look like philosophy but it does look like presumption. That is why it is 
invisible. 
However, the pre-philosophical to which the philosopher returns, in 
which the philosopher reimmerses himself, is not exactly the same as the 
pre-philosophical from which he began, for it is now astonishing, the pre-
philosophical without presumption. In the dialectic with presumption, 
philosophy itself is brought down to the most familiar. In the dialectic 
with philosophy, the most familiar is purified of presumption. What was 
simply and presumptuously one’s own is now one’s own in a new way. 
Judgment, which is “all one’s own” and which makes the thing itself 
“one’s own,” introduces a new order. The act of judgment in which the 
philosopher subjects the thing itself and makes it his own is the same 
act in which he submits to the most common and lowly. That is how he 
makes the thing itself his own, bringing it back down to the original level 
of what was always already there, the most familiar. The philosopher can 
182 Conclusion
only come to know what he already knows. Judgment makes his own 
what was always already his own in the knowledge that is familiarity. In 
one sense, then, everything remains the same, but in another sense, every-
thing is changed. Philosophy is the invisible power that brings the new 
out of the old, the possible out of the impossible. 
The most familiar in which Montaigne begins is “the practice of every-
day life.” The practice of everyday life is the knowledge that is familiarity. 
Thus, the philosopher begins “at home” in the domestic and private. Phil-
osophical presumption despises this beginning because it sees it as servile. 
Montaigne overcomes this philosophical presumption by subjecting the 
thing itself, that is, mastery itself, to the practice of everyday life, to his 
end, the domestic and private. In this way, he frees the most common 
human actions from servility and shame. He frees the slaves. That is, he 
refounds by replacing the old foundation of mastery with the new foun-
dation of freedom. This is effected by the philosophical act: submission to 
the practice of everyday life is the subjection of mastery itself. 
What happens to philosophy in the submission of the philosopher to 
the practice of everyday life? Philosophy becomes unpremeditated and 
accidental. What happens to the practice of everyday life in the submis-
sion of the philosopher? The practice of everyday life becomes the social, 
the space of the free self-revelation of free individuals. The philosopher is 
astonished at this transformation of the servile: actions that were instru-
mental are now good in themselves. Yet, the philosopher is astonished 
only at what he himself has produced. 
In the single philosophical act of making the familiar astonishing, Mon-
taigne both reforms philosophy by bringing it down from the heavens 
and refounds human association by freeing the realm of the domestic and 
private from its bondage to the servile. On the one hand, by descending 
into the pre-philosophical, philosophy itself is freed from philosophical 
presumption. On the other hand, the coming into existence of society 
requires the invisibility of philosophy because the social demands that 
the philosopher overcome his pride. As the philosopher disappears, the 
common man emerges into the light of the good. The philosopher must 
be the first to “step down” because it is the philosopher who orders the 
human world. 
The spring of Montaigne’s action is the desire for self-disclosure. At the 
same time, his settled inclination of judgment is the desire for the volun-
tary dissolution of his self. Montaigne is content to appear in public as 
weak. Yet this willingness actually shows his strength because he makes 
himself vulnerable and thus demonstrates that he does not fear death, 
that is, he is free. But because he looks weak, that strength is hidden. 
The Invisibility of Philosophy 183
The spring of the philosophical act is “the good,” Montaigne’s sym-
pathy with all men, which looks weak because it is so different from 
Aristotle’s striving for perfection. For Aristotle, the philosopher includes 
all men within himself because he is the perfection of the human form. 
Montaigne, the particular, the “new figure” of the philosopher, includes 
all men because, in the very act of self-disclosure, he willingly effaces 
himself for the good of all mankind. 
Montaigne is the new figure of the philosopher: a merely unpre-
meditated and accidental philosopher. In this recovery of his common 
humanity, the philosopher gives up his claim to divinity and disappears 
into the anonymity of the crowd. At the same time, he emerges into the 
public as “the common man,” as every man, in his concrete particularity. 
The Essays of Michel de Montaigne display, in this single act, the essence 
of unpremeditated and accidental philosophy as the selflessness of the 
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293, where he describes Montaigne as a “Catholic Pyrrhonist.” 
2. André Gide, Essai sur Montaigne (Paris: Jacques Schiffrin, Editions de la 
Pléïade, n.d.), 41–42, claims that Montaigne never speaks of Christ and may 
never even have read the Gospels. Arthur Armaingaud, “Montaigne: Etait-il 
ondoyant et divers? Montaigne était-il inconstant?” Revue du seizième siècle 
10 (1923): 44, says that Montaigne sometimes hides his meaning. His contra-
dictions must be interpreted by determining what is real and what is pretended. 
Armaingaud concludes that Montaigne’s expressions of religious opinions are 
not sincere. On the other hand, Philippe Desan, in Montaigne: Les formes, 195, 
claims that it would be absurd to make an atheist of Montaigne.
3. For a thorough account of Catholicism in the Essays and the Travel 
Journal, see B. Petey-Girard, “Catholicisme,” in Dictionnaire de Michel de 
Montaigne, ed. Philippe Desan, 140–43. For Montaigne, religious practice is 
anchored in tradition. Catholicism is for Montaigne a religion perfectly adapt-
ed to the needs of human beings of flesh and blood, as found in the Incarnation. 
M. A. Screech, “Montaigne: Some Classical Notions in Their Contexts,” in 
Montaigne in Cambridge, Proceedings of the Cambridge Montaigne Colloqui-
um 1989, ed. Philip Ford et al. (1989), 45–49, shows that many interpreters are 
not aware of the sometimes subtle indications of Montaigne’s Catholic sensi-
bilities. See also Malcolm Smith, Montaigne and the Roman Censors (Geneva: 
Librairie Droz S.A., 1981), 29. Smith offers an explanation of Montaigne’s use 
of pagan terms, a practice which was of some concern to the censors. Smith ex-
amines the occurrences of these terms and shows how their meaning, within the 
context of the essays, is compatible with Christian teaching. Smith’s exhaus-
tive study of occurrences of pagan terms in the Essays leads him to conclude 
that Montaigne is “suffusing human language with the values of the Christian 
faith.” Indeed, Smith regards the Essays as “the supreme example of a Re-
naissance author fusing the heritage of classical antiquity and the Christian 
faith.” The Essays show how the values of classical antiquity are “absorbed 
and transcended” by Roman Catholic teaching (112). I agree with Smith’s con-
clusion but I believe that it must be taken a step further. The new meanings 
that emerge out of this suffusion of human language with the values of Chris-
tian faith are, in my view, an absorption and transcendence of both classical 
antiquity and Christian belief. They are not reducible to the meanings of ei-
ther ancient philosophy or medieval theology, for Montaigne brings forth new 
meanings.
4. See Thierry Gontier, “Montaigne, les humanistes et la doctrine des 
anciens,” Montaigne Studies 21, nos. 1–2, pp. 26–31. Gontier reconciles Mon-
taigne’s submission to the Church and his independence from the theologians 
by claiming that what legitimates the discourse of humanists in “Of Prayers” is 
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not the subject matter (for “Of Prayers” is a theological subject matter), but the 
modality of affirmation: Montaigne does not claim authority.
5. See M. A. Screech, Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the Es-
says (London: Penguin Books, 1983), 95: “Montaigne professed his complete 
submission to the Church of Rome. These professions increase in number and 
intensity in the final version” of the Essays. Screech also claims that Montaigne 
argued for the truth of Roman Catholicism (18). 
6. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 2, a. 10.
7. The tradition, then, includes many important variants and developments 
from which Montaigne draws out intimations. Aquinas’s Christian develop-
ment, elaboration, and extension of Aristotle’s teaching on the common good 
is in some ways taken up into Montaigne’s notion of society and of virtue. 
See Mary Keys, Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 96: “Aquinas does appear 
to privilege the generically social character of human nature over [Aristotle’s] 
regime-relative political in several key respects. One may even say that while 
retaining an awareness of the importance of regimes and the virtues and vices 
they tend to promote, Aquinas redefines the political or civic character of hu-
man nature more fundamentally in the function of human sociality and its 
ethical requirements.” Keys also discusses the role of goodness of will in Aqui-
nas’s notion of the common good (118–24, especially 123). 
8. Josef Pieper, Tradition: Concept and Claim, trans. E. Christian Kopff 
(Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2008), 35.
9. Ibid., 33.
10. Ibid., 40–43.
11. Malcolm C. Smith, Montaigne and Religious Freedom: The Dawn of 
Pluralism (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1991), 81–82. 
12. Francis Slade, “Was Ist Aufklärung? Notes on Maritain, Rorty, and 
Bloom with Thanks but No Apologies to Immanuel Kant,” in The Common 
Things: Essays on Thomism and Education, ed. Daniel McInerny (American 
Maritain Association, 1999), 52.
13. Ali Benmakhlouf, Montaigne (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2008), 130, 
claims that the superiority of Catholicism over Protestantism is the fact that 
Catholicism does not forget our corporeal condition. 
14. Eamon Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in 
England 1400–1580 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 480. 
Although this book deals specifically with events that took place in England, 
Duffy’s description of the Reformation applies to Christendom as a whole. 
15. Ibid., 237.
16. Michael B. Foster, Mystery and Philosophy (London: SCM, 1957), 41.
17. Ibid., 28.
18. Ibid., 46.
19. For a more complete discussion of the dialectic of faith and reason, see my 
Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 2003), chap. 5; “Montaigne and Scepticism,” in Cambridge Companion 
to Montaigne, ed. Ullrich Langer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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2005), 183–206; and “The Dialectic of Faith and Reason in the Essays of Mon-
taigne,” in Faith and Philosophy 18, no. 3, (July 2001): 323–36.
20. Frédéric Brahami, Le scepticisme de Montaigne (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1997), 23.
21. T. S. Eliot, “The Pensées of Pascal,” in Selected Essays (New York: Har-
court Brace, 1932), 363.
22. See my Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, chap. 6. 
23. T. S. Eliot, Christianity and Culture: The Idea of a Christian Society 




26. Duffy, Stripping of the Altars, 91.
27. Neither Frame’s nor Screech’s translation captures this Eucharistic sense.
28. Duffy, Stripping of the Altars, 52.
29. Blaise Pascal, Pensées et opuscules, ed. Léon Brunschvicg, rev. ed. (Paris: 
Librairie Hachette, 1946), no. 789.
30. C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter 
Hooper (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1970), 37.
31. Michael Oakeshott, Religion, Politics and the Moral Life, ed. Timothy 
Fuller (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993), 34.
32. Oakeshott, Religion, 59–60.
33. Duffy, Stripping of the Altars, 265.
34. Ibid., 298.
35. Roger Scruton, A Political Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2006), 112.
36. Michel de Montaigne, Oeuvres complètes, ed. Albert Thibaudet and 
Maurice Rat (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléïade, 1962), 1236 (F961). 
References to the English translation of the Travel Journal are to The Complete 
Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1943), and will be cited in the notes as (F, CW). This passage is 
from (F, CW 961). The Church, then, is the only multicultural society.
37. Pieper, Tradition, 55.
38. Etienne Gilson, “Where Is Christendom?” in The Gilson Reader, ed. An-
ton Pegis (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Image Books, 1957), 342.
39. Ibid., 343.
40. Ibid., 346. See also Bouwsma, Waning of the Renaissance, chap. 1: “The 
Cultural Community of Europe.” Bouwsma devotes this chapter to a discus-
sion of Christianity as the fundamental community of Europe at the time of 
the Renaissance.
Chapter 3
1. For a more complete discussion of both the skeptical aspects of the Es-
says and Montaigne’s transformation of skepticism, see my “Montaigne and 
Skepticism.”
2. See Benmakhlouf, Montaigne, 54–56, for a discussion of Montaigne as 
“the third possibility” with respect to the choice between two contraries.
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3. In the versions of this passage earlier than the Bordeaux Copy, Montaigne 
had written: “Whoever wants to essay himself in the same way, and get rid of 
this violent prejudice of custom . . .” See François Roussel, Montaigne: Le mag-
istrat sans juridiction (Paris: Éditions Michalon, 2006), 87–92, for a discussion 
of this passage and Montaigne’s interior “reformation.”
4. Those who form man are, presumably, the philosophers and theologians, 
“our masters” and “directors of conscience” (VS942, F720). See G. Defaux, 
“Représentation,” in Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, ed. Philippe Desan, 
869–72. Representation is an image, copy, or likeness, that is, it is not form.
5. In The Fabulous Imagination: On Montaigne’s Essays (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2009), Lawrence Kritzman examines the role of the 
imagination in the emergence of the Western concept of the self. “In the Es-
says, the imagination acts as the generative core of an internal universe that 
influences both the body and mind and reveals itself as essential to human 
experience” (22). Philosophy is limited to the apprehension of static Being, of 
unchanging forms and essences, by the mind alone, separated from the body 
and the senses. However, a particular being that is constantly changing and 
becoming other can be approached only through the imagination. “As opposed 
to the universalizing ethos of reason, the imagination allows for an openness 
to the particular and the strange” (36). In “Of the Power of the Imagination” 
Montaigne says that his end is to tell, not what has happened, but what can 
happen. That is why “fabulous testimonies” serve him as well as true stories. 
“The essay, as Montaigne suggests, consequently becomes an exercise in ap-
proaching a horizon of possibilities” (4).
When we enter the realm of the possible, as distinguished from the actual 
and the probable, we encounter the unexpected and the self appears in all its 
strangeness. Kritzman argues that “at the core of Montaigne’s writerly prac-
tice is the desire to domesticate the excesses and strangeness of the mind’s 
activities. When the essayist explains the shift from reflection to writing . . . 
he recognizes the need to neutralize what he terms the ‘monstrousness’ within 
himself” (31). The Essays depict “imaginative experiences that test the limits 
of identity, knowledge, and ethics, such as the beyond of death, the ineffable 
nature of human desire, and the monstrousness of the self” (22). This picture 
of the self must be understood in contrast to the Aristotelian ontology in which 
human beings are directed to and find their completion and perfection in the 
naturally given end of happiness common to all. In “Of Cripples” Montaigne 
“demonstrates how the quest for causes engages us in a retrospective attempt 
to inscribe the teleological as the basis for a purposeful and predetermined de-
velopment” (52). According to Kritzman, then, “the essaying process suspends 
the teleological thrust of Aristotelian metaphysics and its doctrine of ethics 
based on a principle of totalization” (161).
6. Todorov, Imperfect Garden, 49–50.
7. Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus, ed. and 
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1985), 13.
8. Ibid., 11.
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9. Ibid., 13.
10. Grahame Castor, Pleiade Poetics: A Study in Sixteenth-Century Thought 






16. Ullrich Langer, Invention, Death and Self-Definitions in the Poetry of 
Pierre de Ronsard (Saratoga, Calif.: ANMI LIBRI, 1986), 1–2.
17. Castor, Poetics, 103–104.
18. Ibid., 60.
19. Ibid., 62. In his Montaigne dans tous ses états (Fasano: Schena Editore, 
2001), Philippe Desan discusses Montaigne’s unpremeditated and accidental 
philosophy and links the accidental to contingency and thus to possibility. By 
contrasting Montaigne with Descartes and with Pascal, he shows why Mon-
taigne is so difficult to locate within the parameters of modern philosophy. See 
especially 345, 348, 361–62.
20. This interpretation of what Montaigne means by reason is supported by 
Hobbes’s explanation of his definition of philosophy: philosophy is the knowl-
edge acquired by reasoning to possible causes. “By which definition it is evident 
that we are not to account as any part thereof, that originall knowledge called 
Experience.” Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 46, p. 682.
21. In The Concept of Judgment in Montaigne (The Hague: Martinus Ni-
jhoff, 1968), 12, Raymond La Charité claims that “as far as can be ascertained, 
no tract of any kind, on psychology, existed which could have provided [Mon-
taigne] with the semantic and ideational possibilities which he attributes to 
the faculty of judgment in the Essays.” See also Paul Mathias, Montaigne ou 
l’usage du monde (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2006), 84–90, for a 
helpful discussion of Montaigne’s notion of judgment. Hassan Melehy, Writing 
Cogito: Montaigne, Descartes, and the Institution of the Modern Subject (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 77: “The ‘essays’ are not of 
objects but of judgment—the objects enter indirectly, insofar as their constitu-
tion in the understanding comes under examination. And judgment is the ‘tool’ 
by which the limits of the understanding are scrutinized.”
22. Georges Poulet, Studies in Human Time, trans. Elliot Coleman (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), 47–48. Poulet also shows the 
way in which Montaigne’s notion of judgment is contrasted with memory.
23. La Charité, Judgment, 27: juger and régler (to order) are inseparable 
actions for Montaigne.
24. Ibid., 34: Judgment “always brings something to a close.” Judgment 
stops the discursive and endless movement of reason. 
25. Ibid., 38–40. Montaigne judges what is in him by nature. This can be 
seen clearly in the following passage from “Of the Resemblance of Children 
to Fathers” in which Montaigne discusses his natural aversion to drugs and 
medicine: “I have taken the trouble to plead this cause, which I understand 
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rather poorly, to support a little and strengthen the natural aversion to drugs 
and to the practice of medicine which I have derived from my ancestors, so that 
it should not be merely a stupid and thoughtless inclination and should have a 
little more form; and also so that those who see me so firm against exhortations 
and menaces that are made to me when my sickness afflicts me may not think 
that I am acting out of plain stubbornness; or in case there should be anyone 
so unpleasant as to judge that I am spurred by vainglory. That would be a well-
aimed ambition, to want to derive honor from conduct that I have in common 
with my gardener and my muleteer!” (VS785, F597).
26. See C. Couturas, “Conscience,” in Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, 
ed. Philippe Desan, 201: the absolute refusal of the lie is for Montaigne the 
most constant quality of a conscience accountable for its acts.
Chapter 4
1. See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (In-
dianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1977), 4. “Be a philosopher; but amidst all your 
philosophy, be still a man.” In his “Hume’s Correction of Modern Political Phi-
losophy” (paper delivered at Emory University, November 11, 2010), George 
Russell argues that the meaning of Hume’s admonition is that abstruse philoso-
phy destroys sympathy.
2. David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller 
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1985), 534–35.
3. Pascal, Pensées et opuscules, no. 18. 
4. Erich Auerbach, “L’humaine condition,” in Mimesis: The Representation 
of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, N.J.: Princ-
eton University Press, 1953), 308. 
5. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, ed. Timo-
thy Fuller (London: Methuen, 1962; reprint, Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty, 1991), 
491.
6. T. S. Eliot, “Humanist, Artist, and Scientist,” Athenaeum, October 10, 
1919, p. 1015.
7. Robert Sokolowski, Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions: Fourteen Es-
says in Phenomenology (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1992), 32. See also Thierry Gontier, “Montaigne, les humanistes et la doctrine 
des anciens,” 20–26, for a discussion of Montaigne’s practice of quotation in 
relation to the humanists.
8. Sokolowski, Pictures, Quotations, 32.
9. For a discussion of the status of French and Latin in Montaigne’s day, see 
Giovanni Dotoli, La voix de Montaigne: Langue, corps, et parole dans les Es-
sais (Paris: Éditions Lanore, 2007), 237–38.
10. See Desan, Montaigne: Les formes, 60–62, for a discussion of Mon-
taigne’s “humanization of philosophy.”
11. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 71.
12. Here we can begin to see the influence of the Essays on modern science. 
See Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, trans. Peter Urbach and John Gibson 
(Chicago: Open Court, 1994). Bacon’s new logic is a logic of discovery which 
192 Notes to Pages 74–85
incorporates many of the features of Montaigne’s mode of thought. For ex-
ample, in book 1, aphorism 119, p. 121, Bacon writes: “In my opinion, in fact, 
nothing has hindered philosophy more than the failure to give time and atten-
tion to things of familiar and frequent occurrence that are accepted in passing, 
without any inquiry into their causes.”
13. At the conclusion of the “Apology,” the ancient philosophical contrast 
between being and becoming is set out through a long passage from Plutar-
ch. “We have no communication with being” because we are in time, always 
somewhere between birth and death. There can be no communication between 
the temporal and the eternal because the eternal is unchanging and therefore 
truly is, whereas the temporal is always changing and therefore “never arrives 
at the perfection of being” (VS601–2, F455). Montaigne would have been 
relying on Amyot’s translation of Plutarch’s Moral Essays, in Les œuvres mo-
rales & meslées de Plutarch, trans. Jacques Amyot, vol. 1 (1572; reprint, The 
Hague: Mouton, 1971; New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971), 356. 
The Amyot text of this passage begins “nous n’avons aucune participation du 
vrai estre.” Montaigne changes Amyot’s “participation” to “communication.” 
Participation in the divine is the transcendence of the human. The “Apology” 
concludes with the assertion that “it is for our Christian faith, not for [Sen-
eca’s] Stoical virtue, to aspire to that divine and miraculous metamorphosis.” 
Man cannot raise himself above himself and humanity. He must be lifted up 
“by purely celestial means” (VS604, F457). Why does Montaigne replace “par-
ticipation” with “communication”? The point of the passage at the end of the 
“Apology” is that transcendence of the human is not within our power and 
would have to come through the action of the divine. The Stoic sees himself 
as participating in divinity, as literally becoming divine. By changing “partic-
ipation” to “communication,” Montaigne shows that he is considering man 
without revelation. And that is what he had said he would do in the “Apology” 
from the beginning. But he is also suggesting that the temporal is the realm of 
communication. If there is any human universal in the Essays, it would be the 
ability of human beings to communicate with each other.
14. See René Descartes, Discourse on Method, in The Philosophical Writ-
ings of Descartes. vol. 1, trans. John Cottingham et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 140. In part 5 of the Discourse, Descartes claims that 
there are two ways by which we could tell the difference between “true men” 
and machines that closely resembled men. The first is that “it is not conceiv-
able that such a machine should produce different arrangements of words 
so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its 
presence, as the dullest of men can do.” The second is that machines can-
not act in all of life’s situations in the same way as our reason makes us act. 
These are also the ways we can also know the difference between men and 
beasts.
15. Here again we see the way in which the tradition includes develop-
ments which are taken up by Montaigne. Mary Keys, Aquinas, 98, discusses 
the differences between Aquinas and Aristotle on the value and meaning of 
“servile” actions: “Christ’s actions and example [of serving others] had to have 
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implications for a correct understanding of human nature and consequently the 
exercise of human authority, including political authority.”
16. In his highly suggestive “De l’experience: Montaigne et la métaphy-
sique,” in Montaigne: Scepticisme, métaphysique, théologie, Vincent Carraud 
notes that the first sentence of “Of Experience” is a translation of the first 
sentence of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (69). “Of Experience” is Montaigne’s “first 
philosophy.” It is here that he confronts Aristotle and departs from him. We 
do not recognize the importance of Aristotle for Montaigne on account of the 
traditional interpretation of Montaigne as a skeptic. But the first pages of “Of 
Experience” constitute a precise discussion of the beginning of Aristotle’s Meta-
physics (70–72) and the essay as a whole is Montaigne’s subversion of the 
Aristotelian concept of experience. This subversion is the first condition for 
Montaigne’s notion of the experience of the self (83). Montaigne’s experience is 
of the union of soul and body, the experience that he substitutes for Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics and Physics (84–85). Carraud suggests that it might even be pos-
sible to claim that, for Montaigne, experience is only experience of the self (87). 
17. See Bacon, Novum Organum, book 1, aphorisms 24, 25, pp. 49–50, on 
the discovery of new particulars; and book 2, aphorism 2, p. 135: “Nothing 
truly exists in nature except separate bodies performing separate pure actions.”
18. See Charles Gagnebin, La philosophie critique de Montaigne (Neuchâ-
tel: Éditions de l’Aire, 2007), 161–63, for a discussion of Montaigne’s “strong 
and generous ignorance.”
19. See Sarah Bakewell, How to Live, or A Life of Montaigne in One Ques-
tion and Twenty Attempts at an Answer (New York: Other, 2010), 17: “The 
trick is to maintain a kind of naïve amazement at each instant of experience.” 
This is Montaigne’s “desire to pay astounded attention to life.” 
20. See Michael Oakeshott’s discussion of philosophy in Experience and Its 
Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933). 
21. In his Montaigne en mouvement (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1982), 
Jean Starobinski claims that Montaigne’s purpose is to leave a record of ordi-
nary life: this was what was so outrageous and scandalous about the Essays 
(51). This is “a truth closer to home that philosophy neglects” (282). Marcel 
Conche, “Montaigne, penseur de la philosophie,” in Montaigne: Scepticisme, 
métaphysique, théologie, ed. Vincent Carraud and Jean-Luc Marion, 179: with 
Montaigne we rediscover the astonishment and the attitude of inquiry which 
are at the heart of Greek thought; we rediscover philosophy in its essence.
22. Todorov, Imperfect Garden, 167 (emphasis added). La Charité, Judg-
ment, 48: Montaigne eventually substitutes vie (understood as temperament) 
for jugement. Thus “the faculty of judgment permeates the whole of one’s 
psyche.” Screech, Melancholy, 13: the last pages of “Of Experience” form the 
climax of all three books. “For Montaigne, at the end of his quest, had come to 
terms with melancholy and ecstasy—and so with religion, life and death, and 
with his being as a man.” Tournon, “Action imparfaite de sa propre essence,” 
in Montaigne: Scepticisme, métaphysique, théologie, ed. Vincent Carraud and 
Jean-Luc Marion, 34: concerning Montaigne’s discussion of “vanité toute la 
sagesse,” Tournon says that Montaigne opposes to this, not the wisdom of God, 
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but the deliberate choice of earthly life, here below, in its very inanity. Philippe 
Desan, “Essai (genre),” in Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne, 341: Desan’s 
discussion of the sense of essaying as tasting (dégustation) fits well with this 
sense of experience and the practice of everyday life.
Chapter 5
1. Two major studies of Montaigne’s political philosophy have been 
published over the past twenty years: David Lewis Schaefer’s The Political Phi-
losophy of Montaigne (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990) and Alan 
Levine’s Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne’s Politics 
of the Self (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001). Both have the merit of rec-
ognizing Montaigne’s originality as a political philosopher and his status as a 
founder of modern philosophy. Schaefer claims that Montaigne’s purpose is “a 
radical transformation of the political and social order” (32) and locates him in 
the line of philosophers of liberalism that begins with Machiavelli. Levine ar-
gues that Montaigne cannot be regarded precisely as a liberal because he does 
not insist on democratic government, the separation of powers, or the “rights” 
of individuals. Nevertheless, he sees Montaigne as a “protoliberal” (168) who 
lays the groundwork for liberalism and has a significant role in establishing 
the liberal ethos. Because they take Montaigne seriously as an original political 
philosopher, both Schaefer and Levine provide valuable insights into Mon-
taigne’s thought, and my own understanding of Montaigne has benefited from 
their work.
However, my study of the Essays is ultimately very different from each of 
theirs in emphasis and substance. First, I ground my interpretation of Mon-
taigne’s political philosophy in his rejection of Aristotelian form and final cause 
and, thus, in his rejection of the common good as the end of political associa-
tion. I believe this is implicit in Schaefer and Levine, although it is not thematic. 
Second, Montaigne’s notion of judgment is central to my understanding of 
his epistemology and his moral and political philosophy, whereas it is not for 
Schaefer or Levine. Third, I interpret Montaigne’s refounding as the overcom-
ing of natural mastery and, therefore, I see his liberalism as a radically new 
kind of rule. Montaigne does not insist on any premodern regime, including 
democracy, because he is instituting a more fundamental reform. In this I am 
indebted to Francis Slade’s presentation of Machiavelli’s “new form.” Schaefer 
and Levine seem to understand Montaigne’s innovation as a “lowering” of the 
end and thus of the standards of government, while I see it as a transcendence 
of the traditional hierarchy of weak and strong. 
Fourth, then, both Schaefer and Levine argue that Montaigne is lowering the 
standard of morality. Schaefer claims that Montaigne initiates the morality of 
“bourgeois individualism” and that his preference is that “particular relations 
among human beings be governed by the cash nexus” (376). Levine argues that 
Montaigne’s radically new conception of the subjective self is the basis for the 
liberal value of toleration. The best human life is radically private (167) and the 
character that Montaigne displays is a “sophisticated simplicity.” Montaigne’s 
argument for toleration, he says, appeals entirely to individual self-interest 
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(e.g., 168, 200, 234). I agree that Montaigne introduces a strong sense of the 
individual and also that he values toleration on the grounds that the common 
good must be rejected. However, the character that he displays is that of the 
“self-ordered” individual, “strong in itself” and therefore capable of freedom. 
Montaigne’s character is one of generosity and integrity and is not defined by 
self-interest. Again, his moral teaching can only be seen as a “lowering” of 
standards if one accepts the traditional hierarchy. My view is that Montaigne 
presents his new character as a “higher,” because more fully human, possi-
bility than the character of classical virtue. Montaigne restores philosophy to 
man: he considers the human as such, without linking it to the place of man 
in any traditional hierarchy. While this looks like a lowering of the standards 
of human thought and action, he claims that “it is an absolute perfection and 
God-like to know how to enjoy our own being rightly.” I take this to be due to 
the fact that judgment, the overcoming of natural mastery, and his new charac-
ter are all manifestations of the role of the will that transcends nature and thus 
makes possible a new kind of freedom.
Fifth, both Schaefer and Levine hold that Montaigne is not a Christian and 
that he seeks to undermine the power of religion and especially of the Catholic 
Church. Levine sees Christianity as the major source of the intolerance, oppres-
sion, and cruelty that Montaigne wants to overcome. I agree that Montaigne is 
highly critical of the Catholic side in the civil wars of France and of the cruelty 
of the Spanish conquerors in the New World. However, he does not blame 
Christianity, but rather blames the failure of men to live up to its teachings, for 
these evils. Also, there is good reason to believe that he did not really favor the 
toleration of Protestantism in France but that he ultimately accepted it as the 
only possible solution to the civil unrest. In contrast to Schaefer and Levine, I 
argue that Montaigne sees religion as essential to the social bond and that he 
views the Catholic Church as the basis for the possibility of a universal society 
that transcends the political realm.
2. Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 15, p. 211. 
3. Hobbes makes this explicit: “The difference of Common-wealths, con-
sisteth in the difference of the Sovereign, or the Person representative of all and 
every one of the Multitude. And because the Sovereignty is either in one man, 
or in an Assembly of more than one . . . it is manifest that there can be but 
three kinds of Common-wealth.” The names that Hobbes uses to identify these 
types of government are monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy. “There be oth-
er names of Government, in the Histories and books of Policy; as Tyranny, and 
Oligarchy. But they are not the names of other forms of Government, but of the 
same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it 
Tyranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligarchy: So 
also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy.” 
Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 19, p. 239.
4. Hobbes’s formulation of this relationship as “master-servant” and Ma-
chiavelli’s formulation in terms of the opposition between “the great” and “the 
people” do capture the same idea that rule is not for the sake of the common 
good. However, I use the “master-slave” formulation in order to maintain the 
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12. Hobbes, Leviathan, chap. 16, pp. 217, 220.
13. Thus, when Rousseau claims that the will cannot be represented, the 
result is that slavery is necessary for the full participation of the citizens in the 
activities of ruling. This shocking turn of the argument at the end of the Social 
Contract points to the fact that the “general will” is Rousseau’s version of 
freedom as “neither master nor slave.” Whatever Rousseau’s reasons for assert-
ing that the will cannot be represented, he displays the difficulties of bringing 
together political freedom and personal freedom. This difficulty cannot be 
resolved by requiring the individual to surrender his public will to a representa-
tive. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters, 
ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin’s, 1978), book 3, chap. 15.
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litical philosophy, Francis Slade explains the nature of the new form of rule that 
is introduced by Machiavelli. Whereas, for classical political philosophy, rule is 
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reason without a private will. 
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34. See Todorov, Imperfect Garden, 130: this friendship is “not in the ser-
vice of any external goal” and is “not reducible to any general notion.” See 
also Todorov, Montaigne ou la découverte de l’individu, 9–10. Lorraine Smith 
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35. Etienne de La Boétie, Le discours de la servitude volontaire, 160 (Schae-
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taigne, Of Friendship, and On Tyranny,” in Schaefer, Freedom over Servitude, 
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(326). Sève also argues that generosity is associated with Montaigne’s hatred 
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3.8, “Of the Art of Discussion.”
40. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality 
Among Men, 160–61.
206 Note to Page 179
Works Cited
Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
Trans. C. I. Litzinger. Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1993.
———. Summa Theologica. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 
5 vols. Reprint. Notre Dame, Ind.: Ave Maria, Christian Classics, 1981.
Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1958.
Aristotle. The Complete Works. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1984.
———. The Politics. Trans. Carnes Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984.
Armaingaud, Arthur. “Montaigne: Etait-il ondoyant et divers? Montaigne 
était-il inconstant?” Revue du seizième siècle 10 (1923): 35–56.
Auerbach, Erich. “Figura.” In Scenes from the Drama of European Literature: 
Six Essays, 11–76. New York: Meridian Books, 1959.
———. “L’humaine condition.” In Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in 
Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1953. 
Augustine, Saint. The City of God. Ed. David Knowles. Trans. Henry Betten-
son. Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1972.
———. The Confessions. Trans. F. J. Sheed. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1992.
Bacon, Francis. Novum Organum. Trans. Peter Urbach and John Gibson. Chi-
cago: Open Court, 1994.
Bakewell, Sarah. How to Live, or A Life of Montaigne in One Question and 
Twenty Attempts at an Answer. New York: Other, 2010.
Benmakhlouf, Ali. Montaigne. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2008.
Bouwsma, William J. The Waning of the Renaissance, 1550–1640. New Ha-
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. 
Brahami, Frédéric. Le scepticisme de Montaigne. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1977.
Brann, Eva. What, Then, Is Time? Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France. Buffalo, N.Y.: Pro-
metheus Books, 1987. 
Burke, Peter. The Renaissance Sense of the Past. New York: St. Martin’s, 1969.
Carraud, Vincent, and Jean-Luc Marion, eds. Montaigne: Scepticisme, mé-
taphysique, théologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004.
Castor, Grahame. Pleiade Poetics: A Study in Sixteenth-Century Thought and 
Terminology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964.
Cave, Terence. How to Read Montaigne. London: Granta Books, 2007.
207
Constant, Benjamin. “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the 
Moderns.” In Political Writings, ed. and trans. Biancamaria Fontana. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Curtius, Quintus. History of Alexander. Trans. John C. Rolfe. 2 vols. Loeb 
Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946.
Desan, Philippe, ed. Dictionnaire de Michel de Montaigne. Paris: H. Cham-
pion, 2004.
———. Montaigne dans tous ses états. Fasano: Schena Editore, 2001.
———. Montaigne: Les formes du monde et de l’esprit. Paris: Presses de 
l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2008.
Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 3 vols. Trans. John 
Cottingham et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–91. 
Dotoli, Giovanni. La voix de Montaigne: Langue, corps, et parole dans les Es-
sais. Paris: Éditions Lanore, 2007.
Doucet, R. Les institutions de la France au xvi siècle. 2 vols. Paris: Editions A. 
et J. Picard, 1948.
Duffy, Eamon. The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 
1400–1580. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 1992. 
Eliot, T. S. Christianity and Culture: The Idea of a Christian Society and Notes 
Towards the Definition of Culture. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1949.
———. “Humanist, Artist, and Scientist.” In Athenaeum, October 10, 1919, 
pp. 1014–15.
———. “The Pensées of Pascal.” In Selected Essays. New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1932.
Faye, Emmanuel. “Montaigne et la perfection humaine de Socrate dans ‘De la 
physionomie.’ ” Montaigne Studies 21 (2009): 35–39.
Fontana, Biancamaria. Montaigne’s Politics: Authority and Governance in the 
Essais. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Ford, Philip. “Montaigne’s Homer: Poet or Myth?” Montaigne Studies 17 
(2005): 7–16.
Foster, Michael B. Mystery and Philosophy. London: SCM, 1957.
Friedrich, Hugo. Montaigne. Ed. Philippe Desan. Trans. Dawn Eng. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1991.
Gagnebin, Charles. La philosophie critique de Montaigne. Neuchâtel: Éditions 
de l’Aire, 2007.
Gide, André. Essai sur Montaigne. Paris: Jacques Schiffrin, Éditions de la 
Pléïade, n.d.
Gilson, Etienne. “Where Is Christendom?” In The Gilson Reader, ed. Anton 
Pegis, 342–46. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Image Books, 1957.
Gontier, Thierry. “Montaigne, les humanistes et la doctrine des anciens.” Mon-
taigne Studies 21 (2009): 13–33. 
Hanson, Victor Davis. The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, 
How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny. New York: Free, 1999. 
Hartle, Ann. “The Dialectic of Faith and Reason in the Essays of Montaigne.” 
Faith and Philosophy 18, no. 3 (July 2001): 323–36.
208 Works Cited
———. Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003. 
———. “Montaigne and Scepticism.” In Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, 
ed. Ullrich Langer, 183–206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. C. B. Macpherson. Reprint, London: Penguin 
Books, 1968.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, 
Ind.: Hackett, 1977. 
———. Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary. Ed. Eugene F. Miller. Indianapo-
lis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1985.
Kekes, John. Enjoyment: The Moral Significance of Styles of Life. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 2008.
———. The Morality of Pluralism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1993.
Keys, Mary M. Aquinas, Aristotle, and the Promise of the Common Good. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus. Ed. and 
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1985.
Kritzman, Lawrence. The Fabulous Imagination: On Montaigne’s Essays. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
La Boétie, Etienne de. Le discours de la servitude volontaire. Text established 
by P. Léonard. Paris: Payot, 1985.
 ———. On Voluntary Servitude. Trans. David Lewis Schaefer. In Freedom over 
Servitude, ed. David Lewis Schaefer. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1998.
La Charité, Raymond C. The Concept of Judgment in Montaigne. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1968.
Langer, Ullrich. Divine and Poetic Freedom in the Renaissance: Nominalist 
Theology and Literature in France and Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1990.
———. Invention, Death and Self-Definitions in the Poetry of Pierre de Ron-
sard. Saratoga, Calif.: ANMI LIBRI, 1986.
Laursen, John Christian. The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, 
Hume and Kant. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992.
Levine, Alan. Sensual Philosophy: Toleration, Skepticism, and Montaigne’s Pol-
itics of the Self. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2001.
Lewis, C. S. God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics. Ed. Walter 
Hooper. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1970.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. Discourses on Livy. Trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Na-
than Tarcov. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
———. The Prince. Trans. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1985. 
Mansfield, Harvey C. Manliness. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
2006. 
Mathias, Paul. Montaigne ou l’usage du monde. Paris: Librairie Philosophique 
J. Vrin, 2006. 
Works Cited 209
Melehy, Hassan. Writing Cogito: Montaigne, Descartes, and the Institution of 
the Modern Subject. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Montaigne, Michel de. The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Trans. Donald 
Frame. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943.
———. The Complete Essays of Montaigne. Trans. M. A. Screech. London: 
Penguin, 1991.
———. Les Essais. Ed. Pierre Villey and V.-L. Saulnier. 3 vols., 2nd ed. Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, “Quadrige,” 1992.
———. Oeuvres complètes. Ed. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat. Paris: Gal-
limard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1962. 
Nakam, Géralde. Montaigne: La manière et la matière. Paris: Klincksieck, 
1991.
Nepos, Cornelius. Lives of Famous Men. Trans. Gareth Schmeling. Coronado, 
1971. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Schopenhauer as Educator.” Trans. William Arrowsmith. 
In Unmodern Observations, ed. William Arrowsmith. New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1990.
Oakeshott, Michael. Experience and Its Modes. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1933.
———. The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism. Ed. Timothy Fuller. 
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996.
———. Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. Ed. Timothy Fuller. London: 
Methuen, 1962; reprint, Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty, 1991.
———. The Voice of Liberal Learning. Ed. Timothy Fuller. New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1989; reprint. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Fund, 2001. 
O’Connor, Flannery. Wise Blood. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1949.
Pangle, Lorraine Smith. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Pantin, Isabelle. “Montaigne lecteur de Quinte-Curce: Quelques réflexions sur 
la collecte de Dezeimeris.” Montaigne Studies 17 (2005): 135–54.
Pascal, Blaise. Pensées et opuscules. Ed. Léon Brunschvicg. Revised ed. Paris: 
Librairie Hachette, 1946.
Penelhum, Terence. God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983.
———. “Skepticism and Fideism.” In The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles Burn-
yeat, 287–318. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 
Pieper, Josef. No One Could Have Known: An Autobiography: The Early Years. 
San Francisco: Ignatius, 1987. 
———. Tradition: Concept and Claim. Trans. E. Christian Kopff. Wilmington, 
Del.: ISI Books, 2008.
Platt, Michael. “Montaigne, Of Friendship, and On Tyranny.” In Freedom over 
Servitude: Montaigne, La Boétie, and On Voluntary Servitude, ed. David 
Lewis Schaefer, 31–85. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1998.
Plutarch. Les œuvres morales & meslées de Plutarch. Trans. Jacques Amyot. 
Vol. 1 (1572). Reprint, The Hague: Mouton, 1971; New York: Johnson Re-
print Corporation, 1971. 
210 Works Cited
———. Moralia. Vol. 10. Trans. Harold North Fowler. Loeb Classical Library. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936.
Poulet, Georges. Studies in Human Time. Trans. Elliot Coleman. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956.
Quint, David. Montaigne and the Quality of Mercy: Ethical and Political 
Themes in the Essays. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequal-
ity Among Men. In The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and 
Judith R. Masters, ed. Roger D. Masters. New York: St. Martin’s, 1964.
———. On the Social Contract. Trans. Judith R. Masters. Ed. Roger D. Mas-
ters. New York: St. Martin’s, 1978.
Roussel, François. Montaigne: Le magistrat sans juridiction. Paris: Éditions 
Michalon, 2006. 
Russell, George. “Hume’s Correction of Modern Political Philosophy.” Paper 
delivered at Emory University, November 11, 2010.
Schaefer, David Lewis. The Political Philosophy of Montaigne. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 1990. 
Schneewind, J. B. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral 
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Screech, M. A. Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the Essays. Lon-
don: Penguin Books, 1983.
———. “Montaigne: Some Classical Notions in Their Contexts.” In Montaigne 
in Cambridge, Proceedings of the Cambridge Montaigne Colloquium 1989, 
ed. Philip Ford et al. (1989), 39–52.
Scruton, Roger. A Political Philosophy. London: Continuum, 2006.
Sève, Bernard. Montaigne: Des règles pour l’esprit. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 2007. 
Slade, Francis. “On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its Relevance to the 
Narrative Arts.” In Beauty, Art, and the Polis, ed. Alice Ramos, 58–69. 
American Maritain Association, 2000. 
———. “Rule as Sovereignty: The Universal and Homogeneous State.” In The 
Truthful and the Good: Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski, ed. John J. 
Drummond and James G. Hart, 159–80. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1996.
———. “Two Versions of Political Philosophy: Teleology and the Conceptual 
Genesis of the Modern State.” In Natural Moral Law in Contemporary So-
ciety, ed. Holger Zaborowski, 235–63. Washingon, D.C: Catholic University 
of America Press, 2010.
———. “Was Ist Aufklärung? Notes on Maritain, Rorty, and Bloom with 
Thanks but No Apologies to Immanuel Kant.” In The Common Things: 
Essays on Thomism and Education, ed. Daniel McInerny, 48–68. American 
Maritain Association, 1999.
———. “Zeno’s City.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Maritain Association, Notre Dame University, South Bend, Ind., October 
2007.
Smith, Malcolm C. Montaigne and Religious Freedom: The Dawn of Pluralism. 
Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1991.
Works Cited 211
———. Montaigne and the Roman Censors. Geneva: Librairie Droz S.A., 1981.
Sokolowski, Robert. Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions: Fourteen Essays in 
Phenomenology. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992.
Starobinski, Jean. Montaigne en movement. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1982.
Supple, James J. Arms Versus Letters: The Military and Literary Ideals in the 
Essais of Montaigne. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984.
Tarn, W. W. Alexander the Great II: Sources and Studies. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1948. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. Imperfect Garden: The Legacy of Humanism. Trans. Carol 
Cosman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002.
———. Montaigne ou la découverte de l’individu. Tournai, Belgium: La Re-
naissance du Livre, 2001.
Weil, Simone. “Méditation sur l’obéissance et la liberté.” In Etienne de La 
Boétie, Le discours de la servitude volontaire: La Boétie et la question du 
politique, 87–95. Paris: Payot, 1985. 
Zalloua, Zahi. Montaigne and the Ethics of Skepticism. Charlottesville, Va.: 
Rookwood, 2005.
———. “Montaigne, Seneca, and ‘le Soing de la Culture de l’Ame.’ ” Montaigne 
Studies 21 (2009): 155–68.




actuality/actualization, xiv, 7, 13, 
63–64, 70, 77
Alexander the Great, xvii, 12, 19, 
73, 93, 106, 110, 113–19, 122–23, 
127, 148, 157, 161, 198nn20–21
ambition, 147–48
Aquinas. See Thomas Aquinas, 
Saint
Arendt, Hannah, 17–18, 125, 127, 
143
Aristotle, xii–xvii, 5–28, 36, 37–38, 
51, 56, 61, 69–70, 90–95, 116, 
122–23, 164; categories of moral 
strength and weakness, 157–58, 
159, 164; Montaigne’s familiarity 
with, 5, 194n16; M.’s skepticism 
toward, 6–7, 54, 70; and politics, 
17, 18, 99–101, 103, 135–36, 
168, 169, 197n4. See also causal-
ity; entelechy; form; generosity; 
perfection; philosophy; and under 
Montaigne, Michel de
Auerbach, Erich, 24–25, 79
Augustine, Saint, 22, 43, 59, 63
Bacon, Francis, xii, 108, 192n12
Betis, 110, 113–15, 122, 127, 161, 
198nn20–21





Caesar, Julius, 73, 93, 118–19, 123, 
137, 147, 148, 157
Carraud, Vincent, 194n16
Castor, Grahame, 59–61
Catholicism, xiv–xv, 19, 29–31, 
33–50, 152–53, 187–88nn3–5
Cato the Younger, 71–72, 158, 160, 
170
causality, 6–7, 11–13; efficient 
cause, 11; final cause, 7, 9–10, 11, 
14, 16, 21, 26, 61, 70–71, 195n1; 
Aristotle’s four causes, 6
Charlemagne, 138
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 5, 71, 116
common good, xvii, 18, 38, 
99–104, 121, 126, 128, 131, 
168, 175, 188n7, 195n1, 196n4, 
200n47, 202n20
Constant, Benjamin, 103–4, 122, 
157
cruelty, xvii, 13, 47, 68, 93, 115, 
143, 146–48, 162–63, 202n20, 
204n14
Curtius, Quintus, 114–15, 161, 
198nn20–21
custom, 33, 54–55, 91–92, 133, 
137–38, 144
Desan, Philippe, 191n19
Descartes, René, xii, 166–67, 
185n3, 191n19, 193n14
desire, xiv, 9–10, 12, 19, 74, 76
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 198n20
Dionysius of Syracuse, 110, 112, 
115, 149
Duffy, Eamon, 35, 45, 48
Eliot, T. S., 42, 44, 79
entelechy, 7, 11
Epaminondas, xviii, 73, 103, 110, 
112, 116–23, 126–27, 144–45, 
147, 164, 172, 199n37, 200n43
213
Epicureanism, 72, 82–83
epistemology, xii, 6, 17, 105, 181, 
195n1
eternal vs. temporal, xiv, 19–20, 25, 
27, 50, 65, 88
experience, xvi, 27, 63–64, 79, 84, 
90–95, 128
figure/figural interpretation, 24–25
final cause. See under causality
Fontana, Biancamaria, 139, 142, 
150
forgiveness, 125–27
form, xiv, 7, 8–9, 13, 14, 25, 31, 58, 
61, 195n1
Foster, Michael B., 38
Frame, Donald M., 5, 54
freedom, xiv, xviii–xix, 18, 21, 22, 
26–27, 57–58, 92, 102–4, 107–8, 
126, 144–45, 151–52, 155–79, 
176; of judgment, xv–xvi, 6, 30, 
66–67, 78, 152, 153; of speech, 
177–78
Friedrich, Hugo, 5
generosity, 165–68, 169, 172, 179, 
205n39; distinguished from Ar-




Hanson, Victor Davis, 116–17
Henry of Navarre, 139, 153
hierarchy of being, xiv, 16, 37, 54, 
65, 66, 73, 75–76, 86, 100–101, 
136, 151, 186n11
Hobbes, Thomas, xii, 12, 101, 
104–5, 107–8, 149, 196nn3–4, 
198n17
Homer, 114–16, 123, 127, 132, 
198n23
Horace, 89
humanism, Renaissance, xi–xii; 
Todorov on, xi–xii, 203n10
Hume, David, xii, 78–79, 84, 108





judgment. See under philosophy
Julian, 153
justice, 202n20
Kekes, John, 168–69, 171
Keys, Mary, 193n15, 201n55
Kierkegaard, Søren, 59
Kritzman, Lawrence, 190n5
La Boétie, Etienne de, xix, 106, 152, 
173–74, 176–77, 203n28
La Charité, Raymond, 191n21
Langer, Ullrich, 60, 173
Larmore, Charles, 205n39
law/legal systems, xvii, 138–40, 
201n4, 202n20
Levine, Alan, 195n1
Lewis, C. S., 46, 176
liberty. See freedom
lust, 10, 19, 204n13
Luther, Martin, 34
Lycurgus, 129
lying, 140–41, 148, 205n39
Machiavelli, Niccolò, xii, 63, 135, 
141–42, 148, 195n1, 196n4, 
197n14, 202n23; on Epaminon-
das, 118, 120–21, 126–27
metaphysics, xii–xiii, 6, 11, 90–91
Montaigne, Michel de: as “a new 
figure,” 24–25, 75–76, 78, 181, 
184; aversion to drugs and 
medicine, 191n25; on his change-
ability and consistency, 25–26, 
32; educational views, xix, 65, 69, 
80, 160, 175–76; essay form and 
features, xi, xiii, xvi, 21–22, 27, 
51, 55, 78–86, 109; father’s pres-
ence in Essays, 23, 36–37, 47–48; 
friendships, xviii–xix, 173–75; 
214 Index
on history, 69; M.’s memory, 
58–59, 91, 126; nonchalant at-
titude, 173, 205n32; personal 
qualities, 12, 75, 124, 151, 158, 
175, 178, 196n1; political views, 
xii–xiv, xvi–xvii, 17, 63, 99–105, 
128–31, 150, 155, 169–71, 
195n1; purpose of Essays, 14, 15, 
45, 65, 100, 194n21; rejection of 
Aristotelian tradition, xii–xiii, 7, 
28, 51, 54, 88, 91, 94, 100, 128, 
148, 158, 186n10, 188n7, 190n5, 
194n16, 195n1; religious views, 
xiv–xv, 29–50, 53, 152–53, 187–
88nn2–5, 196n1; self-revelation, 
xviii, xix, 45, 57, 64, 133, 144, 
148, 166, 167, 183; Travel Jour-
nal, 29, 48–49, 106, 151
essays: “Apology for Raymond 
Sebond,” 6, 16, 23, 36, 39–43, 
47, 51, 57, 62, 63, 74, 86, 
153, 193n13, 202n20; “By 
Diverse Means We Arrive at 
the Same End,” xvi–xvii, 11, 
61, 109–17, 122–24, 127, 132, 
142–43, 149, 160, 161, 165, 
202n23; “Cowardice, Mother 
of Cruelty,” 115, 159; “It Is 
Folly to Measure the True and 
the False by Our Own Capac-
ity,” 36, 39, 42, 48, 83, 152; 
“Of the Art of Discussion,” 
178; “Of Cato the Younger,” 
8, 71; “Of Coaches,” 47, 153; 
“Of Cripples,” 14, 91, 190n5; 
“Of Cruelty,” 47, 54, 67, 77, 
158–59, 161, 165, 202n20; “Of 
Custom,” 33, 54–55, 101, 137; 
“Of the Disadvantage of Great-
ness,” 62, 84, 106, 108; “Of 
Diversion,” 132–33, 147; “Of 
Drunkenness,” 147; “Of the 
Education of Children,” xviii, 
65, 80, 145, 160, 175–76; “Of 
Experience,” xvi, 10, 27, 90–91, 
93–95, 194n16, 194n22; “Of 
Freedom of Conscience,” 153; 
“Of Friendship,” 173–75; “Of 
Giving the Lie,” 140–41; “Of 
Glory,” 104; “Of Husbanding 
Your Will,” 37, 163–64, 170, 
172; “Of Idleness,” 56; “Of the 
Inconsistency of Our Actions,” 
9, 25, 26, 70; “Of Liars,” 
141; “Of the Most Outstand-
ing Men,” 73, 116, 118; “Of 
Physiognomy,” 149, 159; “Of 
the Power of the Imagination,” 
11, 58, 83, 132, 190n5; “Of 
Practice,” 8; “Of Prayers,” 30, 
187n4; “Of Presumption,” 52, 
75, 80, 152; “Of Prognostica-
tions,” 74; “Of Repentance,” 8, 
38, 135, 164; “Of the Resem-
blance of Children to Fathers,” 
191n25; “Of the Useful and 
the Honorable,” 26, 121, 
202n20; “Of Vain Subtleties,” 
32, 42, 48, 53, 61–62, 129; “Of 
Vanity,” 20, 99; “Of Various 
Outcomes of the Same Plan,” 
150, 202n23; “On Some Verses 
of Virgil,” 9–10, 133, 143–44; 
“To the Reader,” 6, 11, 14, 17, 
45, 88–89, 100, 121, 136
Nakam, Géralde, 202n23
Nepos, Cornelius, 117–18, 199n37
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 172
Numa, 34
Oakshott, Michael, 46, 47, 79, 105, 
107, 142, 155–56, 167–68, 169, 
172
O’Connor, Flannery, 204n22
original sin, 16, 74
Pascal, Blaise, xii, 45–46, 191n19; 
on M.’s style, 79
Paul, Saint, 76
perfection, Aristotle vs. M. on, xiv, 
7, 9, 14–16, 19, 37–38, 141, 184
Index 215
Petrarch, 156
philosophy: Aristotle’s conception 
of, 5–7, 17, 19, 27–28, 37–38, 56, 
65, 77, 92–94; as judgment, 51–
76, 93–94, 182–83, 191nn21–22, 
195n1; as knowledge of good and 
evil, 16; Hobbes’s definition of, 
12, 191n20; M.’s reordering of, 
87–90, 181–82
Pieper, Josef, 32–33, 36, 49
Plato, 5, 72, 76, 80, 82, 99, 162
Plutarch, 112–13, 116–17, 193n13
Pompey the Great, 110, 122




pride, 16–17, 38, 105–6, 107–8, 
133, 144
privation, 6–7
Protestantism, 34. See also 
Reformation
public vs. private realms, 17–18, 88, 
133, 135–37, 143, 149, 156, 170, 
182, 205n28
Quint, David, 117–18, 142–43
reason, xv, 6, 16, 25, 55, 62–64, 
67–68, 76, 128, 138; faith and, 
31, 40–43, 63; “ravishment” of, 
161–63, 204n14
Reformation, xv, 34–36, 54, 147, 
152–53
repentance, 38–39
representation, xv, 57–58, 61, 70
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, xii, 102, 
108, 179, 197n13
Schaefer, David Lewis, 195n1
Schmitt, Carl, 200n47
Schneewind, J. B., 156
Scholasticism, 5–6
Screech, M. A., 23
Scruton, Roger, 48
Sebond, Raymond, 23, 36, 39–42
Seneca, 5
Sève, Bernard, 205n39
shame, 16, 18, 47, 82, 88, 143–44
skepticism, 42, 51, 62, 155, 156, 
205n39
Slade, Francis, 9, 21, 34, 104, 135, 
197n14, 200n47
slavery/servitude, xv, xviii, 75, 
92–93, 99–106, 111–12, 145; 
voluntary servitude, xix, 106–7
Smith, Malcolm, 152, 187n3
society, emergence of modern, xiii–
xix, 18, 46, 49, 78–79, 87, 126, 
128, 135–53, 181
Socrates, 56, 59, 65–66, 72–73, 





Stoicism, 82, 109, 124, 160, 163, 
165, 193n13
suicide, 76
Sulla, Lucius Cornelius, 110, 112–
13, 122
Tarn, W. W., 198n20
Thomas Aquinas, Saint, 5, 31, 39, 
188n7, 193n15, 204nn13–14, 
204n16
Timoleon, 131
Todorov, Tzvetan, xi–xii, 58, 94
tradition, 32–34. See also custom
vice, xvii–xviii, 13, 47, 67–68, 72, 
130, 140, 143–44, 146–48, 163; 
vicious means, xvii, 129, 131–33
virtue, xvii–xviii, 16, 18, 47, 54, 
129, 133, 143, 146–48, 160–65, 
169; distinguished from good-
ness, 67, 158, 160, 163
Weil, Simone, 128–29
will, 74, 76, 107, 174
216 Index
